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Abstract
The chapters in this thesis tackle different questions, but share the attempt to open the "black
box" of the relationship between institutions and economic outcomes.
In the first chapter, I examine mass media's role in countering special interest group influence by
studying county-level support for US Senate candidates from 1980 to 2002. I use the concentration
of campaign contributions from Political Action Committees to proxy capture of politicians by
special interests, and compare the reaction to increases in concentration by voters covered by two
types of media markets - in-state and out-of-state media markets. Unlike in-state media markets,
out-of-state markets focus on neighboring states' politics and elections. Consistent with the idea
that citizens punish political capture exposed in the media, I find that an increase in concentration
of special interest contributions reduces candidate's vote shares in in-state counties relative to the
out-of-state counties, where the candidate receives less coverage.
The second chapter (with Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson) examines the effect of popula-
tion growth on violent conflict. Exploiting the international epidemiological transition starting in
the 1940s, we construct an instrument for changes in population (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2007) and
find that countries with higher (exogenous) increases in population experimented larger increases
in social conflict. Using a simple theoretical framework, we interpret these findings as evidence that
a larger population generates greater competition for resources and makes violence more likely if
institutions cannot handle the higher level of disputes.
The third dissertation chapter asks the following question: if property rights in land are so
beneficial, why are they not adopted more widely? I propose a theory based on the idea that
limited property rights over peasants' plots may be supported by elite landowners to achieve two
goals. First, limited property rights reduce peasants' income from their own plots, generating a
cheap labour force. Second, they force peasants to remain in the rural sector to protect their
property, even if job opportunities appear in the urban sector. The theory identifies conditions
under which weak property rights institutions emerge, and provides a specific mechanism for the
endogenous persistence of inefficient rural institutions.
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Thesis Supervisor: Abhijit Banerjee
Title: Ford International Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
Media Markets, Special Interests, and
Voters
1.1 Introduction
Interest groups pursue different strategies to influence policy'. These include gathering information
that supports their positions, taking their arguments to politicians and the public to win sympathy,
and undertaking disruptive activities to coerce policymakers into making concessions (Grossman &
Helpman, 2001). Yet, the activity that receives perhaps the most attention from media, the public,
academia, and policymakers, is interest groups' campaign contributions to parties and candidates
as a vehicle for influencing policy.
How can these practices be avoided? In a democracy, elections form the most basic safeguard
against potential undue influence of interest groups through campaign money. If financial support
from special interest groups appears improper, voters may punish the candidate by voting against
him. Of course, for this mechanism to be valid voters need to be well informed. Since the main
source of political information for voters is mass media, the presence of a free, independent mass
media is a key component of democratic political institutions.
In this paper, I examine the role of mass media in countering special interest group influence.
I do so by examining the extent to which county-level support for candidates to the United States
Senate from 1980 to 2002 varies as a function of media exposure and candidates' campaign finance
'I thank Sarah Hamilton and participants of the MIT/Harvard Development Seminar and MIT Political Economy
Breakfast for comments, in particular, Maria Angelica Bautista, Melissa Dell, Dave Donaldson, James Feyrer, Jens
Hainmueller, Horacio Larreguy, Gabe Lenz, Samuel Pienknagura, Vince Pons, and Pablo Querubin.
profiles.
To measure media exposure, I rely on the geographical patterns of TV markets. More specifi-
cally, I use the Areas of Dominance Influence (ADI's) for TV markets defined by Arbitron (a media
and marketing research firm). These areas define each television market exclusive of the others,
based on the geographic distribution of television viewers. Every county is allocated exclusively to
one ADI, and each market's ADI is the set of counties in which the home market stations receive
a preponderance of viewing. A simple example with the Denver-CO and Lincoln-NE ADI's is de-
picted in Figure 1. Most counties of the Denver-CO ADI lie in Colorado. Consequently, this is
a Colorado-centered media market that focuses on providing information about Colorado politics.
However, as seen in the figure, ADIs trascend state borders and a few counties in Wyoming and
Nebraska are in the Denver-CO ADI. These counties, therefore, are more likely to get information
about Colorado politics than about their own states. For example, a Nebraska county of this type
is exposed to less information about Nebraska state politics than the counties in the Area of Dom-
inance Influence of the Lincoln-NE market shown in the figure (a media market largely comprised
of Nebraska counties and thus centered in Nebraska).
I follow Ansolabehere et al. (2006) in defining the dominant state of a media market (ADI)
to be the state that has a majority of the population of that media market. I refer to counties
in ADI's dominated by their own state as "in-state" counties. Likewise, a county is in a media
market that is out-of-state dominated if the state the county is in has a minority of the population
of the media market. Ansolabehere et al. (2006) show that voters in out-of-state markets receive
much less television coverage of their state's politics than voters covered by in-state media markets.
Thus, comparing the behavior of in-state market voters with voters in out-of-state media markets
provides one possible approach to examine the role of mass media.
I use campaign contribution data to construct a proxy for "capture" of politicians by special
interests. In particular, I use data on contributions from Political Action Committees (PACs) to
candidates to build Herfindahl concentration indices, at both the PAC and more aggregate industry
levels. The idea behind this approach is that a more concentrated pattern of contributions (i.e.,
a high Herfindahl index) is a good proxy for the extent to which a candidate is "captured" by
narrow interest groups. Put differently, candidates with more dispersed contribution sources are
preferred by voters because they are less susceptible to capture by one of the (many) interest groups
sponsoring them.
My main finding is that an increase in the concentration of campaign contributions leads to
a differential response from voters across different media markets. The estimates suggest that
the share of the two-party vote for an incumbent with a Herfindahl index one-standard deviation
higher than average will be about 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points lower in in-state counties relative to
out-of-state counties, where the candidate receives less coverage.
I address the concern that these results may be driven by the fact that counties in out-of-state
dominated media markets are different in other dimensions to in-state counties. In particular,
the negative impact of the interaction between campaign contribution concentration and increased
media exposure is present in specifications with county fixed effects, which rely solely on varia-
tion in the Herfindahl indices across time within the same county to estimate the coefficient of
interest. Also, I focus on in-state counties that are geographically contiguous to out-of-state coun-
ties. After demonstrating that they are similar to out-of-state counties on a number of observable
characteristics, I reestimate the effect using solely these observations and find similar results.
I perform an additional robustness check with a placebo test designed to verify whether the
movement from in-state to out-of-state counties captures a general geographic trend in the response
to concentrated contributions that is unrelated with media exposure. To this end, I define the in-
state counties that border out-of-state counties to be the (placebo) out-of-state counties. Then, I
compare them to adjacent in-state counties in the same state. Since these sets of counties are both
in-state counties with good access to information, there should be no correlation between increases in
concentration and moving across county categories. Indeed, I find no correlation between increases
in concentration and moving across county categories.
As noted, I use the pattern of campaign contributions as the main proxy for political capture
by interest groups. Conveniently, I can build a simple measure for every representative based on
campaign finance data alone. Still, it is important to take a step back and ask how voters think
about special interest money. Historical anecdotes and the press' treatment of campaign money
seems to indicate a clear answer: most voters dislike campaigns fueled by interest money. However,
the answer is not obvious. When special interest groups have an informational advantage, their
contributions may signal candidate quality. My results suggest, however, that voters assess interest
group money negatively. Also, I present evidence that they do so in a relatively sophisticated way.
Specifically, voters punish total interest group money less than they punish concentration of interest
group money from a few sectors. These results support the idea that voters punish "capture" of
politicians by narrow interest groups.
A related point is whether the suggested mechanism demands an unrealistic degree of knowledge
on the part of voters. But even if individuals do not know the approximate pattern of campaign
contributions (a reasonable assumption for most voters), a candidate with a more concentrated
pattern of contributions is prone to being pinpointed by journalists or his opponent as potentially
"captured." Such a candidate is likely to figure in ads and news as linked to the economic sectors
that heavily contribute to his campaign.
To verify that this is the case, I conduct automated news searches for a sample of US newspapers,
counting how frequently are Senate candidates featured in news stories. For each candidate, I also
count the number of stories that discuss PAC money in the campaign ("PAC stories"). The results
are reassuring about the validity of the approach. There is a positive and significant correlation be-
tween the share of PAC stories for a candidate and the candidate's Herfindahl concentration index.
This suggests that the concentration indices do proxy for media exposure of campaign contribution
profiles. An additional important advantage of this exercise is that it helps address the concern
that campaign finance concentration captures some other omitted candidate characteristics which
differentially affect their performance across counties (e.g. if candidates with higher Herfindahls
are more or less "popular"). Indeed, by computing the number of PAC stories as a share of the
candidates' total number of stories, I directly normalize by how popular or appealing the candidate
is in the media. And, more compellingly, there is in fact no correlation between the candidates'
Herfindahl and his total number of news stories2.
Moreover, additional results highlight the role of information and the robustness of the main
results. Given that a large theoretical and empirical literature suggests an association between
better information and higher turnout, I examine whether turnout is higher in-state than out-of-
state. I find that in-state counties do have larger turnout than their (otherwise similar) contiguous,
out-of-state neighbors. My estimates imply a 1.7 to 2 percentage point higher turnout in in-state
counties. Furthermore, a regression of turnout on a dummy for the placebo out-of-state counties
versus other in-state neighbors finds no effect, which confirms the hypothesis that information (not
other differences resulting from moving toward out-of-state counties) drives differences in turnout.
This set of results opens the discussion concerning whether the concentration of campaign
finance money for Senate candidates has negative spillovers for fellow party members running for
other offices. To test this idea, I examine if in years where, for example, the Democratic senator has
2 The only drawback of this exercise is that online newspaper archives are typically available only since the 1990s
(at best). Hence, I cannot systematically code the share of PAC stories as an alternative measure of "capture"
to replicate my main specifications with this variable. However, as indicated the correlations where information is
available lend support to the validity of the approach.
a relatively high Herfindahl, the Democratic Presidential (or House) candidate tends to do worse in
in-state counties relative to out-of-state counties. I find no important spillover effects of this sort3 .
This non-result, however, reaffirms that the main findings are not driven by partisan trends.
Indeed, a potentially serious objection to my findings is that partisanship moves in different direc-
tions in different counties across different years. Unfortunately, I cannot control for a full set of
county-year fixed effects, since the variation I use to estimate the key interaction terms is at this
level. However, the regressions for Presidential and Congressional races can in fact be thought of as
placebo tests to rule out this interpretation. If important partisan trends were driving the results,
specifications with vote share of fellow party members as the dependent variable should mirror the
effects observed for the vote share of the incumbent.
In sum, the overall evidence presented in this paper supports the idea that mass media, by
informing voters, may reduce the influence of special interest groups in policy. Better access to
mass media allows voters to react to potentially negative information about their candidates, and
specifically to the possible influence of narrow interests in the politicians' agenda.
The results also reaffirm the idea that patterns of special interest campaign contributions signal
political capture of representatives to voters. The fear of politicians' capture has long been prevalent
in the United States politics and mass media, and some of the most famous political scandals have
involved the alleged use of contributions in exchange for favors4 . The subject most recently hit the
headlines in connection with the recent financial meltdown. Analysts have emphasized the political
force of Wall Street banks in Washington as the fundamental cause of the crisis. While certainly
not their sole source of influence, campaign contributions are among the perceived sources of power
for special interests. Johnson & Kwak (2010) express it clearly:
Financial sector money poured into the campaign war chests of congressional represen-
tatives (...) Campaign contributions and the revolving door between the private sector
3I also find little evidence of other types of information spillovers. For example, it does not appear that voters in
out-of-state counties rely on partisan cues and punish the candidate of the party with a high Herfindahl index in the
neighboring state (from which they receive information), nor that they rely on comparisons between the campaign
finance profiles of candidates in their state with those in neighboring states.
'The topic has been at the center of the policy debate since at least 1957, when allegations of improper influence
of this sort led Senate to establish the Special Committee to Investigate Political Activities, Lobbying, and Campaign
Contributions. A famous earlier attempt to control interest money was President Theodore Roosevelt's argument,
in 1905, for a ban on all political contributions by corporations, and his call, in 1907, for public financing of federal
candidates via candidates' political parties. In 1989, the "Keating Five" scandal (so named because it involved five
senators accused of improperly intervening in 1987 on behalf of Charles H. Keating, Jr.) attracted public attention.
Keating provided substantial political contributions to each involved senator and was chairman of Lincoln Savings
and Loan Association, an institution targeted in investigations by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in the midst
of the Savings and Loan crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
and government service gave Wall Street banks influence in Washington, but their ulti-
mate victory lay in shifting the conventional wisdom in their favor (...) Of course, when
cracks appeared in the consensus, such as in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the
banks could still roll out their conventional weaponry- campaign money and lobbyists
(p. 5).
Similar concerns about the influence of banks before and during the financial crisis and subsequent
bank reform arose in the recent "mid-term elections." To cite one example, one perspective noted
that Spencer Bachus (R.-Ala), the man most likely to become chairman of the House Financial
Services Committee "received well over a million dollars from political action committees repre-
senting banks, insurance companies and auditors over the past two election cycles. And wasting no
time, on Wednesday, reports the Financial Times, Bachus sent a letter to the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (...) that reads as if dictated by bank lobbyists"5.
In short, in the US as in many countries there is a general perception that special interest
groups can exercise to some degree the levers of power, using campaign contributions as a primary
instrument to do so. Yet, there also exist key institutions, free media among them, that exert
control over such influence. For instance, many argue that an active, informative press reduced
corruption in the Progressive Era6. Discussing the period of antitrust reform in the early XXth
Century, Acemoglu & Robinson (2010) highlight the role of a free press to expose the excesses of
Robber Barons as well as corruption in local and federal politics. Among the examples discussed,
one of the most telling about the potential of a free press to counter special interest influence is
that of famous "muckraker" Ira Tarbell. Tarbell wrote the "History of the Standard Oil Company,"
which played a key role in moving public opinion against Rockefeller and his business interests in
Standard Oil.
As Acemoglu & Robinson (2010) note, the US experience in the first half of the 20th century
emphasizes that free media is a key component of the set of "inclusive institutions" that determine
economic success. Absent these institutions, under absolutism or under dictatorships, the US public
probably would not have mobilized against the power and abuses of Robber Barons and their trusts.
5 "Republicans begin carving up bank reform", by Andre Leonard. In Salon, November 4, 2010.
http://www.salon.com/technology/howtheworldworks/2010/11/04/spencerbachuswall_streets_
man in _ washington/index.html
6Along these lines, Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that the US newspaper industry between 1870 and 1920, which
expanded its circulation and became more informative and less partisan, partly caused the decline of political corrup-
tion in that period. Moreover, the entry of US daily newspapers from 1869-1928 produced a more active electorate,
increasing voter turnout (Gentzkow et al., 2009).
The evidence in this paper supports this view that mass media, by informing voters, constitutes
a vital component of the "inclusive institutions" which promote political and economic development
by reducing the influence of special interest groups in policy.
1.1.1 Related literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature, most notably, to the relatively recent but
fast-growing economics literature on the political economy of mass media (see Prat & Str6mberg
(2010)).
A central topic in this line of research is the role of free media in affecting policy and improving
political accountability7 . Although not focused on the potential effect of better information on
reduced interest group influence, several empirical papers show how availability of information
empowers voters and affects policy (see, for instance, Str6mberg (2004b) and Besley & Burgess
(2002)). Snyder and Str6mberg's (2010) work, which estimates the impact of press coverage on
citizen knowledge, politicians' actions, and policy, closely relates to this paper. The authors exploit
the match, or "congruence" between newspaper markets and US congressional districts. Varying
congruence causes news coverage of politics to vary across districts, but unlike other measures of
media availability, it does not directly affect key outcome variables of interest. Results are largely
supportive of the key role of media in facilitating political accountability. Along these lines but
in a developing country context, Ferraz & Finan (2008) find that news about local corruption as
uncovered by (randomly assigned) audit reports on Brazil's municipal mayors hurts incumbent's
electoral performance. Furthermore, these effects are more pronounced in municipalities where
local radio is present to divulge the information. In a field experiment, Banerjee et al. (2010)
provide Indian slum dwellers with newspapers containing report cards on candidate qualifications
and performance. The results indicate that better information increases voter turnout, reduces the
incidence of cash-based vote buying, and causes electoral gains for better performing incumbents.
This paper follows this line of research by studying the role of free media on improving political
accountability, and in particular in changing the electoral support for certain types of candidates.
However, unlike previous work, it emphasizes the role of mass media in countering special interest
7 Several theoretical contributions imply a role of media in countering special interest group influence. For instance,
in Stromberg's (2001, 2004a) theory, mass media counteracts special interest group influence for two reasons. First,
the increasing returns to scale nature of their technology and their need for advertising revenue induce media outlets
to provide news to large groups rather than small interests. Thus, mass media entices politicians to "pay more
attention" to the better-informed, larger audience. Second, by reducing the share of uninformed voters, free media
reduces the effectiveness of advertising purchased with campaign contributions.
group influence.
In terms of the empirical strategy, the differences between in-state and out-of-state counties
exploited in this paper were first studied by Ansolabehere et al. (2006). While these authors study
a different question, my results may explain their surprising result: no effect of television coverage
on the incumbency advantage for senators and governors. This runs against the conventional view
that the rise of television played an important part in the rise of the incumbency advantage in
the US (see, e.g. Erickson (1995)). This conventional logic is largely based on two premises.
First, incumbents have an advantage when raising campaign funds. Second, television maximized
the impact of campaign funds by facilitating personal appeal to voters. Both premises may well
be true, but television can also inform voters about potentially negative candidate traits. With
concentration of campaign contributions acting as a proxy for the degree of capture, this paper
shows that incumbents (more so than challengers) are likely to be depicted as captured in media
markets and get punished by voters.
The paper is also related to a vast empirical and theoretical literature on campaign contri-
butions. Much of the theoretical work assumes that there are "informed voters" who vote for
candidates based on their policy positions, and "uninformed" voters who can be swayed by cam-
paign advertising. Funds for advertising, provided by interest groups, depend upon the positions
taken by the candidates, and these positions take their implications for contributions and votes
into account (Morton & Cameron (1992) offer an early review) 8. While this work incorporates the
response of voters to overall campaign expenditures, less research investigates how the sources of
money raised by politicians influence voters. This occurs partly because the approach described
above assumes that "uninformed" voters do not have rational expectations. As emphasized by
Coate (2004), if they did, they could realize that a party involved in advertising must distort its
policy platform to obtain the necessary funds, and switch their votes against the advertised party!
Similarly, the empirical work has focused mostly on the effect of gross campaign expenditures on
electoral outcomes and in altering policy positions or securing favors (see Stratmann (2005) for a
review).
More recent work reviewed in Prat (2006) seeks to provide a more satisfying analysis assuming
that voters update their beliefs rationally. In this approach, private campaign finance creates
8A much-cited contribution by Grossman & Helpman (1996) builds on Baron (1994) offering a model in which
campaign giving by interest groups may be motivated by both an electoral motive (help politicians with favorable
positions win elections) and by an influence motive (a straightforward quid pro quo of money for services).
a trade-off between a policy distortion and an informational benefit. In equilibrium, qualified
candidates receive more contributions than unqualified candidates, and this provides voters with
information about candidates' quality. However, candidates may need to distort their policy choices
(away from voters' interests) in order to attract private donations. An empirical exercise inspired
by these theories of campaign finance with rational voters is conducted by Prat et al. (2006). Using
a survey-based dataset about the effectiveness of state legislators in North Carolina, they ask what
voters can learn about the candidate characteristics from the amount and pattern of contributions
received during the campaign9.
Only a few other papers have examined the impact of campaign finance composition on voter
behavior10 . Vanberg (2008) uses data on the US House of Representatives from 1990 to 2002 and
finds no evidence of a negative relation between a candidate's reliance on large contributions and
votes1 1 .
Instead, Dharmapala & Palda (2002) find a negative relationship between the concentration of
contributions and vote shares for open-seat candidates and challengers in the US House from 1980
to 1992, with no robust relation for the incumbents' 2 . As a potential explanation, they suggest, in
line with the argument put forward in this paper, that interest groups seek favors for themselves,
and thus are in conflict with each other and with the voters. Therefore, if campaign contributions
are instrumental in securing these favors, candidates with more dispersed contribution sources are
less susceptible to being captured by any one group and are preferred by voters13 . However, they
admit that causality may run the other way: candidates with a higher likelihood of winning may
9They find that the total amount a candidate receives is a weak predictor of that candidate's effectiveness, and
that small-sized (large) contributions from organizations positively (negatively) signal effectiveness. They conclude
that the evidence contradicts the informational argument in favor of private funding when contributions are large
or when they come from individuals and parties. Experimental results by Houser & Stratmann (2008) support the
prediction that voters respond to advertising differently between special interest and publicly-financed campaigns.
'
0Aside from those cited, see also Palda & Palda (1998) who suggest French voters punish candidates who raise
money from narrow sources.
"His motivation is to examine one argument in support of contribution limits: that they equalize the influence
of individual donors and thereby cause candidates' aggregate financial resources to more accurately reflect public
support. To capture this idea, he proposes a model in which candidates' reliance on large contributions (controlling
for the total amount of contributions they receive) is negatively related to voter-preferred characteristics which cannot
be credibly revealed through campaign advertisements. He thus suggests his result casts doubt on the relevance of
the "equalization" argument.
'
2Their motivation is to dispute the Supreme Court's view in Buckley v. Valeo that campaign spending is a form
of speech, but campaign contributions are not. An empirical link between the sources of a candidate's contributions
and that candidate's share of the vote, they argue, would suggest contributions are a form of speech as well.
'
3An alternative account for why voters may respond positively to the degree of dispersion of a candidate's con-
tributions is also discussed. Interest groups are "benign", in the sense that their interests are identical to those of
each other, and of the voters. However, the groups have private information concerning the best way to achieve
the common aims and their contributions are a way of buying access to legislators. Hence, a candidate with more
dispersed contribution sources may end up being better informed.
attract a wider pattern of contributions.
This paper differs from Dharmapala & Palda (2002) in various ways. By exploiting the differ-
ential impact of concentrated patterns of contributions across different media markets, I attempt
to rule out the reverse causality story. In fact, using this approach I find higher concentration is
positively correlated on average with incumbent vote shares in out-of-state markets where infor-
mation is poorer. An offsetting negative correlation only arises in in-state media markets. Also,
I find no significant effects on challengers from my main interaction of interest-namely, the effect
of increased concentration in contributions together with increased media exposure. Instead, my
results are robust only for the incumbents, which is reasonable in light of the well-established fact
that incumbents receive more media coverage than their opponents (see, e.g. Kahn (1993)).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2, I spell out the basic research design and
describe the main data used in the paper (a Data Appendix presents a more complete description
of the variables and sources of the analysis). Section 1.3 presents the main results for the impact of
concentration of campaign contribution on incumbent vote shares across different media markets.
In this section, I also present a number of robustness checks, including the placebo test designed to
verify the identification hypothesis that the results are not driven by geographic characteristics or
distance from the media center of the state. The section also shows that, unlike concentration, total
share of money from interest groups does not affect incumbent senators differentially across media
markets. The section concludes by showing that concentration indices are positively correlated with
the relative frequency of news stories about candidates' campaign money. Next, Section 1.4 shows
that the main results are not driven by partisan trends, and finds little evidence of information
spillovers across members of the same party, whether in the same or neighboring states. Section 1.5
demonstrates that the results of the paper are not sensitive to the exact classification of counties
into those dominated by in-state or out-of-state media markets. I conclude in Section 1.6.
1.2 Empirical Strategy
1.2.1 Design and specification
Like Ansolabehere et al. (2006), I examine the impact of mass media on voters' response to politi-
cians' campaign-finance profiles by exploiting the structure of media markets. Since television is
the primary source of political news for voters (Ansolabehere et al., 1993), I focus on TV markets.
More concretely, I compare results in Senate elections for counties with media markets centered in
their own state (henceforth, I will often refer to these simply as "in-state" counties), with those
whose media markets are centered in a city of a neighboring state ("out-of-state" counties).
In out-of-state counties, news focuses on the neighboring state politics and elections. As a
result, voters receive much less television coverage of their state's politics than voters covered by
in-state media markets. Ansolabehere et al. (2006) present evidence indicating that being in-state
versus out-of-state is more clearly a function of actual television coverage than other measures of
media market structure that have been used in the literature, such as fragmentation or number
of television stations. They searched the on-line archives of 90 stations affiliated with 51 media
markets for stories that mention the governors of states. News programs aired 10 times as many
stories about the in-state governor than they did of governors from neighboring states covered by the
media market. Moreover, the number of stories of the out-of-state governors was typically extremely
small, and on the order of noise. They further report data from the National Election Studies of
1974 and 1978, which contain information to determine the type of market respondents reside in,
confirming that these differences on coverage have consequences on voter knowledge. About 70%
of respondents of in-state counties report that they saw a Senate candidate on television during the
campaign, compared to only 50% of respondents in out-of-state counties, and this is statistically
significant at the 0.01 level.
These observations suggest comparing the response of voters to the campaign profiles of can-
didates depending on whether they are located in in-state or in out-of-state media markets. The
following regression model provides the simplest comparison of this sort:
Vi = 7sxPr + OtxPI +3ininc +3h h +3hoh (1.1)
+ 3 inxI (inc x h, ) +#/inxhO (inc x ho) +#' Xcst + esct.
In (1.1), c indexes counties, s states, and t time. The superscript I is for incumbent and 0 for his
opponent. The dependent variable, V{, is the share of the two-party vote received by the incumbent
candidate running for the Senate in county c at time t; inc is a dummy variable equal to one if
the county is in-state and zero if it is out-of-state; h, is the Herfindahl concentration index of
special-interest campaign contributions to the incumbent (ho is the corresponding measure for the
opponent); and Xc,, is a vector of additional controls. Demeaned variables are shown in bold. I
demean Herfindahl indices before interacting them, so that the coefficient on the main effect for inc
shows the impact measured at the mean values of h, and ho. The impact of h, on the incumbent
vote share is #Ar for out-of-state counties and #Ar +#/inxh for in-state counties (and similarly for
hg). Throughout the paper, I cluster standard errors at the county level.
This specification includes a full set of year and state "times incumbent party" fixed effects
(0 txpr and -yxpr respectively). Year fixed effects interacted with the incumbent's party are im-
portant to capture national political or economic tides, such as presidential coattails, systematic
presidential punishment at the midterm, or any other general trends in political tides or economic
variables (e.g. unemployment, inflation) that could affect election results in all counties. Including
a full set of state-incumbent party fixed effects 7yxpi is important for several reasons. First, the
state fixed effects focus the comparison between in-state and out-of-state counties within the same
state. Thus, since in all counties within a state the same two candidates are running for Senate
at each time period, I can hold the candidates running, the closeness of the election, and other
features of the race constant. This comparison is very useful, as it is typically hard to control for
issues like candidate quality. Finally, to capture the average partisanship of each state s, YsxPr
also includes a dummy variable for the party of the incumbent and its interaction with state fixed
effects.
The main coefficients of interest are #inxhi and #inx o. I expect #inxhr to be negative, implying
that when the incumbent's campaign money comes from relatively few economic sectors (a high
h,), voters residing in in-state counties are more likely to find out and punish the incumbent
relative to voters in out-of-state counties. With a similar logic, I expect #inxho to be positive.
However, there are some threats to the correct identification of #inxhr and 3 inxho in (1.1).
One potential issue is that the counties in out-of-state dominated media markets are not an ad-
equate "control group" for in-state counties. As will be shown below, out-of-state counties are
indeed different along a number of dimensions (e.g., they are smaller, less urban, poorer, and ex-
hibit different age and racial composition) compared to in-state counties. These differences are
concerning if these characteristics influence voters' preferences in ways that lead them to vote more
for or against candidates with concentrated campaign contributions. If this is the case, the effect
attributed to media exposure may actually be driven by these other differences between counties.
I implement the simplest solution to this problem by controlling for these county characteristics in
the regression. However, there may persist additional unobserved factors that are not controlled
for and may be generating the results14 .
14In the context of their examination of the incumbency advantage, in order to assuage these concerns Ansolabehere
To address this problem I adopt three additional approaches. First, I estimate (1.1) with the
inclusion of county (times party of the incumbent) fixed effects. In particular, I run the following
regression:
Vi = 'exp+hSty+ 3 hoho (1.2)
+#inxhr (inc X h,) +#inxho (inc X ho) +3'xXcst + Esct.
In (1.2), 7cxP1 denotes a full set of county-times-party fixed effects. Again, the motivation to
interact the partisanship of the incumbent with the county fixed effects comes from having, more
than "pro-incumbent" counties, "heavily democratic" counties and "heavily republican" counties.
In other words, the incumbent party times county fixed effects capture the underlying partisanship
(normal vote) in each county.
While estimation of (1.2) comes at the cost of not estimating the direct effect of in-state status
on the incumbent vote share, any time-invariant characteristic of the counties that could potentially
be generating a spurious relationship is controlled for. Indeed, such specification relies solely on
variation in the Herfindahl indices across time within the same county to estimate the coefficient
of interest. This estimate asks whether in-state counties tend to punish increases in the Herfindahl
index of the candidate more than out-of-state counties.
Equation (1.2) is therefore a much more demanding specification. However, one may still be
concerned that the two sets of counties have distinct trends. If so, the response of an increase in
the Herfindahl index in-state relative to out-of-state may reflect such a differential trend rather
than the effect of media. Thus, as a second potential solution I look for a set of in-state counties
that are more comparable to out-of-state counties. To do this, I focus on in-state counties that
are geographically contiguous to out-of-state counties. After demonstrating that these counties are
indeed more alike out-of-state counties along a number of dimensions, I estimate (1.2) using solely
these observations.
A third relevant robustness check comes from a placebo test designed to verify whether the
movement from in-state toward out-of-state captures a general geographic trend in response to
concentrated contributions that is unrelated with media exposure. In particular, I define the con-
et al. (2006) match the counties with out-of-state media markets with counties with in-state media on several di-
mensions and estimate the size of the incumbency advantage using only the matched counties. This solution may be
preferable in that it relaxes some of the assumptions of the basic regression alternative with added controls, yet the
concern that there are unaccounted factors which are not controlled for remains.
tiguous, in-state counties to be the (placebo) out-of-state counties, and compare them to adjacent
in-state counties. Since these sets of counties are both in-state, there should be no correlation be-
tween increases in concentration and moving across these categories of counties (i.e., the estimated
Ohnxhr and #inxho should be close to zero).
These robustness checks serve to rule out several potential sources of bias. Note that the varia-
tion to estimate the main coefficients of interest comes from changes across time in the Herfindahl
index of the incumbent and his opponent. Thus, while it is still possible that omitted variables
bias the results, these would have to come from time-varying changes (e.g., a change in candidate
quality through time as opposed to a relatively fixed quality trait of the candidate) that are corre-
lated with changes in the campaign concentration indices. Also, some of the additional robustness
checks on the main results to be presented below, such as controlling for a differential impact of
total campaign funds across categories of counties, may help alleviate this kind of concern.
1.2.2 Data
The sources and definitions of all variables are presented in the Data Appendix. Here, I discuss
details concerning the information on media exposure and on campaign contributions, the two most
important aspects of the analysis.
I focus my analysis in the period 1980-2002. The choice of this period is based partly on
data availability and partly on convenience. Campaign finance data from the Federal Elections
Commission (FEC), while available somewhat earlier, is most comparable and believed to be of
best quality since around 1980. The year 2002 is a natural time to stop, since after 2002 changes
in Federal regulation are believed to have impacted the way campaign funds axe raised.
Media exposure
As noted in the Introduction, I follow Ansolabehere et al. (2006) and use the Areas of Dominance
Influence (ADI's), constructed by Arbitron, to define media markets. ADI's define each television
market exclusive of the others, based on the geographic distribution of television viewers. Every
county is allocated exclusively to one ADI, and each market's ADI is the set of counties in which
the home market stations receive a preponderance of viewing15.
is These market definitions are from Broadcast and Cable (1980, 1990, 2000) and were kindly provided by James
Snyder.
I also follow the authors in defining the dominant state of a media market to be the state that
has at least x% (x > 50) of the population of that media market. Likewise, a county is in a media
market that is out-of-state dominated if the state the county is in has less than (100 - x) % of the
population of the media market. Taking population into account in this way is of course crucial as
these are presumably the viewers that advertisers, politicians, and broadcasters are attempting to
reach. When x = 50, every county can be classified as being in- or out-of-state, but such choice may
imply the inclusion of counties in media markets not clearly dominated by any state. A large x, on
the other hand, may exclude too many counties. As in Ansolabehere et al. (2006) I use two-thirds
(x = 66) as as the benchmark threshold, and verify the robustness of my results to other values of
x.
A second important issue is that the boundaries of television markets change over time, as
new media markets are created, and old ones cease to exist by splintering or slow absorption into
other media markets. Moreover, as noted above, I only have definitions of media markets once per
decade. Hence, in the basic analysis, I include counties that were dominated by the same state
throughout the period1 .
A final sample filter considered by Ansolabehere et al. (2006) concerns "overwhelmed" states.
In these states, only a small percentage of the population lives in a media market that is dominated
in state. Politicians and news broadcasts probably do not neglect a large percentage of voters in
this case. For this reason, I drop all counties in states where less than two-thirds of the population
live in in-state dominated media markets.
Campaign contributions
Campaign contributions by special interest groups have been regulated at least since corporate
contributions to parties and candidates were banned by Congress in 1911. This prohibition was
later extended to labor unions and trade associations. These rules were weakly enforced and by
the early 1970s many unions and organizations had formed Political Action Committees (PACs)
to collect contributions for candidates without violating the law. In 1974, the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA) sanctioned this practice, mandating the disclosure of contributions to the
FEC.
161 verified the robustness to the inclusion of all counties and found similar results.
Ansolabehere et al. (2003) summarize the main features of this campaign finance regulation.
The FECA recognizes two main types of campaign organizations: candidate campaign committees
and party committees; and two main sources of funds: individuals and interest groups17.
Under the Act, organizations wishing to contribute to federal candidates and parties must create
PACs (the FECA refers to them as "separate and segregated funds" 18). Moreover, organizations
may not give money directly to the PAC for the purpose of contributing to a federal campaign.
The organization, however, as the sponsor of the PAC (i.e., its "connected organization"), may
absorb all the costs of establishing and operating the committee and soliciting contributions to it
from individuals.
Also, individuals, PACs, and party committees are subject to contribution limits. The con-
straints on PAC contributions are typically not binding. Ansolabehere et al. (2003) note that only
4 percent of all PAC contributions to House and Senate candidates are at or near the $10,000
limit19, and the average PAC contribution is much smaller ($1,700 in their sample). The Act also
limited candidate and group campaign expenditures, but in 1976 the Supreme Court struck down
spending limits as a violation of free speech in Buckley v. Valeo2 .
As Ansolabehere et al. (2003) note, two loopholes in the FECA constraints have received crit-
icism. The first, created by the Buckley v. Valeo court decision, is that individuals, groups, and
corporations are permitted to spend unlimited amounts of "independent expenditures" on behalf of
or against a candidate, as long as they are not coordinated with the candidate or party campaigns.
The second, created by a series of FEC rulings in 1978 and 1979, created a distinction between
"hard money" and "soft money," making spending limits applicable to the former. "Soft money,"
raised through national party organizations for non-federal accounts, may be spent on non-federal
election activities. Individuals and groups may give unlimited amounts to non-federal party funds
for the purpose of party building activities. Such funds, conceived to strengthen party organiza-
1 7 Other sources of funds and campaigning are also allowed but are relatively unimportant in practice. Parties and
candidates may also give to each other, and individuals and groups can raise their own money and run their own
advocacy or independent campaigns on behalf of or against individual candidates.
18 The press and public refer to all nonparty, noncandidate committees as PACs or political action committees.
However, the Act and Commission Regulations distinguish between two types of PACs: separate segregated funds
described above and nonconnected political committees (or nonconnected PACs). A nonconnected political committee
must pay for its own administrative expenses, using the contributions it raises. If an organization spends funds to
establish or support a nonconnected PAC, these expenditures are considered contributions to the PAC and are subject
to the dollar limits and other requirements of the Act.
19This refers to the pre-2002 limit, relevant to my analysis. On Nov 2002, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act increased the contribution limits. See http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/limits.php for an overview of the
changes.
20An exception is presidential spending limits, which survived because they are voluntary: any candidate who
wishes to receive federal funding must abide by the limits.
tions in the individual states, have in practice been used by the national party organizations to
raise money. Although unlimited in amount, independent expenditures and soft party donations
must still be publicly disclosed 21 . A third loophole allows legislators to set up "leadership PACs"
which allow donors to give up to $10,000 to a candidate, but such funds cannot be used on that
candidate's campaigns.
The data on PAC contributions from the FEC provides itemized contributions containing each
contribution or independent expenditure made by a PAC, party committee, candidate committee,
or other federal committee to a candidate during each two-year election cycle. Types of expendi-
tures range from independent expenditures for and against candidates, coordinated expenditures,
financial contributions to candidates, and in-kind contributions. For each interest-group PAC, I
aggregate all financial contributions (24K), and in-kind contribution made to candidates (24Z).
The most important component are 24K's. In my analysis, I exclude independent expenditures for
candidates (24E), because a candidate can more easily distance himself from such contributions (as
noted, by law these contributions should not be coordinated with the candidate).
Classifying contributions
The FEC provides a very rough five-fold categorization of PAC contribution data by industry:
corporation, labor organization, membership organization, trade association, cooperative, and cor-
poration without capital stock. These are categories of the sponsoring (or connected) organization
for the committee, provided on the statement of organization22 . Since these categories are too
broad, I rely on the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) classification system to identify the
interest group of each PAC.
The CRP coding system is hierarchical, with five super-categories (Business, Labor, Ideological/Single-
Issue, Other and Unknown) divided into 13 "sectors," about 100 "industries," and about 400 cat-
egories. The CRP has been classifying PACs since 1990, whereas I study campaign contributions
and election results since 1980. To classify PAC contribution money before 1990, I proceed in two
steps. First, I check whether the pre-1990 contributing PAC survives after 1990. If so, I assign the
2 1 In 2002, amendments to the FECA by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act placed restrictions on soft money
but raised the limits on hard money party contributions.
22 These categories apply for the two kinds of committees studied in this paper: non-party, non-qualified committees
and qualified non-party committees. The first are separate segregated funds and nonconnected committees that have
not qualified as multi-candidate committees, and may currently contribute up to $1,000 per candidate per election.
Qualified non-party committess instead qualify as multi-candidate committees (to this end, they must be registered
for 6 months, have received contributions from more than 50 people, and made contributions to at least 5 federal
candidates) and may currently contribute up to $5,000 per candidate per election.
sector allocated by CRP to the respective PAC to the earlier period. Next, for the set of unmatched
PACs, I follow the guidelines for PAC classification from the CRP23 to identify the committee's
interest group. As shown in greater detail in the Data Appendix, the first step allows me to classify
more than 90% of the pre-1990 contributions (and a larger share of the contribution money). With
the additional classification, over 95% of the contributions were typically matched.
The CRP classification system is likely to match the public's perception of the interest group
behind contributions, not just because it is based on the PAC names and sponsors (the information
easily visible to voters) but also because the general objective of the system and the Center is
precisely to monitor money in politics and inform citizens about this.
1.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables of the analysis. The incumbent share
of the two-party vote is 58% on average (uncontested elections and open seats are not included).
The maximum for this variable is 92%. In a few cases incumbents receive a very low vote share
(the minimum in the sample is 12.6%), but in most of the cases, the incumbent receives a majority
of the vote (the median, not shown in the table, is 57.8%, and in just about one-fourth of the
county-years the incumbent receives less than half the votes).
There are a total of 180 Senate races in the base sample, in which almost exactly half (89)
of the incumbents are Democrats. At the PAC level, the average Herfindahl index of campaign
contributions is about 0.02 (with standard deviation of 0.089) for the incumbents in these races,
and much larger (0.15, standard deviation 0.24) for challengers. A similar pattern is observed at
the industry level, where the contrast is between an average of 0.06 for incumbents (with a standard
deviation of 0.11) and 0.23 for challengers (with a standard deviation of 0.23). Incumbents raise
much more money (on average around $5 million, in 2, 000 constant prices) than their challengers
(around $3 million on average). Of this money, a relatively small percentage comes from special
interests. Over the period, PAC money added on average $1 million for incumbents and about
$300, 000 for challengers per election cycle. There is substantial variation both for incumbents and
challengers in the money raised and the extent of its concentration.
The base sample includes 1, 759 US counties, 86% of which are in-state. When restricting
attention to out-of-state and in-state and contiguous counties, the sample is reduced to 542 counties,
"
3http://www.opensecrets.org/action/ftm/index.php
with roughly one-half classified as in-state (56%).
1.3 Main results
1.3.1 Main results for the full sample of counties
I begin by estimating (1.1) for the sample of US Senate candidates in the period 1980-2002. The
results are shown in Table 2. As noted before, all standard errors in the paper are fully robust
against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the county level. Also, all regressions include a
full set of year (times party of the incumbent) fixed effects, which are not presented in the tables
to save space.
In columns 1-5, the Herfindahl indices are constructed at the PAC level. This is a useful
reference point. These indices rely solely on the extent to which contributions come mostly in the
form of large contributions from relatively few PACs, and thus do not depend on the exact choice
for classifying PACs by industry.
Column 1 estimates (1.1) without any additional controls. The coefficient (0.171) on h, is
positive and significant. This result indicates that in out-of-state counties, an increase in the in-
cumbent's Herfindahl index is correlated with a higher vote share for the incumbent. The estimated
coefficient implies that an incumbent with a one-standard deviation higher Herfindahl index than
the average in the sample (a rise in the index in 0.09, see Table 1) will have an advantage of 1.5
additional percentage points over his opponent in these counties. The coefficient for ho, though
also positive and significant, is much smaller (0.078) and is not robust to the inclusion of controls in
the remaining columns. More important are the results for the interaction coefficients, #i,xrh and
#inxho. Column 1 estimates #inxhI = -0.171, indicating that the positive correlation between the
Herfindahl for the incumbent and the incumbent vote share vanishes for in-state counties. The de-
gree of concentration of the opponent does not seem to affect the incumbent vote share differentially
across media markets, as the point estimate for #inxho, though positive, is small and statistically
insignificant. As mentioned before, that results are present only for the incumbents is reasonable
given the well-established fact that incumbents receive more media coverage than their opponents.
Columns 2-5 examine the robustness of the previous results to the inclusion of several additional
2
'A second reason why this benchmark is useful is the fact that, prior to 1990, the sector of a few PACs in the
dataset could not be established. As noted in the Data Appendix, this is not a major problem as the success in
classifying PAC contributions was quite high. Still, the PAC-level Herfindahl verifies that results are not driven from
differential success in classifying PACs for different candidates or years.
controls. Concerns include whether the patterns of concentration of campaign contributions merely
mirror the pattern of concentration of economic activity in each state at time t, and whether a
change in such degree of concentration may affect the incumbent vote share for reasons unrelated
to the candidate's potential link to interest groups. For such a story to drive the results the effect
would need to differ across the two types of counties, which is not obvious. Still, to guard against
this possibility, in column 2 I include a measure of the degree of concentration of economic activity
in state s at time t (the Herfindahl index of Gross State Product at the sectoral level) as well as
its interaction with the in-state dummy. These variables are significant, but the main coefficient of
interest (#inxhr) is still negative and statistically significant and, moreover, the point estimate is
remarkably stable (-0.168).
A more serious concern may be that the results are driven by other characteristics of a can-
didate's campaign contribution patterns. For instance, candidates with different Herfindahl in-
dices could also be candidates who receive and spend different sums of money in their campaigns.
Moreover, since candidates are subject to contribution limits, there may be a mechanical negative
relationship between the amount of money raised and the Herfindahl index, as raising more money
may necessarily imply raising money from a larger number of PACs (see, however, Ansolabehere
et al. (2003) who show that individual donors grow in importance relative to PAC money as de-
mand for campaign cash increases). Thus, in Column 3 I include the total campaign receipts
by the incumbent and his opponent, as well as the total campaign receipts from interest-group
PACs, as additional controls. The estimated value of #3inxhr decreases slightly in absolute value
(-0.150),remaining significant at more than 99% confidence level. Also, once other campaign con-
tributions patterns are taken into account, 3 inxhO is estimated to be significantly positive. This
lines up with my hypothesis, though the estimated coefficient is still quite small, 0.033.
Column 4 controls for a number of time-varying county characteristics. These include real per
capita income (in 2000 US$ dollars), population, population density, percent of the population
under 18, percent of the population over 65, percent female, percent black, percent urban, and
percent with 12 or more years of education (among people with 25 or more years of age). This
column also includes state income growth as a control, since voters tend to punish incumbent
senators when growth is poor (Levitt & Snyder, 1997). Again, the estimated coefficient for #,xhr
is remarkably stable (-0.150 with a standard error of 0.02), assuaging concerns that results are
driven by other differences between the two types of counties.
While column 4 includes county characteristics, interacting each of these controls by the party
of the incumbent allows us to account for potentially different effects of demographic and social
characteristics on either party. Also, it may be important to interact the campaign finance controls
with the in-state dummy to make sure that the significant interaction of the Herfindahl is not
capturing a potentially differential effect of such variables.
This last exercise is especially useful to rule out a number of plausible alternative mechanisms
driving the results. For instance, candidates with concentrated patterns of campaign contributions
could have different abilities to raise campaign funds (overall, or from connected PACs). Since
campaign funds are used for advertising, this could affect candidates' support in-state relative to
out-of-state. On the one hand, more advertising funds could imply more exposure in in-state TV
markets, and hence a greater difference in candidate support across the two types of counties.
Or, alternatively, more funds could allow candidates to reach to out-of-state voters, reducing such
difference.
Whatever the correlation, failure to account for it may bias the results. For similar reasons,
changes in candidate "quality" (be it objective performance characteristics of the candidate or
other traits such as "charisma") may affect the candidate's electoral performance across different
counties. While such a variable is hard to measure, total campaign receipts may be thought of as
a crude proxy.
For these reasons, column 5 adds, as additional controls, the interaction of each county control
with a dummy for the party of the incumbent as well as the interaction of each of the campaign
finance variables with the in-state dummy. While the point estimate for #inxh decreases in mag-
nitude (from -0.154 to -0.129), it is still highly significant (the standard error is 0.021).
In columns 6-10, I run similar specifications as in columns 1-5, but with the Herfindahl index
calculated at the industry level. While columns 1-5 have the advantage of not depending on any
sort of classification, this exercise is also informative. In principle, a candidate may have a highly
dispersed pattern of contributions across PACs within a single industry, but in this case it would be
desirable to interpret his pattern of contributions as suggestive of a close link with the respective
industry. As it turns out, results in columns 6-10 are very similar to those in columns 1-5. Most
importantly, the coefficient on #inxhr is still negative, highly significative, and the magnitude of
the effect implied by the estimated coefficient is similar.
In sum, the results in Table 2 are largely in line with the hypothesis that voters with better access
to information punish a more concentrated pattern of campaign contributions is punished. However,
as discussed in Section 1.2.1, a more convincing strategy to control for potential differences in
unobservable characteristics across counties and capture the underlying partisanship (normal vote)
in each county, includes a full set of county-party fixed effects as in (1.2). The results are presented
in Table 3, which has the same structure as Table 2. Again, the main interaction coefficient 3 inxh
is negative and significant at more than 99% confidence level. The result is robust to the definition
of the Herfindahl, and to the inclusion of controls in columns 2-5 and 6-10. The coefficient is again
remarkably stable across specifications, though the estimated effect is smaller than with state times
incumbent-party fixed effects alone (the point estimate ranges from about -0.05 to -0.10 in Table
2, compared to about -0.14 to -0.17 in Table 3). This estimated value #hixhr indicates that an
increase in concentration leads to lower vote shares in-state relative to out-of-state, though the
effect is quantitatively small (about a half of a percentage point for a one-standard increase in
the concentration indices). The coefficient on the incumbent's Herfindahl in the most demanding
specifications with full controls is also reduced, both relative to columns without controls and to
Table 2.
1.3.2 Examining neighboring counties
The regressions from Table 3 rely solely on variation in the Herfindahl indices across time within
the same county to estimate the coefficient of interest. Those specifications ask whether in-state
counties tend to punish increases in the Herfindahl index of the candidate more than out-of-state
counties. This is a demanding specification which controls for any time-invariant characteristics of
counties, but the response of an increase in the Herfindahl index in-state relative to out-of-state
may still reflect differential trends across counties rather than the effect of media.
This subsection investigates the possibility. First, I focus on in-state counties that are geograph-
ically contiguous to out-of-state counties. Table 4 demonstrates that these counties are similar to
out-of-state counties along a number of dimensions. This table runs regressions of the following
form:
Ycst = 7s + Ot + 6 iniTc ± scst,
where ys and Ot are state and year fixed effects, and ycst varies per column and is one of several
observable county characteristics, namely: real per capita income (in 2,000 US$ dollars), pop-
ulation, population density, percent of the population under 18, percent of the population over
65, percent female, percent black, percent urban, and percent with 12 or more years of education
(among people with 25 or more years of age).
In Panel A, inc is simply the in-state dummy defined before (equals 1 if the state the county
is in has more than two-thirds of the population of that media market, and zero if it has less than
one-third). Thus, 6in measures the average difference in observable characteristics for in-state and
out-of-state counties after controlling for fixed state and overall time trends. In-state counties have:
about $1, 700 higher per capita income than out of state counties (column 1); about twice as many
people and about 22 more individuals per square mile (columns 2 and 3); a higher proportion of
young (under 18), black, and urban population, and a smaller proportion of people over 65 (columns
4-8); and a higher proportion of people with 12 or more years of schooling (column 9).
In contrast, in Panel B inc equals 1 if it satisfies the same conditions as in Panel A and the
in-state county borders an out-of-state county in the same state. These contiguous in-state counties
are much more comparable to the set of out-of-state counties. In all cases, the estimated coefficients
that were previously significant fall in absolute terms. Moreover, the two sets of counties are not
found to be significantly different in terms of population density, or any of the basic dimensions
of population structure (age, gender, race, or urban-rural). However, three estimated coefficients
are still significant. While the differences are smaller than in Panel A, in-state and contiguous
counties are significantly richer, more populous, and slightly better educated than neighboring
in-state counties.
Table 5 focuses on this set of more comparable counties, running specifications as in Table 3.
The results are similar to the ones obtained for the full sample of counties. With either Herfindahl
measure (at the PAC or industry level) and with or without controls, the estimated absolute value
of f3inxhr decreases slightly. Without controls, it is still close to -0.08 with a standard error of
about 0.02. The inclusion of the set of controls further decreases the point estimate to around
-0.5. The statistical significance also falls, though even in columns 4 and 9, with a full set of
county and campaign finance controls, the hypothesis that the interaction term is zero is rejected
at conventional significance levels. Only columns 5 and 10, where (i) county controls are interacted
with the incumbent's party dummy and (ii) campaign finance controls are interacted with the in-
state dummy, have marginally significant coefficients on the interaction term. Note, however, that
even in this case, the point estimate is similar in magnitude (-0.04) to the previous estimates.
Also, the increase in standard errors is not surprising given the simultaneous inclusion of various
campaign finance variables in the regression.
1.3.3 A placebo test
Table 5 shows that the negative impact of increased campaign concentration in counties with better
access to information relative to those with less information holds for a restricted set of more
comparable in-state and out-of-state counties. Such evidence suggests that the previous results
were not driven by differential trends across counties rather than the effect of media. However, it
is possible to further investigate this possibility by running a simple placebo test.
In Table 6, I define the contiguous, in-state counties to be the (placebo) out-of-state counties,
comparing them to adjacent in-state counties in the same state. Since these sets of counties are
in-state with good access to information, there should be no correlation between increases in con-
centration and moving across county categories (i.e., the estimated 3 inxh and 3 inxhO should be
close to zero). However, if the previous results were driven by a general geographic trend as one
moves from in-state towards out-of-state captures, these coefficients could be significant, raising
concerns about the validity of the preceding results. Results from Table 6 reassure previous re-
sults. Unlike Tables 2, 3 and 5, the interaction coefficient inxhr (and #ixfhO) is not statistically
significant in any of the specifications (the structure of the table is the same as before). Moreover,
the point estimate is very small in all columns suggesting this is a precisely measured "non-effect"
rather than an uncertain potential effect.
1.3.4 Share of connected-PACs money
The evidence presented thus far suggests that voters dislike concentrated special interest money.
But is it the case that voters dislike special interest money in general, concentrated or otherwise?
Table 7 suggests not. This table presents similar regressions to the ones presented before, where
the share of connected PAC money is used (in place of Herfindahl indices of concentration), as a
"proxy" for capture of politicians by interest groups.
In the table, we see that the share of connected PAC money of the incumbent and the opponent
are not robustly correlated with different vote share patterns across media markets. In the case of
the incumbent, the estimated interaction term is close to zero and not statistically significant with
either the full sample of counties (and including state times party fixed effects as in columns 1 and
2 or county times party fixed effects as in columns 3 and 4), or with the set of contiguous counties
only (and county times party fixed effects as in columns 5 and 6).
These results are consistent with idea that voters view PAC money as buying influence. More
specifically, it is in line with the view that a high share of PAC-money is not necessarily bad for
the incumbent's vote share because, if this money is dispersed in many sectors, his agenda cannot
be captured by any one of them. Results in the previous subsections suggest that it is PAC money
concentrated in a few sectors what may indicate capture.
1.3.5 Automated news searches
A valid concern with results presented thus far is whether the suggested mechanism demands an
unrealistic degree of knowledge on the part of voters. However, even if individuals do not know the
approximate pattern of campaign contributions, a candidate with a more concentrated pattern of
contributions is prone to being pinpointed by journalists or his opponent as potentially "captured."
The presumption is that such a candidate is likely to figure in ads and news as linked to the
economic sectors that heavily contribute to his campaign.
An additional important issue is whether campaign finance concentration captures some other
omitted candidate characteristics which differentially affect their performance across counties (e.g.
whether candidates with higher Herfindahls are more "popular" or charismatic). As noted above,
other campaign finance controls such as total campaign receipts may be thought of as a crude proxy
for this, and I have demonstrated the robustness of the results to the inclusion of such controls.
However, in this section, I present an additional simple exercise to help address these two issues.
In particular, I conduct automated news searches for a sample of US newspapers verifying how
often are Senate candidates featured in the news. To this end, I search for back issues of a sample
of US newspapers available on NewsLibrary.com. Overall, the search is for 139 newspapers across
the US. The major limitation of this exercise is that only a few newspapers have online archives
going back to the 1980s (in fact, only one, The Boston Globe goes back to 1982). Appendix Table
3 shows the number of states in the sample, per year, for which I can find one or more newspapers
on which to conduct news searches.
For each candidate, I conduct two searches. In the first one, I look for stories about the candidate
during the campaign period (which I define to be the two months leading up to the election). The
search is limited to newspapers within the candidates' state, and allow for various possible variations
in the usage of the candidates' first name, middle name (or initial), last names, and nicknames. Any
news story containing the candidate's name and the words "senate" or "senator" is counted as one
hit that adds to the candidate's "total stories." The second search demands stories to meet the prior
criteria and, in addition, that the words "PAC" and "money" feature in the story25. This subset of
stories are the candidate's "PAC stories." The main interest is to examine whether the proportion of
PAC stories for each candidate is positively correlated with the candidate's concentration indices26 .
Table 8 reports the results. Column 1 reports the results of a regression for each candidate's
Herfindahl index (at the PAC level) on the ratio of PAC stories to total stories, controlling for
year fixed effects, an incumbent dummy, and a Democratic dummy. The ratio of PAC stories is
positively and very significantly correlated with the concentration index (the point estimate, 0.993,
has a robust standard error of 0.161). In column 2, instead, the total number of stories is used as
the main independent variable of interest (again, year fixed effects and partisan and incumbency
dummies are included). Also interesting, this regression shows no significant correlation between
the total number of stories and the concentration index. The same conclusion emerges in column
3, where the proportion of PAC stories and the total number of stories are included simultaneously
in the regression. A similar picture emerges in columns 4-6, which repeat the specifications in
columns 1-3 but use the concentration index at the industry level as the dependent variable. The
only difference is that there is now a small (and marginally significant) negative correlation between
total stories and the concentration index.
These results are very reassuring about the validity of the approach. In particular, the positive
and significant correlation between the share of PAC stories for a candidate and the candidate's
Herfindahl concentration index suggests that the concentration indices do proxy for media exposure
of campaign contribution profiles. And the weak correlation between the candidates' Herfindahl and
his total number of stories suggests the former is not capturing differences in candidate charisma or
popularity. Along these lines, columns 7-9 in Table 8 present a final set of regressions like those in
columns 1-3, but where the dependent variable is total PAC contributions to the candidate. While
this is positively correlated with total stories about a candidate, it is uncorrelated with the share
of PAC stories.
In short, these results lend further credibility to the validity of using the concentration indices as
a proxy for capture. To provide further support for the main conclusions, I now present additional
results that highlight the key role of information and the robustness of the main results.
25 experimented with other keywords to find the number of stories concerning campagin money, including "contri-
butions," "campaign finance," and "interest groups," among others. However, an examination of the resulting stories
suggested that the selected alternative both included the major stories about interest group money and (unlike other
keywords) did not include as many unrelated stories.
26Appendix Table 3 gives summary statistics for the number of total stories, stories about PACs, and the ratio.
1.4 Other results: turnout and information spillovers
1.4.1 Turnout
Theory and evidence suggest that better information increases turnout 2 7 . Since the suggested
mechanism, whereby concentration of PAC money affects incumbent's vote shares, is information,
a useful question to ask is whether turnout is higher in-state than out-of-state.
I explore this question in Table 9. Columns 1 to 3 compare all in-state counties to out-of-state
counties. The columns present regressions of the ratio of total votes to population in each county
on the baseline dummy variable that equals 1 for in-state counties. Perhaps surprisingly, columns 1
(with state and year fixed effects) and 2 (with state-times-party and year-times-party fixed effects)
find no significant effect of being in-state on turnout. However, recall that in-state counties are much
more populous, which mechanically reduces the dependent variable by increasing the denominator.
After controlling for population on the right hand side (as in column 3), in-state counties do have a
turnout around 1.5 percentage points higher than out-of-state counties. This suggests population
"grows faster" than turnout and is suggestive of the role of the better information in in-state
counties.
Perhaps more convincingly, columns 4 to 6, which replicate the regressions of columns 1 to 3
but for contiguous counties only, show that irrespective of controlling for total population, in-state
counties do have larger turnout than their otherwise relatively similar out-of-state neighbors. The
coefficient is quite stable and implies a 1.7 to 2 percentage point higher turnout in in-state counties.
While we have seen that these sets of contiguous counties are quite similar, differences remain that
could explain this differential behavior of turnout and be unrelated with information. For this
reason, columns 7 to 9 present a regression of the dependent variable on the placebo out-of-state
counties versus their neighbors as before. In this case, I find no significant effects, confirming the
hypothesis that the differences in turnout found in columns 3-6 are driven by information and not
by other differences from moving towards out-of-state counties.
At first glance, these result may seem to contradict some studies (e.g. Gentzkow (2006)) that
find a negative impact of television on turnout, unlike the positive impact of radio or newspapers
discussed in the Introduction. The erosion of social capital and the crowding out of other media
with better political coverage have been suggested as possible mechanisms for this effect. Notice,
2 7 For a review of some theoretical arguments, see Feddersen (2004) and in particular Feddersen & Pesendorfer
(1996); Fedderson & Pesendorfer (1999). Some of the empirical evidence was discussed in the Introduction (see also
Prat and Stromberg's (2010) review).
however, that the results presented above are not necessarily inconsistent with such finding. The
variation between in-state and out-of-state counties is not determined by the availability of TV,
but the relevance of its content for voters. On the contrary, given the well-established connection
between information and turnout, these results further confirm that moving to out-of-state counties
affects information relevant for voters.
But is the main channel for the earlier results concerning incumbent vote share that news about
"captured" politicians discourages voters in-state relative to out-of-state? We can investigate this
question by running the main specification with turnout, rather than vote share for the incumbent,
as the dependent variable. This is done in Table 10. As is clear from the table, an increased
Herfindahl for the incumbent does not seem to reduce turnout differentially in-state relative to out-
of-state. This is suggestive that turnout is not the main or sole channel. Moreover, by looking at
the non-interacted effect of the incumbent concentration index, we see that "high Herfindahl" years
do not seem systematically correlated with turnout, suggesting that effects presented for the vote
share of the incumbent do not mechanically follow from differences in turnout when the Herfindahl
is high.
1.4.2 Spillovers
The results presented thus far, by revealing the electoral cost that "captured" politicians face
with better-informed voters, open up the discussion about whether the concentration of campaign
finance money for Senate candidates has negative spillovers for fellow party members running for
other offices. I examine this question in Table 1128. In columns 1 and 2, I present results for
the main specification but with vote share for the presidential candidate of the same party as the
incumbent senator functioning as the dependent variable. The standard concentration measures
(and campaign finance controls), however, are for the Senate candidates. If there are significant
spillovers, the coefficient on the interaction of the Herfindahl index for the incumbent senator and
the in-state dummy should be negative (and that on the interaction of the index for the opponent
senator and the dummy, positive). Indeed, this would be an indication that in years where, for
example, the Democratic senator has a relatively high Herfindahl, the Democratic presidential
candidate does worse in in-state counties relative to out-of-state counties. Column 1 presents the
28 All regressions in this table focus on the set of contiguous counties, include a full set of county times party and
year times party fixed effects, as well as the campaign finance controls, county controls, and state Herfindahl controls
described above.
results for the PAC-level Herfindahl index. None of the interaction terms is significantly different
from zero. A similar result is obtained in the case of the industry-level Herfindahl in column 2.
A similar exercise can be accomplished with the vote share for the House candidate of the same
party as the incumbent as the dependent variable 29. The results are reported in columns 3 and
4 for the PAC-level and industry-level concentration measures, respectively. Though imprecisely
estimated (the standard error is 0.315), the negative coefficient of column 3 (-0.594) suggests the
presence of spillover effects. That is, a "tainted" senator affects fellow congressmen. However,
upon further examination, this does not seem to be the case. First, column 4 for the industry-level
Herfindahl estimates an almost identical coefficient, yet it is not statistically significant. Second,
and more importantly, columns 5 and 6 control for the House candidates' campaign contributions
concentration measures, and their interaction with the in-state dummy. Indeed, it could be that the
significant negative interaction in column 3 is in fact driven by correlation between the House and
Senate candidates contribution patterns within the same county and year. After all, Senate and
Congress candidates of the same party and state may have similar campaign finance profiles. The
results suggest this because the coefficients on the interaction terms with the Senate candidates'
Herfindahls are now smaller and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
While indicative of the absence of important spillover effects, results from Table 11 at the
same time reassure that the results presented before are not driven by partisan trends. Indeed, a
potentially serious objection to the models estimated thus far is that partisanship moves in different
directions in different counties across different years. Unfortunately, I cannot control for a full set
of county-year fixed effects, since the variation I use to estimate the key interaction terms is at
this level. However, the President and House regressions just examined can be considered placebo
regressions to rule out this interpretation. If important partisan trends were driving the results,
observed effects for the vote share of the incumbent should be mirrored in specifications with the
vote share of fellow party members as a dependent variable instead. They do not, and this gives
further credibility to the results of Section 1.3.
Information spillovers, however, may take several other forms than simply the "contagion"
of representatives from the same party and state. Specifically, out-of-state counties are exposed
29In this case, since voting and other data is at the county-level, a decision must be taken regarding the treatment
of counties with multiple congressional districts. Results presented in Table 11 simply add the votes for all the
Democratic and Republican candidates running for Congress in a county to find the Democratic and Republican vote
share per county. I verified that results are similar when restricting to counties with no more than one congressional
district.
relatively more to neighboring states' political information. Thus, there may be partisan spillovers
from neighboring states. Imagine an out-of-state county c of state s sitting in a media market
dominated by neighboring state s'. There are at least two questions that seem worth asking. First,
to examine the hypothesis that voters in these out-of-state counties are on average "misinformed"
voters who must rely on a partisan cue, one could ask: do voters in county c punish the candidate
of party P in state s when the Herfindahl of the candidate for party P in neighboring state s' rises?
Second, a different hypothesis suggests that out-of-state voters are not misinformed, but are better
informed on average because they get information about both states, s and s'. Hence, they may
rely on comparisons, and, for instance, it is possible to examine if voters in c punish the candidate
of party P in state s if the Herfindahl of party P in state s is larger than that in state s'.
I examine both questions in Table 12. The table focuses on out-of-state counties only30. In
line with previous results, columns 1 and 2 verify that the dependent variable, the incumbent
senator's vote share, does not react to his Herfindahl index or that of his opponent in out-of-state
counties. Columns 3 and 4 ask if it responds instead to the concentration indices of the neighboring
states' candidates. The coefficients are again not significant, with small point estimates. Finally,
columns 5 and 6 check whether it could be the difference between the incumbent's Herfindahl and
the Herfindahl of his fellow party member running in a neighboring state (and similarly for the
opponent) that affects voting patterns in out-of-state counties. Once again, the point estimates are
close to zero and statistically insignificant.
Overall, this section suggests that partisan trends are unlikely to drive the main results of the
paper. Additionally, information spillovers across members of the same party, whether in the same
or neighboring states, are not first-order.
1.5 Further robustness checks: definition of media markets
Before concluding, I demonstrate the robustness of the main result to alternate definitions of the
media market. Recall that a county is in-state if the state the county is in has more than x%
of the population of that media market, and out-of-state if it has less than (100 - x)%. Results
reported thus far are for x = 66. In Table 13, I vary x. I focus on the most demanding specification
with county fixed effects and a full set of controls. Panel A looks at all in-state and out-of-state
30Again, all regressions in this table include a full set of county times party and year times party fixed effects, as
well as the campaign finance controls, county controls, and state Herfindahl controls described above.
counties, whereas Panel B restricts attention to the in-state and contiguous counties compared to
out-of-state counties. In odd columns, the Herfindahl index is at the PAC level. In even columns,
it is computed at the industry level. Finally, x = 50 in columns 1-2, x = 60 in columns 3-4, and
x = 70 in columns 5-6. The table shows that the results do not depend on the exact threshold of
population to define media markets. In all cases, #inxh' is negative, typically significant at more
than a 99% confidence level, and the point estimate is very close in all specifications to results
presented in Table 5.
An alternative approach to check the robustness of the results to the media market definition is
to rely directly on the share of in-state media market population as the key, continuous, measure of
availability of information in each county. More concretely, for each county c in state s and media
market (Area of Dominance Influence) m, define the "ratio in-state" as the ratio of the population
of media market m residing in state s to the total population of market m. This variable can
then be used, in place of the in state dummy, in specifications analogous to (1.1) and (1.2). The
results, presented in Table 14, are in line with the ones presented previously, both for PAC-level
concentration indices (Panel A) or at the industry-level (Panel B). Regardless of whether we focus
on state fixed effects regressions (columns 1 and 2), county fixed regressions (columns 3 and 4), or
county fixed effects regressions among the set of more comparable contiguous counties as defined by
the in-state dummy (columns 5 and 6), the message is the same. An increase in the concentration
of campaign contributions for the incumbent leads to a fall in his vote share in counties with media
markets that have a larger proportion of their population in the county's state.
1.6 Final Remarks
The evidence presented in this paper supports the idea that mass media, by informing voters, may
reduce the influence of special interest groups. Better access to mass media allows voters to react
to negative information about their candidates, and in particular the influence of narrow interests
in policy as proxied by their campaign finance profiles. For this reason (among others) the presence
of a free, independent mass media is a key component of democratic political institutions.
Hence, the paper contributes to the growing evidence on the crucial role of the media in em-
powering voters and improving accountability. In doing so, it suggests a channel that has received
relatively little attention in the empirical literature. As noted in the Introduction, there is by now
a fair amount of evidence on the impact of free media on voter turnout, voter knowledge, and
representative behavior and policy choices. But special interests are fundamental players in any
democracy. The evidence presented here suggests that mass media may help reduce their influence.
Candidates who are more likely to be connected with interest groups receive less votes on average
in places where they face greater media exposure. This relation provides a direct effect on reduced
interest group influence.
Admittedly, the magnitude of the effects found is relatively small, and typically would not
decide the election outcome for the average incumbent. Nonetheless, there are various reasons why
the estimated effect may underestimate the impact, for voters, of revealed "capture" of politicians
by special interests. First, the concentration of campaign contributions to politicians is inevitably a
noisy measure of the degree of capture31 . Second, notice that if concentrating contribution patterns
likely hurt politicians, those politicians who are willing to fund their campaigns with money from a
narrow set of interest groups should also possess other resources to counteract the negative signal
this entails. In this sense, the estimated effects likely underestimate the impact on an "average"
politician of the public disclosure of his links to special interests.
Also related, notice that the reduction in candidate vote share is only one of the channels
whereby mass media may reduce special interest group influence in politics. To provide just one
example, mass media disclosure of potentially undue interest group influence may, even when not
affecting voter behavior, trigger or facilitate the action of other institutions, such as courts, to hold
politicians accountable.
More generally, the electoral cost of concentrated campaign contributions documented in this
paper, even when small, may lead to a virtuous circle encouraging candidates to distance themselves
from narrow interests. In fact, that campaign contributions are able to buy policy influence in the
United States is not clear according to an important line of academic research on the issue. An-
solabehere et al. (2003) argue that campaign contributions in the US are not a form of policy-buying.
Rather, they are primarily a form of political participation and consumption since individuals, not
special interests, are the main source of campaign contributions (and their contributions behave as
a normal good, dependent upon income).
At first glance, these findings appear to be at odds with some of the premises guiding the
present paper. If campaign contributions are not a form of policy buying, why do voters respond
31For a more recent period, a more direct measure of interest-group connectedness based on searches for news
stories regarding interest group influence could provide a more precise measure and allow a reexamination of the
magnitude of the effects. Still, the results presented in this paper are interesting in their own right, as they allow us
to study the ways in which campaign contribution patterns directly and indirectly transmit information to voters.
negatively to them? There are several replies to this question. First, while contributions may
or may not actually buy policy (hard to establish or refute), voters may certainly believe they
do (a more realistic assumption). Only this belief is necessary for the negative reaction. Second,
such negative reaction to the presence or appearance or undue influence is in fact consistent with
equilibrium situations in which candidates seek and obtain funds from individuals while trying to
avoid support from narrow interest groups in ways that may be taken by journalists and voters as
a proxy for their commitment to such interests. In other words, it can be part of the virtuous circle
mentioned before.
Finally, along these lines the results obtained here are context-specific. While many studies
have documented the bias in political news in the US, the extent of misinformation and bias in
many other countries in the world is a far more serious problem 32 . In such contexts, it is not clear
that greater access to mass media will enable voters at large to put a check on potentially undue
influence from narrow interest groups. In other words, the power of the media is a double-edged
sword. By improving information and electoral response, it may improve accountability. It may
also reduce corruption (Brunetti & Weder, 2003), and perhaps aid in democratic consolidation
(Andriantsoa et al., 2005), and development (Djankov & McLiesh, 2002). On the other hand, the
media is in many ways a special interest group itself or may collude with interest groups (Corneo,
2006). If too powerful, the media could sway policies in its favor at the expense of other groups in
society33
32In 2009, for instance, the US ranked 20 (of 175) on the Press Freedom Index published yearly by Reporters
Without Borders.
3 3The negative consequences of media influence have been studied by many. By making some issues more salient
than others, mass media may distract the public from pressing needs (Eisensee & Stramberg, 2007). More generally,
media content may be biased, and such bias may persist over time as well as influence electoral behavior (Groseclose
& Milyo, 2005; Puglisi, 2006; Baron, 2006; DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010).
Even more detrimental, with media capture by the government or other powerful actors, checks and balances may
be dismantled rather than strengthened (McMillan & Zoido, 2002; Besley & Prat, 2006; Petrova, 2008; Durante &
Knight, 2009), and when used for propaganda can even exacerbate violence (Yanagizawa, 2010). Finally, there is also
evidence that mass media may destroy social capital (Olken, 2009).
L.A Appendix: Data
1.A.1 Variable Sources and Definitions
See Appendix Table 1 for the sources and definitions of the variables used in the analysis.
1.A.2 Campaign finance data industry sector classification
As noted in the main text, to classify the PAC contributions in industry categories, I follow the Cen-
ter for Responsive Politics' coding system. This is a hierarchical system, with five super-categories
(Business, Labor, Ideological/Single-Issue, Other and Unknown) divided into 13 "sectors," about
100 "industries," and about 400 categories as shown in Appendix Table 2.
The CRP has been classifying PACs since 1990, whereas I study campaign contributions and
election results since 1980. From 1990 onwards, there are nearly 50, 000 PAC-candidate pairs in
the sample (more precisely, there are 49, 739 PAC-candidate pairs, from 3,295 PACs contributing
to any of the Senate candidates in the sample after 1990). The classification of the interest group
sector for these PACs is facilitated by the fact that the Federal Elections Commission assigns a
unique identification number to each committee, and this identification number is also part of the
CRP dataset. Hence, I can classify every PAC's interest group after 1990.
To classify PAC contribution money before 1990, I proceed in two steps. First, I check whether
the pre-1990 contributing PAC survives after 1990. If so, I assign the sector allocated by CRP to the
respective PAC to the earlier period. Prior to 1990, there are nearly 41,783 PAC-candidate pairs
in the sample, from 3,232 PACs contributing to any of the Senate candidates before 1990. Of these
PAC-candidate pairs, 38,712 (that is, 93% of the total PAC-candidate pairs, which correspond to
2,625 contributing PACs) can be classified by this first step alone.
Next, for the set of unmatched PACs, I assigned the sector in the following way. First, when pos-
sible I use the name of the sponsor of the unmatched PAC to search for other matched committees
sponsored by the same organization, and assign the corresponding industry.
When this procedure does not permit the classification of the PAC, I follow the guidelines for
PAC classification from the CRP 34 to identify the committee's interest group. In some cases, the
PAC sponsor name does not provide enough clues to classify the interest group sector. Hence,
while the classification is very complete, it is below 100%. More specifically, of the 3,071 PAC-
candidate pairs that remained to be classified (corresponding to 607 unclassified PACs), 1, 930
PAC-candidate pairs are classified after these steps (corresponding to 372 PACs). Hence, overall I
am able to classify 40,642 PAC-candidate pairs (from 2,997 PACs) before 1990. This amounts to
97% of the total number of PACs before 1990.
Also importantly, the average contribution for unclassified PACs is smaller than the average.
Thus, in terms of contribution money, the share of unclassified contributions is even smaller. For
instance, in 1980, the year with least success in the classification, 94% of the contributions are
classified, yet this represents 96% of the contribution money. By 1988, 98.4% of the contributions
are classified, and this amounts to 99.4% of the contribution money.
34 http://www.opensecrets.org/action/ftm/index.php
1.B Tables
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations
County-level variables
Incumbent share of the two party vote 0-58 0.12 0.13 0.92 9532
per capita personal income, 2000 US$ 20,597 5,042 0 69,910 9532
population 90,655 323,054 84 9,542,574 9532
population density (population per square mile) 146.28 597.41 0.13 16539.57 9532
% under 18 46.72 22-69 13.19 84.4 9532
% over 65 14.33 4.32 1.38 34.7 9532
% female 50.62 1.61 32.75 57.44 9532
% black 6.63 12.46 0 86.81 9532
% urban 38.59 29.72 0 100 9532
% 12 years of more of school (persons 25+) 69.18 10.92 25.9 95.5 9532
ratio of in-state population for county's media market 0.84 0.28 0 1 9532
Candidate-level variables
Dummy-1 if incumbent is Democratic 0.49 0.5 0 1 180
Herlindahl index PAC contributions -incumbent 0.02 0.09 0 1 180
Herfindahl index PAC contributions -opponent 0.15 0.24 0 1 180
Herfindahl index PAC contributions at industry level -incumbent 0.06 0.11 0.03 1 180
Herfindahl index PAC contributions at industry level -opponent 0.23 0.23 0.03 1 180
Campaign receipts (2000 US $)-incumbent 5,185,977 3,550,866 0 27,301,767 180
Campaign receipts (2000 US $)-opponent 3,076,456 4,133,369 17,047 34,851,988 180
Receipts from special interest PACs (2000 US $)-incumbent 1,036,460 450,742 0 3,063,172 180
Receipts from special interest PACs (2000 US $)-opponent 312,506 387,474 37 1,690,014 180
Share of connected PACs money-incumbent 0.25 0.12 0 0.64 180
Share of connected PACs money-opponent 0.13 0.11 0 0.48 180
County Media Market Classification
In-state dummy (1 if in-state) 0.86 0.34 0 1 1759
In-state and contiguous dummy (1 if in-state and adjacent to out-of-state) 0-56 0.5 0 1 542
Summary statistics are for the base sample in the analysis: excludes counties that were not dominated by the same state throughout the period and
counties in overwhelmed states (an "overwhelmed" state has less than two-thirds of the population living in in-state dominated media markets). For the
herfindahl at the PAC (industry) level, the contribution from each PAC (industry) is expressed as a share of the total PAC contributions to the
candidate, and the index corresponds to the sum of the squares of such shares. For each county in state s and media market m, the ratio of in-state
population refers to the proportion of the total media market population residing in state s. The in-state dummy equals I if the state the county is in has
more than two-thirds (66%) of the population of that media market, and zero if it has less than one-third (33%). In the in-state and contiguous dummy,
in addition to the latter conditions the in-state county must border an out-of-state county in the same state for the dummy to be equal to 1. See the text
and Data Appendix for detailed variable definitions and sources.
Table 2. Media markets and electoral response to campaign finance concentration, US Senate 1980-2002
Dependent variable: share of the two-party vote received by the incumbeni
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (t0)
State fixed effects
herfindahl at PAC level herfindal at interest group (industry) level
in state dummy 0.00782 0.00537 0.00575 0.00617 -0.024 0.00738 0.00504 0.00552 0.00595 -0.0254
(0.00365) (0.00363) (0-00362) (0.00363) (0.0105) (0.00364) (0.00364) (0.00362) (0.00363) (0.0106)
herfindahl incumbent 0.171 0.158 0.116 0.125 0.128 0.122 0.108 0.0871 0.0978 0.0982
(0.0221) (0.0228) (0.0214) (0.0217) (0.0207) (0.0272) (0.0283) (0.0245) (0.0249) (0.0239)
herfindahl opponent 0.0775 0.0728 0.00175 0.00745 0.0267 0.107 0.104 0.0114 0.0181 0.043
(0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0148) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0169)
herfindahl state -3.414 0.763 0.692 -0.169 -3.533 0.553 0.480 -0.330
(0.503) (0.621) (0.510) (0.507) (0.499) (0.512) (0.501) (0.502)
in state dummy x herfindahl incumbent -0.17 1 -0.168 -0.15 -0.154 -0.129 -0.163 -0.156 -0.135 -0.14 -0.113
(0.0236) (0.0242) (0.0230) (0.0228) (0.0208) (0.0274) (0.0285) (0.0252) (0.0253) (0.0236)
in state dummy x herfindahl opponent 0.0205 0.0242 0.0333 0.0281 0.0108 0.0242 0.0259 0.0359 0.0308 0.0101
(0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0168) (0-0168) (0-0154) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0176)
in state dummy x herfindahl state -1.465 -1-277 -1.395 -1.246 -1.382 -1.15 -1.271 -1.188
(0.470) (0.457) (0.448) (0.456) (0.471) (0.455) (0.447) (0.456)
Campaign finance controls
County controls V
Campaign finance controls x in-state dummy Y
County controls x incumbent party
Observations 9,532 9,532 9,532 9,527 9,527 9,532 9,532 9,532 9.527 9.527
R-squared 0.286 0.294 0.363 0.369 0.490 0.293 0.302 0.364 0.370 0.491
Standard errors, clustered by county, in parenthesis. All regressions include a full set of state and year fixed effects and interactions of the state and year fixed effects with
a dummy that equals 1 if the incumbent is a Democrat. Campaign finance controls in columns 3-6 and 8-10 include the total campaign receipts, and total campaign receips
from connected PACs, for the incumbent and his opponent (in 2000 US$ thousands of dollars). County controls in columns 4-5 and 9-10 include real per capita income (in
2000 USS dollars), population, population density, percent of the population under 18, percent of the population over 65, percent female, percent black, percent urban,
percent with a high 12 or more years of education (among people with 25 or more years of age), and state income growth. The in-state dummy equals 1 if the state the
county is in has more than two-thirds (66%) of the population of that media market, and zero if it has less than one-third (33%). For the herfindahl at the PAC (industry)
level, the contribution from each PAC (industry) is expressed as a share of the total PAC contributions to the candidate, and the index corresponds to the sum of the
squares of such shares. "Herfindahl state" corresponds to a similar index computed from the contribution of each of several economic sectors to the Gross State Product.
Demeaned variables are shown in bold. I demean herfindahl variables before interacting them, so that the coefficient on the main effect for the in-statedummy shows the
impact measured at the mean values of the herfindal indices. See the text a rd Data Appendix for detailed variable definitions and sources.
Table 3. Media markets and electoral response to campaign finance concentration, US Senate 1980-2002
Dependent variable: share of the two-party vote received by the incumbent
(0) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
County fixed effects
herfindahl at PAC level herfindahl at interest group (in dustry) level
herfindahl incumbent 0.113 0.098 0.0532 0.0513 0.0687 0.0661 0.0495 0.0261 0.0269 0.0449
(0.0214) (0.022a) (0.0189) (0.0191) (0.0201) (0.0331) (0.0339) (0.0251) (0.0248) (0.0257)
herfindahl opponent 0.0859 0.0835 0.001,15 0.00324 0.0281 0.128 0.126 0.0206 0.0233 0.0667
(0.0206) (0-0205) (0.0182) (0.0185) (0.0175) (0.0232) (0.0233) (0.0212) (0.0216) (0.0214)
herfindahl state -3.864 -0.378 -0.736 -1956 -3.652 -0.399 -0.765 -2.01
(1.011) (1.087) (1.056) (1.162) (1.021) (1.089) (1.053) (1.148)
in state dummy x herfindahl incumbent -0.0995 -0.0939 -0.0721 -0.065 -0.048 -0.0997 -0.0899 -0.065 -0.0592 -0.0456
(0.0222) (0.0235) (0.0185) (0.0182) (0.0184) (0.0330) (0.0336) (0.0246) (0.0239) (0-0243)
in state dummy x herfindahl opponent 0.0116 0.0126 0.033 0.0302 0.00772 0.000863 0.00116 0.0246 0.0222 -0.00792
(0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0186) (0.0188) (0.0185) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0217) (0.0219) (0.022T)
in state dummy x herfindahl state -0.942 -0.0542 -0.0607 0.682 -1.221 -0.138 -0.146 0.602
(1.024) (1.061) (1.027) (1.154) (1.033) (1.063) (1.026) (1.142)
Campaign finance controls 4
County controls
Campaign finance controls x in-state dummy
County controls x incumbent party
Observations 9,532 9,532 9,532 9,527 9,527 9,532 9,532 9,532 9,527 9,527
R-squared 0.748 0.756 0.824 0.827 0.843 0.755 0.763 0.826 0.828 0.844
Standard errors, clustered by county, in parenthesis. All regressions include a full set of state and year fixed effects and interactions of the county and year fixed effects
with the party of the incumbent. Campaign finance controls in columns 3-6 and 8-10 include the total campaign receipts, and total campaign receips from connected
PACs, for the incumbent and his opponent (in 2000 USS thousands of dollars). County controls in columns 4-5 and 9-10 include real per capita income (in 2000 US$
dollars), population, population density, percent of the population under 18, percent of the population over 65, percent female, percent black, percenturban, percent with
a high 12 or more years of education (among people with 25 or more years of age), and state income growth. The in-state dummy equals 1 if the state the county is in
has more than two-thirds (66%) of the population of that media market, and zero if it has less than one-third (33%). For the herfindahl at the PAC (industry) level, the
contribution from each PAC (industry) is expressed as a share of the total PAC contributions to the candidate, and the index corresponds to the sum of the squares of
such shares. "Herfindahl state" corresponds to a similar index computed from the contribution of each of several economic sectors to the Gross State Product. See the
text and Data Appendix for detailed variable definitions and sources.
Table 4. in-state versus out of state counties, differences in observable characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
% with 12+ years
Real per population of school (people
Dependent variable: capita income population density % under 18 % over 65 % female % black % urban 25+)
Panel A: in-state versus out of state
in state dummy 1,704 55,533 98.23 0.162 -1.158 0.0421 1.855 10.6 2.873
(212.8) (11,584) (18.56) (0.0764) (0.228) (0.0886) (0.703) (1.810) (0.423)
Constant 22,877 51,014 76.01 25.65 15.66 50.26 5.201 31.69 69.2
(219.0) (8,626) (15.71) (0.127) (0.223) (0.0884) (0.656) (1.713) (0.387)
Observations 9,528 9,528 9,528 9,528 9,528 9,528 9,528 9,527 9,527
R-squared 0.390 0.106 0.095 0.978 0.263 0.213 0.558 0.151 0.588
Panel B: in-state and contiguous versus out of state
in state and contiguous dummy 782.8 12,529 12.35 -0.00876 -0.0438 0.118 1.401 3.002 1.233
(236.7) (4,773) (7.880) (0.119) (0.300) (0.112) (0.886) (2.214) (0.535)
Constant 19,686 23,169 49.26 72.46 15.61 50.73 5.506 27.89 69.47
(212.0) (9,231) (7.854) (0.266) (0.241) (0.0933) (0.606) (1.717) (0.371)
Observations 2,623 2,623 2,623 2,623 2,623 2,623 2,623 2,623 2,623
R-squared 0.551 0.108 0.310 0.984 0.337 0.357 0.482 0.154 0.672
Standard errors, clustered by county, in parenthesis. All regressions include a full set of state and year fixed effects. The in-state dummy equals 1 if the state the county is in has
more than two-thirds (66%) of the population of that media market, and zero if it has less than one-third (33%). In the in state and contiguous dummy, in addition to the latter
conditions the in-state county must border an out-of-state county in the same state for the dummy to be equal to 1.
Table 5. Media markets and electoral response to campaign finance concentration, US Senate 1980-2002
In-state contiguous counties vs out-of-state counties only
Dependent variable: share of the two-party vote received by the incumbenl
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
herfindahl at PAC level herfindahl at interest group (industry) level
herfindah incumbent 0.0645 0.0702 0.0319 0.0264 0.0404 0.0153 0.0232 -0.00126 -0.00436 0.0128
(0.0254) (0.0267) (0.0254) (0.0270) (0.0292) (0.0346) (0.0356) (0.0300) (0.0305) (0.0327)
herfindahl opponent 0.0955 0.086 0.0282 0.0307 0.0356 0.13 0.122 0.0484 0.0521 0.0621
(0.0216) (0.0212) (0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0183) (0.0243) (0.0239) (0.0235) (0.0237) (0.0217)
herfindahl state -5.511 -2.32 -2.606 -3.151 -5.176 -2.266 -2.587 -3.216
(1.067) (1.031) (1 002) (1.042) (1.085) (1.042) (1.006) (1.037)
in state dummy x herfindahl incumbent -0.0769 -0.0625 -0.0657 -0.0573 -0.0414 -0.0752 -0.0624 -0.0582 -0.0499 -0.0400
(0.0309) (0.0310) (0.0241) (0.0233) (0.0246) (0.0371) (0.0379) (0.0284) (0.0272) (0.0287)
in state dummy x herfindahl opponent 0.0231 0.0251 0.0344 0.0323 0.0286 0.0125 0.0111 0.0240 0.0228 0.0155
(0.0285) (0.0273) (0.0270) (0.0265) (0.0260) (0.0324) (0.0311) (0.0307) (0.0301) (0.0310)
in state dummy x herfindahl state -1 885 -0.812 -0.838 -0.229 -1.867 -0.788 -0.812 -0.159
(1.196) (1.084) (1.052) (1.067) (1.199) (1.079) (1.047) (1.053)
Campaign finance controls V ; V
County controls
Campaign finance controls x in-state dummy
County controls x incumbent party
Observations 2,623 2,623 2,623 2,623 2,623 2,623 2,623 2,623 2,623 2,623
R-squared 0.764 0.777 0.825 0.831 0.844 0.771 0.782 0.827 0.833 0.845
Standard errors, clustered by county, in parenthesis. All regressions include a full set of county and year fixed effects and interactions of the county and year fixed
effects with the party of the incumbent. Campaign finance controls in columns 3-4 and 7-8 include the total campaign receipts, and total campaign receips from
connected PACs, for the incumbent and his opponent (in 2000 US$ thousands of dollars). County controls in columns 4 and 8 include real per capita income (in 2000
US$ dollars), population, population density, percent of the population under 18, percent of the population over 65, percent female, percent black, percent urban,
percent with a high 12 or more years of education (among people with 25 or more years of age), and state income growth. Like in Table 2, the in-state dummy equals 1
if the state the county is in has more than two-thirds (66%) of the population of that media market, and zero if it has less than one-third (33%). However, in addition to
the latter conditions the in-state county must border an out-of-state county in the same state for the dummy to be equal to 1. For the herfindahl at the PAC (industry)
level, the contribution from each PAC (industry) is expressed as a share of the total PAC contributions to the candidate, and the Index corresponds to the sum of the
squares of such shares. "Herfindahl state" corresponds to a similar index computed from the contribution of each of several economic sectors to the Gross State
Product. See the text and Data Appendix for detailed data definitions and sources.
Table 6. Media markets and electoral response to campaign finance concentration, US Senate 1980-2002
Placebo out of state vs in-state contiguous counties only
Dependent variable: share of the two-party vote received by the incumbent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
herfindahl at PAC level herfindahl at interest group (industry) level
herfindahl incumbent -0.0107 0.00474 -0.0344 -0.0369 -0.0671 -0.0494 -0.0673 -0.0667
(0.0337) (0.0344) (0.0297) (0.0305) (0.0363) (0.0372) (0.0292) (0.0288)
herfindahl opponent 0.103 0.0999 0.0415 0.0423 0.127 0.124 0.048 0.0499
(0.0160) (0.0152) (0.0171) (0.0176) (0.0184) (0.0176) (0.0196) (0.0201)
herfindahl state -5.913 -1.437 -1.84 -5.667 -1.375 -1.811
(0.828) (0.720) (0.728) (0.830) (0.739) (0.742)
in state dummy x herfindahl incumbent 0.00834 0.00376 0.0147 0.0135 0.0150 0.00866 0.0204 0.0185
(0.0387) (0.0391) (0.0281) (0.0268) (0.0405) (0.0417) (0.0281) (0.0262)
in state dummy x herfindahl opponent 0.0153 0.0133 0.00524 0.00524 0.00847 0.00726 0.00514 0.00472
(0.0238) (0.0224) (0.0232) (0.0231) (0.0266) (0.0249) (0.0258) (0.0258)
in state dummy x herfindahl state 0.541 -0.191 -0.553 0.642 -0.155 -0.527
(1.126) (0.994) (1.011) (1.123) (0.992) (1.009)
Campaign finance controls V
County controls N
Observations 2,505 2,505 2,505 2,505 2,505 2,505 2,505 2,505
R-squared 0.734 0.744 0.807 0.811 0.741 0.750 0.808 0.812
Standard errors, clustered by county, in parenthesis. All regressions include a full set of state and year fixed effects, as well as interactions
of the state fixed effects with the party of the incumbent. Campaign finance controls in columns 3-4 and 7-8 include the total campaign
receipts, and total campaign receips from connected PACs, for the incumbent and his opponent (in 2000 US$ thousands of dollars). County
controls in columns 4 and 8 include real per capita income (in 2000 US$ dollars), population, population density, percent of the population
under 18, percent of the population over 65, percent female, percent black, percent urban, and percent with a high 12 or more years of
education (among people with 25 or more years of age). The in-state dummy equals 0 for in-state and contiguos counties as defined in
Table 4, and 1 for their in-state neighbors. For the herfindahl at the PAC (industry) level, the contribution from each PAC (industry) is
expressed as a herfindahl of the total PAC contributions to the candidate, and the index corresponds to the sum of the squares of such
herfindahls. "Herfindahl state" corresponds to a similar index computed from the contribution of each of several economic sectors to the
Gross State Product. See the text and Data Appendix for detailed variable definitions and sources.
T a b l e  7 .  M e d i a  m a r k e t s  a n d  e l e c t o r a l  r e s p o n s e  t o  s h a r e  o f  c o n n e c t e d - P A C s  
m o n e y ,  U S  S e n a t e  1 9 8 0 - 2 0 0 2
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e :  s h a r e  o f  t h e  t w o - p a r t y  v o t e  r e c e i v e d  b y  t h e  i n c u m b e n t
( 1 )  
( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 )  ( 5 )  ( 6 )
C o u n t y  
f i x e d  
e f f e c t s ,
i n - s t a t e  
a n d
S t a t e  f i x e d  
e f f e c t s  
C o u n t y  
f i x e d  e f f e c t s  
c o n t i g u o u s  
o n l y
i n  s t a t e  d u m m y  0 . 0 0 4 3 3  0 . 0 1 2 1
( 0 . 0 0 4 2 2 )  ( 0 . 0 0 3 0 7 )
s h a r e  i n c u m b e n t  - 0 . 0 0 2 1 9  - 0 . 0 0 6 7 4  - 0 . 0 1 6 2  - 0 . 0 1 1 6  - 0 . 0 2 0 0  - 0 . 0 1 6 9
( 0 . 0 1 8 6 )  ( 0 . 0 1 5 8 )  ( 0 . 0 1 4 9 )  
( 0 . 0 1 5 3 )  ( 0 . 0 1 5 6 )  ( 0 . 0 1 6 5 )
s h a r e  o p p o n e n t  
- 0 . 0 2 5 3  - 0 . 0 0 6 9 9  
- 0 . 0 1 1 2  0 . 0 0 1 7 3  - 0 . 0 0 9 5 8  0 . 0 0 3 8 6
( 0 . 0 0 8 4 6 )  ( 0 . 0 0 5 5 2 )  ( 0 . 0 0 6 3 4 )  ( 0 . 0 0 6 0 9 )  
( 0 . 0 0 6 5 9 )  ( 0 . 0 0 6 7 7 )
i n  s t a t e  d u m m y  x  s h a r e  i n c u m b e n t  - 0 . 0 0 9 2 9  0 . 0 1 0 1  0 . 0 0 8 0 3  0 . 0 0 5 5 0  - 0 . 0 0 8 6 9  
- 0 . 0 0 5 7 4
( 0 . 0 2 0 3 )  ( 0 . 0 1 6 5 )  
( 0 . 0 1 5 8 )  ( 0 . 0 1 5 9 )  ( 0 . 0 1 8 5 )  ( 0 . 0 1 8 2 )
i n  s t a t e  d u m m y  x  s h a r e  o p p o n e n t  0 . 0 2  0 . 0 1 7 2  0 . 0 0 3 8 9  
0 . 0 0 2 4 7  - 0 . 0 1 0 4  - 0 . 0 1 4 3
( 0 . 0 0 9 2 8 )  ( 0 . 0 0 5 8 0 )  ( 0 . 0 0 6 5 6 )  ( 0 - 0 0 6 3 1 )  ( 0 . 0 0 8 1 9 )  
( 0 . 0 0 8 1 1 )
S t a t e  h e r f i n d a h l
C a m p a i g n  f i n a n c e  c o n t r o l s
C o u n t y  c o n t r o l s
O b s e r v a t i o n s  9 , 5 3 2  9 , 5 2 7  9 , 5 3 2  9 , 5 2 7  2 , 6 2 3  2 , 6 2 3
R - s q u a r e d  
0 . 5 6 1  0 . 7 4 9  0 . 9 2 3  0 . 9 3 1  0 . 9 1 9  0 . 9 2 6
S t a n d a r d  e r r o r s ,  c l u s t e r e d  b y  c o u n t y ,  i n  p a r e n t h e s i s .  I n  c o l u m n s  1 - 2 ,  r e g r e s s i o n s  i n c l u d e  a  f u l l  s e t  o f  s t a t e  x  p a r t y  a n d
y e a r  x  p a r t y  f i x e d  e f f e c t s .  I n  c o l u m n s  3 - 6 ,  r e g r e s s i o n s  i n c l u d e  a  f u l l  s e t  o f  c o u n t y  x  p a r t y  a n d  y e a r  x  p a r t y  f i x e d  e f f e c t s .
I n  c o l u m n s  5  a n d  6  o n l y  c o n t i g u o u s  c o u n t i e s  a r e  i n c l u d e d .  I n  e v e n  c o l u m n s ,  c a m p a i g n  f i n a n c e  c o n t r o l s  i n c l u d e  t o t a l
c a m p a i g n  r e c e i p t s ,  a n d  t o t a l  c a m p a i g n  r e c e i p t s  f r o m  c o n n e c t e d  P A C s ,  f o r  t h e  i n c u m b e n t  a n d  h i s  o p p o n e n t  ( i n  2 0 0 0
U S $  t h o u s a n d s  o f  d o l l a r s ) ;  c o u n t y  c o n t r o l s  i n c l u d e  r e a l  p e r  c a p i t a  i n c o m e  ( i n  2 0 0 0  U S $  d o l l a r s ) ,  p o p u l a t i o n ,  p o p u l a t i o n
d e n s i t y ,  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  u n d e r  1 8 ,  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  
p o p u l a t i o n  o v e r  6 5 ,  p e r c e n t  f e m a l e ,  p e r c e n t  b l a c k ,  p e r c e n t
u r b a n ,  p e r c e n t  w i t h  a  h i g h  1 2  o r  m o r e  y e a r s  o f  e d u c a t i o n  ( a m o n g  p e o p l e  w i t h  2 5  o r  m o r e  y e a r s  o f  a g e ) ,  a n d  
s t a t e
i n c o m e  g r o w t h ;  s t a t e  h e r f i n d a h l  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  a  h e r f i n d a h l  i n d e x  c o m p u t e d  f r o m  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  e a c h  o f  s e v e r a l
e c o n o m i c  s e c t o r s  t o  t h e  G r o s s  S t a t e  P r o d u c t  a n d  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  
o f  t h i s  m e a s u r e  w i t h  t h e  i n - s t a t e  d u m m y .  T h e  i n - s t a t e
d u m m y  e q u a l s  1  i f  t h e  s t a t e  
t h e  c o u n t y  i s  
i n  h a s  m o r e  t h a n  
t w o - t h i r d s  ( 6 6 % )  
o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  t h a t  m e d i a  
m a r k e t ,
a n d  z e r o  i f  i t  h a s  l e s s  t h a n  o n e - t h i r d  ( 3 3 % ) .  S h a r e  i n c u m b e n t  a n d  s h a r e  o p p o n e n t  r e f e r  t o  t h e  t o t a l  s h a r e  o f
c o n n e c t e d - P A C s  m o n e y  i n  c a m p a i g n  r e c e i p t s .  I n  c o l u m n s  1  a n d  2 ,  t h e s e  s h a r e s  a r e  d e m e a n e d  b e f o r e  i n t e r a c t i n g
t h e m  w i t h  t h e  i n - s t a t e  d u m m y .  S e e  t h e  t e x t  a n d  D a t a  A p p e n d i x  f o r  d e t a i l e d  d a t a  d e f i n i t i o n s  a n d  s o u r c e s .
Table 8. Concentration indices and news about campaign contributions
Dependent Variable:
herfindahl (PAC level) herfindahl (industry level) total PAC contributions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PAC stories/Total stories 0.993 0.984 0.887 0.869 -205,697 -91,968
(0.161) (0.159) (0.155) (0.156) (144,480) (158,422)
Total number of candidate stories -0.000154 -9.23e-05 -0.000253 -0.000198 1,245 1,239
(0.000138) (0.000119) (0.000127) (0.000112) (419.2) (423.0)
Observations 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175
R-squared 0.322 0.192 0.324 0.404 0.309 0.411 0.521 0.561 0.561
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. All specifications include a full set of year fixed effects, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the candidate is
Democratic and a dummy variable that equals one if the canidate is the incumbent. Total number of stories refer to the number of stories in which
keywords identifying the candidate name and the word "senate" or "senator" appears in a story. Total number of PAC stories are those in which, in
addition, the story contains the keywords "PAC" and "money". The search window is two months before each election. Appendix Table 3 shows the
sample of states included each year (and the number of newspapers on which the automated search was done), as well as basic summary statistics
Table 9. Media markets and turnout, US Senate 1980-2002
Dependent variable: ratio of total votes in senate race to population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
state and state x party state x party state and state x party state x party state and state x party state x party
Fixed effects: year year x party year x party year year x party year x party year year x party year x party
in state dummy 0.00473 0.00461 0.0155
(0.00415) (0.00417) (0.00361)
in state and contiguous 0.0168 0.017 0.0205
dummy (0.00534) (0.00537) (0.00413)
placebo in state and -0.0123 -0.0123 -0.00207
contiguous dummy (0.00503) (0.00506) (0.00389)
Population control
Observations 10,331 10,331 10,331 2,782 2,782 2,782 2,675 2,675 2,675
R-squared 0.546 0.564 0.650 0.520 0.534 0.689 0.554 0.570 0.707
Standard errors, clustered by county, in parenthesis. In columns 1-3, the in-state dummy equals 1 if the state the county is in has more than two-thirds
(66%) of the population of that media market, and zero if it has less than one-third (33%). In columns 4-6, to the latter conditions the in-state county must
border an out-of-state county in the same state for the dummy to be equal to 1. In columns 7-9 the placebo in-state dummy equals 0 for in-state and
contiguos counties as defined in columns 4-6, and 1 for their in-state neighbors. Columns 3, 6 and 9 include total population in the right hand side. The
fixed effects included in each regression are noted in the title of each column.
T a b l e  1 0 .  M e d i a  m a r k e t s  
a n d  t u r n o u t  r e s p o n s e  t o  
c a m p a i g n  f i n a n c e  
c o n c e n t r a t i o n ,
U S  S e n a t e  1 9 8 0 - 2 0 0 2
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e :  r a t i o  
o f  t o t a l  v o t e s  
i n  s e n a t e  r a c e  t o  p o p u l a t i o n
( 1 )  ( 2 )  ( 3 )  
( 4 )  ( 5 )  ( 6 )
C o u n t y  
f i x e d  
e f f e c t s ,
i n - s t a t e  a n d
S t a t e  f i x e d  e f f e c t s  
C o u n t y  f i x e d  
e f f e c t s  c o n t i g u o u s  o n l y
i n  s t a t e  d u m m y  
0 . 0 0 4 3 3  
0 . 0 1 2 1
( 0 . 0 0 4 2 2 )  
( 0 . 0 0 3 0 7 )
h e r f i n d a h l  i n c u m b e n t  
- 0 . 0 0 2 1 9  
- 0 . 0 0 6 7 4  - 0 . 0 1 6 2  - 0 . 0 1 1 6  
- 0 . 0 2 0 0  - 0 . 0 1 6 9
( 0 . 0 1 8 6 )  ( 0 . 0 1 5 8 )  ( 0 . 0 1 4 9 )  ( 0 . 0 1 5 3 )  ( 0 . 0 1 5 6 )  ( 0 . 0 1 6 5 )
h e r f i n d a h l  o p p o n e n t  
- 0 . 0 2 5 3  
- 0 . 0 0 6 9 9  - 0 . 0 1 1 2  
0 . 0 0 1 7 3  - 0 . 0 0 9 5 8  0 . 0 0 3 8 6
( 0 . 0 0 8 4 6 )  
( 0 . 0 0 5 5 2 )  ( 0 . 0 0 6 3 4 )  ( 0 . 0 0 6 0 9 )  ( 0 . 0 0 6 5 9 )  ( 0 . 0 0 6 7 7 )
i n  s t a t e  d u m m y  
x  h e r f i n d a h l  i n c u m b e n t  - 0 . 0 0 9 2 9  
0 . 0 1 0 1  0 . 0 0 8 0 3  
0 . 0 0 5 5 0  - 0 . 0 0 8 6 9  - 0 . 0 0 5 7 4
( 0 . 0 2 0 3 )  ( 0 . 0 1 6 5 )  
( 0 . 0 1 5 8 )  ( 0 . 0 1 5 9 )  ( 0 . 0 1 8 5 )  ( 0 . 0 1 8 2 )
i n  s t a t e  
d u m m y  x  h e r f i n d a h l  
o p p o n e n t  0 . 0 2  
0 . 0 1 7 2  0 . 0 0 3 8 9  0 . 0 0 2 4 7  
- 0 . 0 1 0 4  
- 0 . 0 1 4 3
( 0 . 0 0 9 2 8 )  ( 0 . 0 0 5 8 0 )  ( 0 . 0 0 6 5 6 )  
( 0 . 0 0 6 3 1 )  ( 0 . 0 0 8 1 9 )  ( 0 . 0 0 8 1 1 )
S t a t e  h e r f i n d a h l
C a m p a i g n  
f i n a n c e  c o n t r o l s
C o u n t y  c o n t r o l s
O b s e r v a t i o n s  
9 , 5 3 2  9 , 5 2 7  
9 , 5 3 2  9 , 5 2 7  
2 , 6 2 3  2 , 6 2 3
R - s q u a r e d  
0 . 5 6 1  0 . 7 4 9  
0 . 9 2 3  
0 . 9 3 1  0 . 9 1 9  0 . 9 2 6
S t a n d a r d  e r r o r s ,  c l u s t e r e d  b y  
c o u n t y ,  i n  p a r e n t h e s i s .  I n  c o l u m n s  
1 - 2 ,  r e g r e s s i o n s  i n c l u d e  a  f u l l  s e t  o f  s t a t e  x  p a r t y  a n d
y e a r  x  p a r t y  f i x e d  e f f e c t s .  
I n  c o l u m n s  3 - 6 ,  
r e g r e s s i o n s  i n c l u d e  a  f u l l  s e t  o f  c o u n t y  x  p a r t y  
a n d  y e a r  x  p a r t y  f i x e d  
e f f e c t s .
I n  c o l u m n s  5  a n d  6  o n l y  c o n t i g u o u s  c o u n t i e s  
a r e  i n c l u d e d .  
I n  e v e n  c o l u m n s ,  c a m p a i g n  
f i n a n c e  c o n t r o l s  
i n c l u d e  t o t a l
c a m p a i g n  r e c e i p t s ,  a n d  t o t a l  c a m p a i g n  
r e c e i p t s  f r o m  c o n n e c t e d  
P A C s ,  f o r  t h e  i n c u m b e n t  
a n d  h i s  o p p o n e n t  
( i n  2 0 0 0
U S $  
t h o u s a n d s  o f  d o l l a r s ) ;  
c o u n t y  c o n t r o l s  i n c l u d e  r e a l  p e r  c a p i t a  i n c o m e  
( i n  2 0 0 0  U S $  d o l l a r s ) ,  
p o p u l a t i o n ,  p o p u l a t i o n
d e n s i t y ,  p e r c e n t  
o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  u n d e r  1 8 ,  
p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  
o v e r  6 5 ,  
p e r c e n t  f e m a l e ,  
p e r c e n t  b l a c k ,  p e r c e n t
u r b a n ,  p e r c e n t  w i t h  
a  h i g h  1 2  o r  m o r e  y e a r s  
o f  e d u c a t i o n  ( a m o n g  
p e o p l e  w i t h  2 5  o r  
m o r e  y e a r s  o f  a g e ) ,  a n d  s t a t e
i n c o m e  g r o w t h ;  
s t a t e  h e r f i n d a h l  
c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  
a  h e r f i n d a h l  i n d e x  c o m p u t e d  f r o m  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
o f  e a c h  o f  s e v e r a l
e c o n o m i c  
s e c t o r s  t o  
t h e  G r o s s  S t a t e  
P r o d u c t  a n d  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  
t h i s  m e a s u r e  w i t h  
t h e  i n - s t a t e  d u m m y .  T h e  
i n - s t a t e
d u m m y  
e q u a l s  1  i f  t h e  s t a t e  
t h e  c o u n t y  i s  i n  h a s  m o r e  t h a n  t w o - t h i r d s  ( 6 6 % )  
o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  
o f  t h a t  m e d i a  m a r k e t ,
a n d  z e r o  i f  i t  h a s  l e s s  t h a n  o n e 4 h i r d  ( 3 3 % ) .  
F o r  t h e  h e r f i n d a h l  a t  
t h e  P A C  ( i n d u s t r y )  
l e v e l ,  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  f r o m  
e a c h
P A C  
( i n d u s t r y )  i s  e x p r e s s e d  
a s  a  s h a r e  o f  t h e  
t o t a l  P A C  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t o  t h e  c a n d i d a t e ,  a n d  t h e  i n d e x  c o r r e s p o n d s  
t o
t h e  
s u m  o f  t h e  s q u a r e s  
o f  s u c h  s h a r e s .  
I n  c o l u m n s  
I  a n d  2 ,  t h e s e  i n d i c e s  a r e  d e m e a n e d  
b e f o r e  i n t e r a c t i n g  
t h e m  w i t h
t h e  i n - s t a t e  d u m m y .  S e e  
t h e  t e x t  a n d  D a t a  A p p e n d i x  f o r  d e t a i l e d  d a t a  d e f i n i t i o n s  
a n d  s o u r c e s .
T a b l e  1 1 .  S p i l l o v e r s :  
M e d i a  m a r k e t s  a n d  r e s p o n s e  o f  H o u s e  a n d  P r e s i d e n t i a l  v o t e  t o  S e n a t e
r a c e  c a m p a i g n  f i n a n c e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n ,  1 9 8 0 - 2 0 0 2
( 1 )  
( 2 )  
( 3 )  
( 4 )
D e p e n d e n t  
v a r i a b l e :
( 5 )  - ( 6 )
H e r f i n d a h l  a t  l e v e l :
s h a r e  o f  t w o - p a r t y
v o t e  t o  p r e s i d e n t i a l
c a n d i d a t e  o f
i n c u m b e n t ' s  p a r t y
P A C  
I n d u s t r y
s h a r e  o f  t w o - p a r t y  v o t e  t o  h o u s e
c a n d i d a t e  o f  i n c u m b e n t ' s  p a r t y
P A C  I n d u s t r y  
P A C  I n d u s t r y
h e r f i n d a h l  i n c u m b e n t
h e r f i d n a h l  o p p o n e n t
i n  s t a t e  d u m m y  x  h e r f i n d a h l
i n c u m b e n t
i n  s t a t e  d u m m y  x  h e r f i n d a h l
o p p o n e n t
C o n t r o l  f o r  h o u s e  
c a n d i d a t e
h e r f i n d a h l
O b s e r v a t i o n s
R - s q u a r e d
- 0 . 2 4 0  - 0 . 4 5 7  - 3 . 4 6 6  
- 1 . 8 4 5  - 2 . 5 3 8  - 0 . 0 2 2 7
( 0 . 1 9 5 )  
( 0 . 2 4 9 )  ( 0 . 7 7 4 )  ( 0 . 9 9 5 )  ( 0 . 7 3 8 )  ( 1 . 3 9 4 )
- 0 . 0 0 4 2 2  
- 0 . 0 1 5 1  - 0 . 1 7 9  - 0 . 1 4 1  - 0 . 0 6 2 1  - 0 . 0 2 8 9
( 0 . 0 2 4 6 )  ( 0 . 0 2 6 6 )  ( 0 . 0 6 4 0 )  ( 0 . 0 6 8 3 )  ( 0 . 0 4 8 3 )  ( 0 . 0 5 5 0 )
0 . 1 9 0  0 . 2 3 4  - 0 . 5 9 4  - 0 . 5 9 5  - 0 - 2 1 0  - 0 . 1 1 0
( 0 . 1 4 9 )  ( 0 . 1 6 9 )  ( 0 . 3 1 6 )  
( 0 . 4 4 5 )  ( 0 . 1 9 8 )  ( 0 . 3 1 6 )
0 . 0 1 0 2  0 . 0 0 5 1 3  0 . 1 2 8  
0 . 0 9 9 2  0 . 0 6 2 2  0 . 0 3 4 9
( 0 . 0 2 3 9 )  ( 0 . 0 2 6 7 )  ( 0 . 0 8 0 1 )  ( 0 . 0 7 8 7 )  
( 0 . 0 5 2 7 )  ( 0 . 0 5 5 9 )
1 , 3 2 4  1 , 3 2 4
0 . 9 6 4  0 . 9 6 4
1 , 3 2 1  1 , 3 2 1  1 , 1 6 9  1 , 1 6 9
0 . 8 4 9  
0 . 8 4 1  0 . 8 9 9  
0 . 9 0 2
S t a n d a r d  
e r r o r s ,  c l u s t e r e d  b y  c o u n t y ,  i n  p a r e n t h e s i s .  A l l  r e g r e s s i o n s  i n c l u d e  
a  f u l l  s e t  o f  c o u n t y  x
p a r t y  a n d  y e a r  x  p a r t y  f i x e d  e f f e c t s .  C a m p a i g n  f i n a n c e  c o n t r o l s ,  c o u n t y  c o n t r o l s ,  a n d  s t a t e
h e r f i n d a h l  
c o n t r o l s  a s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  T a b l e  2  a r e  i n c l u d e d  i n  a l l  r e g r e s s i o n s .  T h e  i n - s t a t e  d u m m y  
i s
l i m i t e d  t o  c o n t i g u o u s  c o u n t i e s  a n d  e q u a l s  1  i f  t h e  s t a t e  t h e  c o u n t y  i s  i n  h a s  m o r e  t h a n  t w o - t h i r d s
( 6 6 % )  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  t h a t  
m e d i a  m a r k e t ,  a n d  z e r o  i f  i t  h a s  l e s s  t h a n  o n e - t h i r d  ( 3 3 % ) .  F o r  t h e
h e r f i n d a h l  a t  t h e  
P A C  ( i n d u s t r y )  l e v e l ,  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  f r o m  e a c h  P A C  ( i n d u s t r y )  
i s  e x p r e s s e d  a s  a
s h a r e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  P A C  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t o  t h e  c a n d i d a t e ,  a n d  t h e  i n d e x  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  
t h e  s u m  o f  t h e
s q u a r e s  o f  s u c h  s h a r e s .  N o t e  t h a t  t h e s e  m e a s u r e s  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  c a m p a i g n  
f i n a n c e  c o n t r o l s  i n  t h e
r i g h t  h a n d  
s i d e  o f  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  r e f e r  t o  t h e  s e n a t e  c a n d i d a t e s ,  
w h e r e a s  t h e  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s
f o r  h o u s e  c a n d i d a t e s  a n d  p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e s  a s  d e s c r i b e d  
i n  t h e  c o l u m n  t i t l e s .  S e e  t h e  t e x t
a n d  D a t a  A p p e n d i x  f o r  d e t a i l e d  d a t a  d e f i n i t i o n s  a n d  s o u r c e s .
Table 12. Spillovers: Out-of-state counties response to neighboring state campaign finance profiles in Senate
races, 1980-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable is incumbent shar. of the two-party vote
Industry Industry Industry
PAC level level PAC level level PAC level level
herfindahl incumbent
herfindahl opponent
-0.0224 -0.0687
(0.130) (0.0982)
0.0393 0.0559
(0.0516) (0.0591)
herfindahl for neighboring state,
incumbent's party
herfindahl for neighboring state,
opponent's party
Difference in herfindahls (incumbent-
incumbent's party in neighboring state)
Difference in herfindahls (opponent-
opponent's party in neighboring state)
Observations
R-sauared
551
0.901
-0.00475 0.0240
(0.0575) (0.0644)
-0.0125 -0.0182
(0.0395) (0.0386)
-0.00282 0.00276
(0.0503) (0.0555)
0.0433 0.0403
(0.0315) (0.0316)
574
0.902
574
0.902
551
0.902
551
0.902
551
0.902
Standard errors, clustered by county, in parenthesis. All regressions include a full set of county x party and year x
partyfixed effects. All regressions include campaign finance controls, county controls, and the state herfindahl as defined
in Table 2. Only out-of-state counties are included, that is if the state the county is in has less than one-third (33%) of the
population of the media market. For the herfindahl at the PAC (industry) level, the contribution from each PAC (industry)
is expressed as a share of the total PAC contributions to the candidate, and the index corresponds to the sum of the
squares of such shares. See the text and Data Appendix for detailed data definitions and sources.
Table 13. Media markets and electoral response to campaign finance concentration, US Senate 1980-2002
Robustness to media market definition
Dependent variable: share of the two-party vote received by the incumbent
In-state= if the state the county is in has more than x% of the population of that
media market out-of-state: if it has less than (100-x)%.
x=50 x=60 x=70
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
herfindah at level PAC industry PAC industry PAC industry
PANEL A: in state versus out of state
in state dummy x herfindahl incumbent -0.0653 -0.0619 -0.0688 -0.0652 -0.0827 -0.0786
(0.0172) (0.0227) (0.0175) (0.0237) (0.0190) (0.0262)
in state dummy x herfindahl opponent -0.00204 -0.00891 0.0148 0.0108 0.0184 0.00127
(0.0156) (0.0172) (0.0168) (0.0181) (0.0220) (0.0243)
State Herfindahl, Campaign finance, and county controls Y
Observations 12,922 12,922 11,946 11,946 8,379 8,379
R-squared 0.836 0.837 0.833 0.835 0-835 0.836
PANEL B: in state and contiguous versus out of state
in state dummy x herfindahi incumbent -0.064 -0.0628 -0.0627 -0,0615 -0.0697 -0.0644
(0.0241) (0.0287) (0.0238) (0.0285) (0.0256) (0.0302)
in state dummy x herfindahl opponent 0.0165 0.0116 0.0356 0.0309 0.0160 -0.000127
(0.0194) (0-0210) (0.0226) (0.0235) (0.0313) (0.0335)
State Herfindahl, Campaign finance, and county controls 41 4q
Observations 3,999 3,999 3,580 3.580 2,084 2,084
R-squared 0.841 0.843 0.840 0.843 0.840 0.842
Standard errors, clustered by county, in parenthesis. All regressions include a full set of county x party and year x partyfixed effects .
Campaign finance controls include the total campaign receipts, and total campaign receips from connected PACs, for the incumbent and his
opponent (in 2000 US$ thousands of dollars). County controls include real per capita income (in 2000 US$ dollars), population, population
density, percent of the population under 18, percent of the population over 65, percent female, percent black, percent urban, percent with a
high 12 or more years of education (among people with 25 or more years of age), and state Income growth. The in-state dummy is defined as
described in each column title. However, in Panel B in addition to the stated conditions the in-state county must border an out-of-state county
in the same state for the dummy to be equal to i For the herfindah at the PAC (industry) level, the contribution from each PAC (industry) is
expressed as a share of the total PAC contributions to the candidate, and the index corresponds to the sum of the squares of such shares.
State herfindahl corresponds to a similar index computed from the contribution of each of several economic sectors to the Gross State
Product. The direct effects of the herfindahl of the incumbent and the opponent, as well as the direct effect of the state herfindahl and its
interaction with the in state dummy, are always included. See the text and Data Appendix for detailed data definitions and sources.
Table 14. Media markets and electoral response to campaign finance concentration, US Senate 1980-2002
Robustness to Media Market Definition
Dependent variable: share of the two-party vote received by the incumbent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
County fixed effects,
in-state and
State fixed effects County fixed effects contiguous only
Panel A: herfindahl at PAC level
ratio in state 0.00625 0.00365 0.183 0.0882 -0.0364 0.0318
(0.00416) (0.00411) (0.0457) (0.0339) (0.118) (0.0901)
herfindahl incumbent 0.0938 0.0535 0.0688 0.0232 0.0314 0.00198(0.0136) (0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0129) (0.0225) (0.0250)
herfindahi opponent 0.0952 0.0282 0.0985 0.0275 0.106 0.0455(0.00880) (0.00875) (0.0104) (0.00995) (0.0160) (0.0164)
ratio in state x herfindahl incumbent -0.202 -0.166 -0.134 -0.0816 -0.103 -0.0798
(0.0269) (0.0258) (0.0245) (0.0207) (0.0365) (0.0277)
ratio in state x herfindahl opponent -0.00278 0.00986 -0.0117 0.00684 0.0220 0.0347
(0.0193) (0.0185) (0.0209) (0.0185) (0.0340) (0.0319)
Campaign finance, county, and state herfindahl controls '
Observations 10,305 10,300 10,305 10,300 2,623 2,623
R-squared 0.279 0.363 0.748 0.829 0765 0.831
Panel B: herfindahl at interest group (industry) level
ratio in state 0.00580 0.00339 0.193 0.0952 -0.0224 0.0393
(0.00415) (0.00411) (0.0456) (0.0345) (0.122) (0.0929)
herfindahl incumbent 0.0498 0.0328 0.0195 -0.00129 -0.0147 -0.0243
(0.0158) (0.0144) (0.0199) (0.0157) (0.0262) (0.0256)
herfindahl opponent 0.129 0.0402 0.138 0.0435 0.136 0-0626
(0.00992) (0.0100) (0.0120) (0.0117) (0.0179) (0.0187)
ratio in state x herfindahl incumbent -0.18 -0.141 -0.113 -0.0619 -0.0986 -0.067
(0.0284) (0.0267) (0.0352) (0.0268) (0.0424) (0.0326)
ratio in state x herfindahl opponent -0.00234 0.0126 -0.0286 -0.00312 0.00846 0.0237
(0.0219) (0.0213) (0.0247) (0.0222) (0.0385) (0.0362)
Campaign finance, county, and state herfindahl controls
Observations 10,305 10,300 10.305 10,300 2,623 2,623
R-squared 0.287 0.363 0.755 0.830 0.771 0.832
Standard errors, clustered by county, in parenthesis. Regressions in columns 1-2 include a full set of state x party and year x party
fixed effects, and in columns 3-6 a full set of county x party and year x party fixed effects. Campaign finance, county controls and state
herfindahl controls are as defined in Table 2. In columns 5 and 6, only the set of contiguous in-state and out-of-state counties as
defined in Table 3 are included in the regression. For each county in state s and media market m, the variable "ratio in state" refers to
the share of the media market population that is in state s. For the herfindahl at the PAC (industry) level, the contribution from each
PAC (industry) is expressed as a share of the total PAC contributions to the candidate, and the index corresponds to the sum of the
squares of such shares. The ratio in state and herfindahl indices are demeaned before interacting. State heriindahl corresponds to a
similar index computed from the contribution of each of several economic sectors to the Gross State Product. See the text and Data
Appendix for detailed data definitions and sources.
Appendix Table 1: Main variables socires and definitions
Vanable Description Source
Electoral results
incumbent share of the two- Total votes obtained by the incumbent senator divided by Election data and incumbency
party vote total votes for the Republican and Democratic candidate, status is onstructed from a
1980-2002, calculated at the county level Open seats and variety of sources by
unchalleraed races are droooed from the anaNsis. Ansotabehere and S er
These data run through 2000 and
Share of two-party vote to Total votes obtained by the presidential candidate of the were updated from similar
presidential candidate of same party as the incumbent senator divided by total votes s and kindy shrd by the
incumbents party for the Republican and Democratic presidential cdidates authors. The main onianal
1960-2002, calculated at the county level. For the sample of sore aeICPS study nuite
senate races included in the analysis and for the years in 13 (General Election Data for the
which there is a presidential election. Un States, 1950-1990), and
America Votes (1 992. 1994, 1996.
1998, and 2000). The House
Share of two-party vote to house Total votes obtained by the Congress (House) candidate of election variables are available
candidate of incumbents party the same party as the incumbent senator divided by total from Snyder and Str6nters
votes for the Republican and Democratic House candidates, Q2oir repication dataset
1980-2002, calcilated at the county level. For counties with
multiple congressional districts the votes for all the
Democratic and Republican candidates runring for Congress
in a county are added to find the Democratic and Republican
vote share per county.
Campaig contribeations
Total campaign receipts (2000 Total campaign contributions from any source to the given
uS) candidate dring the two-yeav electoral cycle preceeding the
election, deflated by the consumer price index to express in
constant 2000 US dcllarsT Sources of funds include
connected PACZ ideologcawsingle-issue PACp, indf siduals.
party comnittess and other can1idates. Federal Elections Cortissort
Conittee master iles, candidate
Receipts from connected Total contributions from connected PACs to the candidate master fles, and dternted
(special interest) PACs (2000 during the two-year electoral cycle preceeding the election, oitribti~ois files. The fternted
us $) deflated by the consumer price index to express in constant connittee contributions file
2000 US dollars. Connected PACs include all inn-party containing each PAC contiboution
contieees classified by the FEC as sponsored by a is matched to the other files using
corporation, Labor organization. rnerterrship organization, the ID nunterof the conibuting
trade association, cooperatie, or corporation without capital onvrittee and th00e ID number of
stock. Theyexclude ideologcal and single-issue PAC as the reciient (see
well as partc committe o and trbutions f othe httpilwf-fecgovntcedisclos
candedates. ureaetsll) Total campaign
receipts and total froR connected
Hedindahl index of PAC Financial contributions (24K) and in-kind contributions (24Z) PACt are availale from the
contributions (PAC level) fom each PAC are expressed as a share of the total PAC candidates master lies, Whereas
contributions to the candidate, and he index corresponds to for the herindah iices the
the sucm of the squares of such shares- Contributions are or iteied contribution tiles are
the two-year electoral cycle preceeding the eleceion- necessary. For industry
classification, the soprce is Center
for Responsive Politics and
Hetfindahl index of PAC Financial contributons (24K) and in-kind contributions (24Z) author's adjustmnents, as
contribrInons (industcy level) from each PAC are classified into a sine industry as explained inAppendix section 2.
explained in the main text Indtry contrbons are
expressed as a share of the tal PAC coributions to the
candidate, and the index corresponids to the sum of the
squares of such shares and are for the two-year electoral
cycle prceeding the election.
Appendix Table I (continued): Variable Sources and DefinitionE
Varnable escription source
Media Markets
In-state dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 ithe county is 'in-state" and zero
if it is out-of-state. Each county in the sanle is assigned to
one TV market or Area of Dominance Influence A couny is Data and media market
"in-state' if the state the county is in has more than x% of the dftions from Aebeere.
population of the media market, and ot-of-state' if the state Siowberg and Snyde (2W6L
the county is in has less than (100-x)% of such population, for Area of Donance Influence,
x greater than or equal to 50. Unless othernise stated, the ctruted by Aibitroof, are
analysis in the paper uses x-66. Only counties that were o from Broadcast and
doninated by the same state are considered in the baseline Cable in 1980 1990 and 2Q00
analysis in the paper.
In-stale and contiguous dlumm~y Identical to the In-state dunrndy except thae in addition f e Snowerg and
latter conditions, the in-state county must border an out-at- Snyder (206; Broadcast aid
state county in thie same state for the- variable to be equal to Cable in 1980,1990, and 200ff
- That is. the n-state and contigons dummy is Ike the in-
state dumrmy but excludes from the analysis af in-state
counties that are not contiguous to other out-of-tate counties
in t same state
Placebo in-state and contiguous Dummy vanable equa to zero for the in-state and contiguous Ansolabehere, Snowterg and
dtmmy counties as defined by the in-state and continuous dut-oy Snyder (2006); Broadcast and
and one for neighboring I-state counties in the same state- Cable in 1980, 1990, and 200.
Overwhielmed states States-years where less than two-hkds of the- population Ansolabeflere, Sncrwterg and
lived in rn-state doin-ated media uodetsm as deliked above- Snyder(2061; Broadcast and
Counties in these states are excuded from the analysis. Cable in 198 01990, and 200.
Ratio in state For each county c in state sand media market (Area of Ansolabehere. Snowberg and
Dor sdnance Influencel m ratio of the population of media Snyder (2006); Broadcast and
market ni residing in state s to the total population of tart Cable 1980, 1990, and 2000.
M.
Other variables and controls
Real per capita personal income County-evel per capita personal income in constant prices Regioal Economic nformation
(2,000 US$1. Nominal tigrures frm Bureau of Economic System, Bureau of Economic
Analysis deflated at the Consumer rice Index- Analysis U.S Department of
Commnerce
PopuRation and population County population. an county population per s(uare mile. US Census Bureau
density
% unider 18D % over 65o % Percent of the populaton in each category at the county le . nUS Census Bureau
female, % blackm % 12 years or Except in dine case of percent of population wit 12 or more
more of school (persons 25+1, years of school which is computed with respect to total county
% urban population of 25 or more years of age, percents ar with
resoect to total oooutabon.
State-level grc rth Yearly percentage change in real state per capita personal Regional Economic Information
Income Real sate per capita personal income a t e nominal System, Bureau of Economic
value reported by the BEA deflated by Consumer Price Index. Analysis, U.S. Department of
Commerce
State herfindahl Sum of the squares of the contribution shares of each Regional Economic Information
economic sector to the total Gross Stat Product Systemn, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, U.S. Department of
Commerce
Total Stories and PAC stories Total stoines-number of news stories in the two months r n calculao based on
leading t an election appearing containing the candidas automated news search on
name and the words"senate" or "senatcoer.' iewsLibraryuco. Search limited
PAC stories-o the total stories for a candidate in a given for newspapers of the state where
electiod nut erwhich inrude, in addition the keywords the candidate runs for office.
"PAC sanr "mnneve
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Appenix Table 3: Automated News Searches
Candidate news stories Candidate rnvs stories
about candidates (total CEscLsing PAC money Ratio of PAC
stories) (PAC stories) sories/total stories
Number of
yea States newSpapers mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
1982 MA 1 44.5 34.6 2.50 0.71 0.07 0.04
1984 OK 1 20.0 283 0.50 0.71 0.03 .
1986 CA FL, GA IL, IN, OH, OK, WA 18 109.9 88.1 3.25 2.98 0.04 0.02
1988 CA IN, MA, MN, OH, TX, UT 18 77.3 90.6 0.93 1.38 0.01 0.01
1990 IL. IN, LA MA, MN, NC, OK, OR, TN,
TX 24 106.9 104.8 1.60 2.11 0.02 0.02
1992 AL, AZ, CT, FL, GA, IA, IL, IN, NC,
OH, OK, OR, WI 36 78.0 87.5 2.92 4.92 0.04 0.04
1994 CA, CT, FL.IN, MA, MS, UT., WA, W1
40 131.5 142.7 1.94 2.80 0.01 0.01
1996 LA, MA, MI, MN, MS, NC, NM, OK,
TN, TX 31 105.3 104.9 2.70 3.06 0.08 0.23
1998 AL,. AZ, CA, GO, CT, FL., GA, 1A, IL,
NC, NV, OK, OR,. UT, WAv WI 95 98.4 104.2 1.75 2.74 0.02 0.03
2000 CA CT, IN, MA ME, MI, MN, MS,
OH, TN, TX, UT, WA, WI 74 84.6 8&6 1.43 3.64 0.01 0.02
2002 ALCOGAYLAIDILMEMMN,
NE, NM, Ol, OR 44 59.7 59.7 0.69 1.12 0.01 0.02
Total 139 9L5 97.1 1.87 3.07 0.03 0.08
1.C Figures
Figure 1. The Denver-CO and Lincoln-NE
Areas of Dominance Influence
Note: Counties in the Denver-CO Area of Dominance Influence (for 1980) are shown hatched,
and those in the Lincoln-NE Area of Dominance influence (for 1980) are shaded.
Chapter 2
Population Surges and Social Conflict1
2.1 Introduction
Civil wars have been one of the most major social events of the past several decades, creating
enormous economic costs and human suffering in many countries2 . Standard measures indicate
that, since 1960, internal violent conflicts of lower intensity have affected half of all nations in the
world, and a third of all countries have suffered more intense civil wars (Blattman and Miguel,
2010).
This paper investigates the effect of population growth on violent conflict. Obviously, population
growth and armed conflict can be jointly determined. There may be reverse causation, for instance
if only peaceful countries can sustain population growth. Also, omitted variables may cause both
population and conflict, and without properly controlling for such a variable we may spuriously
estimate a causal effect of population on conflict when there is none. To solve these problems,
we follow Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) in using the international epidemiological transition (the
large improvements in life expectancy driven by international health interventions, more effective
public health measures and the introduction of new chemicals and drugs that began in the 1940s).
This "natural experiment" provides us with an empirical strategy to isolate potentially-exogenous
changes in population. In particular, the effects of the international epidemiological transition on
a country's life expectancy and population were related to the extent to which its population was
initially (circa 1940) affected by various specific diseases. Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) construct
'This Chapter was written with Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson.
2We thank seminar participants at MIT's development lunch, the University of Chicago, the XXII Annual Con-
ference of the European Society for Population Economics at UCL, Universidad de los Andes, and Universidad del
Rosario. Ioannis Tokatlidis provided superb research assistance.
an instrument for population growth based on this pre-intervention distribution of mortality from
various diseases around the world, and the dates of global intervention. The only source of variation
in this variable, referred to as the "predicted mortality" instrument, comes from the interaction of
baseline cross-country disease prevalence with global intervention dates for specific diseases. Since
these innovations were exogenous to the conditions of each particular country, and since the instru-
ment does not rely on the efficacy of each country's application of global programs, it provides the
exogenous source of variation in population growth we are interested in.
Using this strategy, we find that countries with higher (exogenous) increases in population
experimented higher increases in social conflict. Using various definitions of civil war and conflict
commonly used in the literature, the instrumented changes in population have a significant and
positive effect on the share of years per decade in which a country experiences civil war or conflict.
The magnitude of our estimates indicate that a rise in log population of about 0.65 from 1940 to
1980, corresponding to the average change in (log) population in our sample of countries, causes
roughly 4.3 additional years with civil war in 1980 relative to 1940. When considering lower intensity
conflicts, the corresponding predicted effect is similar, of about 4.1 more years in conflict in 1980.
Our sample includes 65 countries listed in Appendix Table 1. Of these, 47 countries have
complete data from 1940 or earlier (and include ten countries in Asia, 17 in Europe, 16 in Latin
America, Australia and New Zealand, and Canada and the US). The remaining 18 countries, for
which we have data from 1950 or 1960, include 12 non-Eastern European countries (four in Africa,
six in Asia, two in Latin America) and six Eastern European countries. Thus, our sample has a
good coverage of most regions in the world, with the exception of Africa. Of course, given the
prevalence of violent civil conflict in Africa, this is an important limitation, but one that we cannot
overcome with the available data. In particular, most African countries lack reliable data on causes
of death disaggregated by disease dating back to the 1940s, and this is essential for our identification
strategy.
However, in our sample, our results are robust to a wide variety of checks. Regressions using
an alternative instrument show that our results are not driven by the choice for dating global
interventions. In the alternative instrument, each country's initial mortality rate is assumed to
decrease at the pace of the global mortality rate for the disease in question. Hence, this instrument
is independent of the coding of global interventions.
Moreover, we verify that the connection between the predicted mortality instrument and conflict
is not driven by a general long-run trend. More specifically, we conduct a simple falsification test
using information on conflict prior to the epidemiological transition, from 1900 to 1940. Using
this information, we find that while the change in our instrument from 1940 to 1980 is correlated
with changes in conflict over the same period, it has no predictive power on the changes over
the prior period. This simple "placebo" test gives additional support to the approach, by ruling
out the possibility that these two variables are spuriously correlated because they follow a more
fundamental long-run trend caused by a third factor.
Additional evidence suggests that the effect of predicted mortality works through changes in
overall population, and not through changes in the age composition of the population induced by
the international epidemiological transition. Indeed, there is no significant correlation in our sample
between age composition and conflict. Part of the reason for this may be the fact that our set of
diseases includes diseases that affect both adults and children. Also, by 1980 or after, when most
of the change in conflict is observed, any changes in the demographic structure induced by the
international epidemiological transition are much reduced.
Since civil wars are hard to measure, we make sure that our results are robust to using several
different measures of internal armed conflict. The "Correlates of War" dataset, that covers a longer
period than other sources and allows us to conduct our basic placebo test, constitutes our baseline
source. We also use the backdated version of the Uppsala Conflict Data Project put together by
the International Peace Research Institute. This alternative provides a lower threshold of annual
deaths for inclusion, verifying that our results are present with low-intensity conflicts and not only
limited to major civil wars. We also verify that our results hold when following Fearon and Laitin's
(2003) suggestion of coding anticolonial wars as occurring within the empire in question. Also
importantly, we verify that other related variables, such as state failure from the Polity IV State
Failure Task Force, similarly increase for countries with higher exogenous increases in population.
Moreover, our results are present when examining both the simple presence or absence of civil war,
and also the intensity of conflict as measured by available estimates of battle-related deaths.
The evidence also indicates that our results are not spuriously identifying a relationship between
population and conflict that is truly explained by differential trends (between countries with high
and low population growth) caused by an omitted variable. The results hold when controlling
for differential trends, parametrized as functions of various baseline country characteristics. For
instance, since our results may in part be about wars that followed independence, we allow for
differential trends depending on whether countries were already independent or not in 1940, finding
similar results. Other baseline characteristics include the average quality of institutions, initial
population and initial GDP. We do a similar check with variables that have often been emphasized
in the literature on conflict, such as ethnolinguistic fractionalization, religion, and availability of
natural resources.
The 1940s were of course a decade of big wars. To take this into account we not only examine the
implications of population growth on conflict by examining panel regressions that exploit decade
by decade changes in population from 1940 to 1980. We also verify that our results hold when
excluding the countries demographically most affected by World Wax II. In an additional exercise,
we assign the level of conflict of the 1950s to the 1940s. Finally, we run specifications ignoring the
World War II years. In all cases, we find similar results.
Since most available measures of civil wars used by scholars rely on absolute thresholds of
number of battle deaths to categorize violence as civil war or conflict, greater population may me-
chanically increase the number of "detected" civil wars. To test whether this may partly explain
our findings, we not only use several measures as explained above. We also check if, above what
is predicted from the initial size of each country's populations, conflict increases more where pop-
ulation increased more. Also, we create a new definition of war, based on a relative threshold of
violence.
That our results are largely robust to this set of specification checks lends further support to
our conclusion that countries with higher (exogenous) increases in population after World War II
experienced higher increases in social conflict.
This conclusion is in line with theories dating back at least to Malthus, suggesting that large
populations may affect social conflict. Along these lines, we use a simple theoretical framework
to interpret our findings as suggestive that larger populations, without a corresponding increase
in resources and technology, exacerbate the competition for resources and increase the likelihood
of conflict and civil wars in environments where the institutions cannot handle the higher level of
disputes.
Our results are of first-order importance for several reasons. First, there has been a tremendous
increase in population in developing countries (the most common stage for internal warfare) in the
last 100 years. Figure 1, depicting population and the logarithm of population for our sample of
countries, reveals that those countries that were rich around the 1940s have experienced less rapid
growth than initially-poor or middle-income countries. If greater population or sudden increases in
population increase conflict, then post-World War II changes in population (partly a by-product
of the international epidemiological transition) could have sizable effects on the likelihood of civil
wars. This is an important additional dimension of the implications of population changes in
less-developed countries.
A few examples convey the extent of these "population surges" that followed the international
epidemiological transition, especially for initially poor countries. Ecuador, for instance, more than
tripled its population from 1940 to 1980, moving from being a country of roughly 2.5 million people
to having nearly eight million inhabitants. While sizeable, its population increase from 1900 to
1940 was much smaller, with an increase of roughly 75% (from a level of 1.4 million in 1900). This
was not an isolated case. Other countries in our sample that roughly tripled their population from
1940 to 1980 include El Salvador (1.6 million to 4.5 million), Honduras (from 1.1 million to 3.6
million), the Philippines (from 16.6 million to 51 million), and Thailand (15 million to 47 million).
Also, where we have data, these rates of growth are significantly faster than those experienced by
these countries during the first four decades of the century.
Contrast these increases with the increase in US population following the much discussed "baby
boom" after 1945. In the US, population increased "only" around 70% from 1940 to 1980, starting
at a level of about 130 million in 1940 and reaching roughly 228 million in 1980. Perhaps even more
starkly, contrast the growth of these countries with the increase in population pressure over land in
the United Kingdom from around the 1500s to the 1800s, a topic much discussed among economic
historians given its potential repercussions for enclosures and the Industrial Revolution (see, for
example, the review in Turner, 1984). According to Maddison, population in the UK rose from
3.94 million around 1500 to 6.17 million in 1600, 8.6 million in 1700, and finally reached 21 million
by 1820. In three centuries, this was a five-fold increase, and looking at the 120 years leading up
to 1820 population increased by a factor of 2.2. Over a bit over two centuries, from 1700 to 1820,
the UK population was multiplied by 3.4. In sum, many of the low income countries in our sample
had a population increase in a couple of decades similar to what the UK had in a century or more.
In line with the above, a second important implication of the effect of population growth on
civil conflict is that it may help explain a puzzling fact. As Figure 2 shows, the international
epidemiological transition produced significant convergence in health conditions around the world.
By the year 2000, the gap in average life expectancy at birth between initially rich and initially
poor countries was reduced to about a half of its 1930 level, measured in absolute terms. However,
in spite of the consensus that improving health can have large indirect payoffs through accelerating
economic growth, no such convergence is apparent when examining output per capita. This is
shown in Figure 3, which illustrates that while average (log) GDP per capita for initially poor,
middle-income, and rich countries has trended upwards since the 1930s, poorer countries have not
been able to outgrow and "catch-up" richer countries. The trends shown in these figures are robust
to a more careful statistical analysis. When using the exogenous variation in health induced by the
international epidemiological transition, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) find little increases in GDP
and a significant negative impact on GDP per capita. If increases in population exacerbated social
conflict, the resulting productivity costs may help explain this result. Indeed, the relatively poorer
countries experienced greater improvements in health and population. But they also experienced
the largest increases in civil wars, as depicted in Figures 4 to 7 using the various measures of conflict
that will be considered in this paper.
Our paper is related to several strands of research. A large line of research relies on cross-country
evidence to study the causes of civil war. Following contributions such as those of Collier and
Hoeffler (1998; 2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), scholars have emphasized poverty, inequality,
weak institutions, political grievances, and ethnic divisions as explanations for the outbreak and
persistence of civil war. Yet, the validity of the statistical inference exercise challenges many of
these studies. With a few exceptions3, they do not adequately address the possibility of reverse
causality, or omitted variables bias, driving observed correlations. Indeed, Blattman and Miguel
(2010) conclude in their survey of the literature that "further cross-country regressions will only be
useful if they distinguish between competing explanations using more credible econometric methods
for establishing causality" (p. 8).
To the best of our knowledge, Bruckner's (2010) paper is the only previous work that addresses
these causality issues in a study of population size and civil conflict 4 . It studies a panel of 37
Sub-Saharan countries during the period 1981-2004 and uses randomly occurring droughts as an
instrumental variable for population. In line with our findings for a sample of non-African countries,
Bruckner finds that (instrumented) population size has an economically meaningful and statistically
significant effect on African civil conflict. The most important threat to the validity of his estimates
3 Exceptions include Miguel, Shanker Satyanath and Sergenti (2004), who use annual rainfall growth as an in-
strument for income growth in sub-Saharan Africa; Besley and Persson (2008), who rely on plausibly exogenous
international commodity price movements; and BrUckner (2010), which we review below.
4 In most of the empirical economics literature on conflict, population is a control variable (often with a positive
sign), but it is rarely the prime focus and there is no attempt to control for its endogeneity. For instance, in Sambanis
(2002) review of this research, the role of population is hardly mentioned. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) report a positive
coefficient on population, which the authors interpret as consistent with either a greed or grievance story for conflict,
but their regressions for a panel of countries do not control for country fixed-effects and thus may well be driven by
omitted country-specific characteristics. Indeed, in Fearon and Laitin's (2003) study of conflict onset, the positive
coefficient on population disappears once fixed effects are included in the regression. Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti
(2004) also report a positive coefficient, but their focus is on the effect of income on conflict.
is that droughts affect conflict through their effect on other variables, such as income, and not via
population. To tackle this issue, Bruckner (2010) estimates the impact of population on civil
conflict risk conditional on per capita GDP, and uses rainfall and international commodity prices
as additional instrumental variables to deal with the endogeneity of income. While, as noted above,
we are unable to use our identification strategy for most African countries given lack of reliable
disaggregated disease data dating back to the 1940s, Bruckner's results are very suggestive that
the main implications of population surges studied in our sample apply to Africa also.
Somewhat surprisingly, population has not been a prime focus in the theoretical literature on the
"economics of conflict" (see, for example, the survey by Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2007). However,
there has been a lively debate on the effects of population pressure on violent conflict in other
disciplines, in particular political science5 . Broadly (and simplifying) the debate is between one that
highlights "Malthusian" channels to conflict and other which is more skeptical about the practical
relevance of such arguments. Among the former, Homer-Dixon (1991, 1999) studies the connection
between population growth, pressure on environmental resources, and conflict. For Homer-Dixon,
poor countries are in general more vulnerable to environmentally-induced conflicts. Moreover, while
recognizing (as do many anti-Malthusians) resilience and adaptability in human-environmental
systems, he contends that "as population grows and environmental damage progresses, policymakers
will have less and less capacity to intervene to keep this damage from producing serious social
disruption, including conflict" (Homer-Dixon, 1991). During the 1990s, Homer-Dixon and his
collaborators on the Project on Environment, Population and Security (EPS), often referred to as
the Toronto Group, produced a number of case studies on "environmental conflict" which, though
not concerned solely with population growth, did underscore its importance as potential source of
environmental scarcity and consequently conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1994).
The overall approach of these studies on "environmental security" has come under attack from
a number of researchers. Richards (1996) dismisses what he calls the "New Barbarism" theory of
conflict put forward by Kaplan's (1994) essay. In particular, for the case of Sierra Leone, he refutes
the neo-Malthusian "believe that ordinary Africans will 'sink their ship' by over-production, unless
checked by famine, war and disease [and that] war is a process through which the poor in Africa
will learn its limits" (p. 121). Instead, he notes that the process of forest conversion in Sierra Leone
has taken place over many centuries, and that local land-users have responded in sensible way to
5The connection between population and conflict has also received significant public attention, as testified by
Robert Kaplan's famous 1994 essay "The Coming Anarchy," in turn heavily influenced by Homer-Dixon.
its different phases, with no evidence of environmental degradation spiralling out of control prior
or around the years of civil war between the government and the Revolutionary United Front. He
concludes that in Sierra Leone "war is a consequence of political collapse and state recession, not
environmental pressure (...) Violence has been incubated in forest fastnesses. [The problem] is too
much forest, not too little" (p. 124).
Gleditsch (1998) also offers a critique of this line of research, but emphasizes its methodological
shortcomings. Most importantly, he argues that much of it fails to qualify as "systematic" quan-
titative or comparative research, and violates the rules of quasi-experimental methodology 6. On
the specific issue of population density (or population growth) and violence, he notes that while
"strictly speaking, these are not measures of either resource scarcity or environmental degrada-
tion," (p. 384) they may provide an indirect measure and, at least in this area, a few papers
have provided systematic cross-national evidence. The evidence has not been conclusive7. More
importantly, these studies typically do not address the endogeneity of population in regressions for
conflict.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2.2 we present a simple motivating theory capturing
the "Malthusian" mechanisms that may lead from population growth to conflict. Section 2.3
describes our data, and Section 2.4 presents ordinary least square (OLS) results. Section 2.5
discusses our identification strategy, and Section 2.6 shows our main results from two-stage least
squares (2SLS) estimates. Section 2.7 presents a series of robustness checks on our estimates, and
Section 2.8 is a more speculative section on possible consequences of population growth for regime
changes. Section 2.9 concludes.
6His full critique includes 9 more specific "problems" of the literature: 1. There is a lack of clarity over what is
meant by "environmental conflict"; 2. Researchers engage in definitional and polemical exercises rather than analysis;
3. Important variables are neglected, notably political and economic factors, which have a strong influence on conflict
and mediate the influence of resources and environmental factors; 4. Some models become so large and complex
that they are virtually untestable; 5. Cases are selected on values of the dependent variable; 6. The causality of
the relationship is reversed; 7. Postulated events in the future are cited as empirical evidence; 8. Studies fail to
distinguish between foreign and domestic conflict; and, 9. Confusion reigns about the appropriate level of analysis.
7 In particular, Tir and Diehl (1998) examine the Correlates of War dataset to evaluate the impact of population
growth and density on international conflict involvement, initiation, and escalation over the period 1930-89. They
find that population growth pressures have a significant impact on military conflict involvement, especially in poor
countries, but no correlation with conflict initiation or escalation, or between population density and conflict. Hauge
and Ellingsen (1998) find that factors like deforestation, land degradation, and scarce supply of freshwater, alone and
in combination with high population density, increase the risk of domestic armed conflict, especially low-level conflict,
in the period 1980-92. However, economic and political variables prove more decisive than environmental scarcity in
predicting the incidence of domestic armed conflict. For more studies along these lines, see the special 1998 issue of
the Journal of Peace Research and Diehl and Gleditsch (2001).
2.2 Motivating Malthusian Theory
In this section, we present a simple framework capturing the "Malthusian" mechanisms that may
lead from population growth to conflict. The basic idea is that population growth generates greater
rents to a fixed factor relative to labor, and this form of "scarcity" makes conflict more likely. In
the specific case of land as the fixed factor, this mechanism is particularly relevant in less-developed
economies, where agriculture and traditional activities matter most.
It must be noted that the connection between population growth and conflict is not a necessary
one. Indeed, it is not necessarily true with constant returns to scale to variable factors. However,
we show that when greater population increases "scarcity," it also makes conflict more likely.
Suppose that aggregate output is given by a constant returns to scale production function of a
fixed factor, Z, and labor, N, and is also a function of technology, A:
Y = F (Z, N, A) = f (N) , (2.1)
where F (-) exhibits constant returns to scale in (Z, N) and f gives output as a function of labor,
holding technology and Z constant. Thus, if N increases with A constant, output per worker,
f (N) /N, declines. However, if increases in labor (population) come together with increases in the
technology parameter A, output per worker can remain constant, thus avoiding scarcity.
We assume the following simple allocation of resources. Each individual i in society supplies
one unit of labor inelastically and also owns a fraction O of land. For simplicity, we also suppose
markets are competitive, though this is not important for our analysis. With these assumptions,
individual income and consumption is given by
cj (N, 9j) = f' (N) + 9 [f (N) - Nf' (N)]. (2.2)
The key observation from equation (2.2) is that the marginal increase in an individual's consumption
from an increase in his landholdings, is larger when population increases,
a
2ci =
- -N f" (N) > 0.
That is, land shares matter more for consumption when population is greater. The intuition is
simple: with higher N, land rents are more important relative to wages due to diminishing returns.
This implies a Malthusian channel to conflict when land can be contested with violence.
To explore this channel, imagine the society consists of two groups, 1 and 2. All members
within a group are identical, and also, to simplify the discussion we suppose both groups are of
size N/2 and population growth leaves relative shares unchanged. To capture the disruption costs
of conflict, assume that if a group initiates conflict, then this reduces output to a fraction (1 - p)
of what it would have been without conflict. Group j has probability pj of winning the conflict
and if so, it captures a fraction A_y of the land of the other group (A loosely an inverse measure of
the "specificity of assets"). With probability p-j = 1 - pj, it loses the conflict and a fraction A3
of its land. Also for simplicity, the advantage of being the first mover and deaths from conflict are
ignored. Also, as discussed below, voluntary concessions to avoid civil war are ignored. Finally,
assume that all agents are risk neutral. Then, the expected benefits to conflict, 7ry (N, 0, A, p), for
group j is given by
rj (N,0, A, p) = -p {F' (N)+ (j[f (N) - Nf' (N)] } (2.3)
+ (1 - p) [ pA-j0-j - p-jhj0] [f (N) - Nf' (N)] .
In (2.3),the first line captures the destruction costs of conflict. The second line captures potential
benefits, amounting to the undestroyed expected additional land rents that will be expropriated
with violence. For there to exist equilibrium conflict, a necessary (but not sufficient condition) is
to take a society in which
pg A __j - p-jAj0g # 0.
so that one of the groups will have potential gains from conflict-say group j. These gains are
likely to be higher when 0_y and Ay are high, so greater inequality of resources between the two
groups and lower degree of specificity will contribute to the potential gains from conflict. But
even in this case rj (N, 0, A, p) < 0 is possible for both groups because of the first term-cost of
disruption.
The same reasoning as above in our discussion of equation (2.2) implies that whenever rj (N, 0, A, p) =
0,
B9ry (N, 0, A, p) >0
ON
Therefore, an increase in population makes the group that is more likely to initiate civil war more
"pro civil war." As noted before, this result does not apply when N increases in tandem with A.
This observation is important, in the sense that the Malthusian mechanism says nothing about
secular increases in population. Rather, the predictions are about the level of population for given
A or for "unusual increases in population".
This simple framework generates other intuitive comparative static results. Greater inequality
(0) between groups makes conflict more likely. Lower disruption costs (lower p) and lower asset
specificity (higher A), makes conflict more likely. The latter results may be linked to the importance
of natural resources and agriculture versus human capital and industry. In particular, modern
capitalism depends on production processes that may be easily disrupted with violence. When
traditional production methods are prevalent, for instance when the main form of capital is land,
the costs of violence are relatively smaller. Presumably, the productivity of land is harder to destroy
than the productivity of a factory. Also, in less-developed economies there is less investment in
specific assets, such as human capital, which not only cannot be expropriated through violence
but which, unlike land, can move to other places with the outbreak of violence (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2006).
Finally, a central question that we have ignored is why is conflict not prevented by more efficient
ways of redistributing resources. A plausible (and prominent) explanation concerns commitment
problems (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001, 2006; Fearon, 1998, 2004; Powell, 2006; Acemoglu, Egorov
and Sonin, 2008). To see this, consider the same environment in a dynamic setting, but in each
period there is a probability q < 1 that either group can initiate civil war. Assume all agents
have discount factor # C (0, 1). To simplify the discussion, assume that, after civil war, there is
a permanent redistribution of resources and never any social conflict again. Also to simplify, only
cash transfers are feasible and group 1 is the one considering civil war.
In this context, the benefits from civil war for group 1 are proportional to 1/ (1 - )-because
of discounting. If the group is sufficiently patient (3 is high enough), then cash transfers in a given
period are not sufficient to offset this gain. But group 2 cannot make a credible promise to make
the cash transfers in the future once the window of opportunity for civil war disappears. In this
setting, civil wars arise along the equilibrium path even though more efficient ways of dealing with
conflict exist. In particular, fix # E (0, 1), then there exists q such that for all q < 4, the Markov
Perfect Equilibrium will involve equilibrium civil war. Also, there exists 4 < q, so that for all q < 4,
all Subgame Perfect Equilibria involve civil war.
2.3 Data
Measuring civil war and conflict is not simple8 . The most commonly used datasets differ in the
data sources they draw from and in important aspects of the coding procedure, such as thresholds
of violence required, definitions of war onset and termination, and treatment of outside parties,
communal violence or state repression (see Sambanis, 2004). For this reason, we rely on a number
of alternative databases to measure conflict.
We measure conflict as the ratio of number of years in conflict to total years for a period around
a reference date t (where, typically, t = 1940, 1950, ..., 1980). Thus, we focus on conflict incidence,
rather than onset, per decade. This is a natural choice since we are focusing on a relatively
long-term phenomenon: increases in population over a period of several decades and the potential
response of conflict. Relatedly, since datasets may disagree on the exact year of conflict initiation,
the differences between them is typically larger for conflict onset than for conflict incidence. This
problem must be addressed when examining high-frequency responses of conflict, but in our case
it is better to select the most robust measure of conflict.
Our baseline dataset for conflict is version 3 of the Correlates of War (henceforth COW) dataset
(Sarkees, 2000). This source records civil wars since 1816, which allows us to run a simple falsi-
fication test using pre-existing trends in conflict. A civil war is defined as a war fought within
state borders, between a government and non-government forces, where the central government
is actively involved in military action, with effective resistance for both sides9 , and with at least
1000 battle-related deaths during the war. This is a higher threshold of violence for inclusion than
alternative sources, which we also use for robustness. When using COW, we assign the number
of years with conflict to the reference dates as follows: wars from 1940-1949 are assigned to 1940,
wars from 1950-1959 are assigned to 1950, etc.
Our second database for conflict, available since 1946, is the backdated version of Uppsala
Conflict Data Project, in conjunction with International Peace Research Institute (UCDP/PRJO
Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4, Gleditsch et al, 2002). We assign number of years in conflict
to reference dates as follows: 1946-1949 to 1940, 1950-1959 to 1950, 1960-1969 to 1969, etc. Of
course, in the case of 1940, we divide the number of years in war by 4, and not by 10 like in the
8 Here we describe our main dependent and independent variables, and a full description of all variables and sources
including all controls and baseline characteristics can be found in Appendix Table 1.
9To constitute effective resistance, both sides must have been initially organized for violent conflict, or the weaker
side must be able to inflict the opponents at least five percent of the number of fatalities it sustains.
other reference years. This dataset includes conflicts where at least one of the primary parties is
the government of a state, and where the use of armed force results in at least 25 battle-related
deaths per year. The dataset includes four types of conflicts, and we use the two categories for
internal conflict ("internal armed conflict" and "internationalized internal armed conflict").
As a third database to verify the robustness of our results, we consider Fearon and Laitin's
(2003) coding of civil war. This dataset covers the period 1945-1999, and the criteria are broadly
similar to those of COW'0 , except that anticolonial wars are coded as occurring within the empire
in question (e.g. Algeria is assigned to France). As with the other datasets, we count the number of
years with any incidence of war, and use a similar assignment to reference dates (1940 = 1945-1949,
1950 = 1950 - 1959, etc.).
To examine effects on the intensity of conflict and as further robustness, we use information on
battle deaths from the Center for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) Battle Deaths Dataset (Lacina
and Gleditsch, 2005). We use version 2, compatible with the COW dataset, and use the "best
estimate" of annual battle-related deaths (similarly assigning deaths to reference years using the
rule: 1940 = 1940 - 1949, 1950 = 1950 - 1959, etc.). We also use version 3, compatible with the
UCDP/PRIO dataset, since this dataset has a smaller threshold of battle-deaths for inclusion. This
allows us to more convincingly check the robustness of our results to possible mechanical effects on
detected wars with increases in population.
We also explore whether the large exogenous increases in population in our data have an effect
on state failure and regime changes. As a measure of state failure, we use the "extreme political
failure" dummy, available from 1955 from the Political Instability Task Force (Phase III), with
similar assignment to dates (1950 = 1955 - 1959, ... ). For regime changes and democratic changes
we use Polity IV.
We have data for 65 countries listed in Appendix Table 1, although only for 47 of them we have
complete data from 1940 or earlier. The remaining 18 countries, for which we have data from 1950
or 1960, include 12 non-Eastern European and six Eastern European countries. As highlighted
previously, we are able to include only four African countries (Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, and
Tunisia), an important limitation given the prevalence of Civil War in Africa. However, lack of
reliable data on causes of death disaggregated by disease dating back to the 1940s explains the
1 Conflicts are included if they: involved fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, nonstate
groups who sought control of a government, region, or change in government policies; killed at least 1,000 over its
course, with a yearly average of at least 100; at least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by
rebels).
exclusion of most of Africa in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). Our efforts to extend that sample
proved futile.
The treatment of countries which enter or leave the state system or whose borders change over
time must be explained. For each country, we check when the respective datasets considers the
country as entering or leaving the state system, and adjust accordingly the number of years on
a reference year. Thus, for example, if Algeria enters the COW system membership in 1962, the
measure of conflict for 1960 is the number of years in conflict from 1962-1969 (if any), divided by
8 (instead of 10). Moreover, we code as missing (not zero) the observations for Algeria in reference
years prior to 1960. While this surely is a reasonable choice (Algeria did not exist as a state before,
just like Bangladesh did not prior to 1971, and so on), the criteria for inclusion in the COW system
membership include a population threshold of 500,000 and having diplomatic recognition (prior to
1920, recognition at or above the rank of charge d'affaires with Britain and France and, later, being
a member of the League of Nations or the United Nations, or receiving diplomatic missions from
two major powers). Thus, for instance, Costa Rica and Australia are not in the system in 1900.
While it may be seem reasonable to include them as (peaceful) states in 1900 for our falsification
regressions, we avoided doing any of these adjustments to the data, instead following the approach
of abiding by the choices made by the authors of each of the independent codings of civil war.
As a general rule, when a country splits we do not attempt to code "external" wars between
formerly member states as "internal" wars in the territory as a whole. Again, we follow this
procedure to avoid including our own criteria of what constitutes an internal conflict, instead
abiding by the classification of the various sources we use, and verifying the validity of our results
to dropping potentially problematic countries or territories.
Also, we adopt the general rule of aggregating civil wars and regime changes for the splitting
territories. The countries in our sample potentially affected by this choice are just Czechoslovakia,
Germany, the USSR and Vietnam. Thus, for example, we add USSR internal conflicts while it
existed, and aggregate internal conflicts (if any) and regime changes of the member states and
assign them to the USSR as a whole after 1991. As it turns out, choosing this against other
alternatives makes little difference in practice for the coding of our dependent variables. First, our
main specifications end in 1980, prior to many of these splits. Second, in many cases the dependent
variable would be the same aggregating the territories or not. For instance, in Czech Republic in the
90s, our dependent conflict variables are always zero with or without aggregating Slovakia. Also,
we would have 1 in our regime transition dummy in the 1990s whether we took Czech Republic,
Slovakia, or the aggregate.
This procedure also minimizes potential mismatches between the level of aggregation of the
population figures from Maddison (2006) and civil conflict/political data. Indeed, in the case of
Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic, Maddison presents throughout the data for Czechoslovakia as a
whole, even after split between Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Similarly, population figures
are for Vietnam as a whole, and for the USSR while it existed and later the total for ex-USSR.
Maddison's treatment of Germany is more complicated. It takes the 1870 frontiers until 1918, the
1936 frontiers for 1919-1945, and present frontiers from then on. Also, it must be noted that the
immediate post-war disease data from the UN are divided into Eastern Germany, Federal Republic
of Germany, Berlin and West Berlin, and numbers for the Federal Republic were used in Acemoglu
and Johnson (2007). To make sure our results do not depend on any of these choices, we also
dropped Czechoslovakia, Germany, the USSR and Vietnam and found results similar to those
reported below.
The sources to build our instruments can be found in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007)11. Infor-
mation on age structure is from the United Nations. We also consider a number of controls for
robustness exercises, all of which are described in Appendix Table 1. These include measures of in-
stitutions, whether our countries were independent in 1940 or not, whether the country was affected
by World War II, initial (in 1930) GDP per capita, availability of natural resources (diamonds, oil,
and gas), ethnic and religious fragmentation and fractionalization, and share of Catholic, Muslim,
and Protestant populations.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics (sample means and standard deviations) for our main
data. We present these summary statistics for the sample as a whole, for groups of countries by
income, as well as dividing them between countries experiencing a change in predicted mortality
above and below the median. Column 2 shows a general trend, evident in every measure of conflict,
of increasing conflict from 1940 to 1980. Also, columns 3 to 5 show that such an increase is
concentrated in middle-income and, especially, poor countries. But more importantly, comparing
the change in our conflict measures from 1940 to 1980 in columns 6 and 7, we observe that countries
above median change in predicted mortality exhibit larger increases in conflict than those below
the median change. For instance, the average years in conflict (per decade) according to the COW
measure increased from 0.8 years to 2.5 years for countries with above median change in predicted
"The main source of the necessary health data on incidence of diseases circa 1940 is the League of Nations (based
on national statistics), but other sources were consulted for consistency.
mortality from 1940 to 1980, while it decreased from 0.2 years to 0.06 years for those with below-
median change. These patterns are suggestive for our hypothesis, and we will examine below if
they survive in our regression exercises and various robustness checks.
2.4 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Results
As a benchmark for our IV estimates reported below, and to examine more systematically these
correlations in our data, we start by presenting results for simple ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions of our measures of conflict on population. More specifically, in Table 2 we report
regressions of the form
Cit = 7rXit + (i + At + Zit# + ct, (2.4)
where cit is one of our measures of conflict for country i and reference year t, and Xit is (logarithm
of) population. (i denote a full set of country fixed effects while it are a full set of year dummies,
which we always include to remove time-invariant country-specific factors and global trends affecting
population and conflict. Zit is a vector of other controls. In Table 2, as in subsequent tables, we
present two types of estimations. Panel A presents long difference estimations in which just 2
dates, usually 1940 and 1980, are included in the regressions. In this case, (2.4) is equivalent to a
regression of the change in conflict between the two dates on the change in population between the
same two dates, giving us a particularly simple interpretation. In Panel B of the Table, we look at
panel results between 1940 and 1980, with data for t = 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980.
For all of our regressions, we calculate standard errors that are fully robust against serial
correlation at the country level (e.g., Wooldridge 2002, p. 275)12. However, these standard errors
may be downward biased due to the relatively small number of clusters. Thus, we also implemented
the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). In particular, we
performed wild bootstraps resampling our clusters with replacement, and calculated bootstrap p-
values for the t-statistics of our main coefficients of interest. Our regression tables report p-values
following both of these approaches.
The OLS results in columns 1-3 of Table 2 reveal that population is positively correlated with
conflict. The estimated coefficient for log population (0.303) in the long-difference regression in
1 2Moreover, as a "degrees of freedom adjustment" we adopt the relatively conservative formula for the covariance
matrix N-1 k V where N is the number of observations, k the number of coefficients (excluding the fixed effects
and constant), M the number of clusters, and V is the asymptotic cluster-robust covariance matrix. A less demanding
alternative often used is N-1 1-V.
column 1 of Panel A, where conflict is measured using the COW dataset, implies that the average
change in log population in our sample of 0.65 is correlated with about 1.97 more years in conflict
in 1980 relative to 1940. For a country like El Salvador, with an increase in population from 1.6 to
4.6 million, this predicts about 3.2 more years in conflict during the 1980s than during the 1940s.
The size of the coefficient is fairly stable across different datasets for conflict, as columns 2 and
3, which use the UCDP/PRIO and Fearon and Laitin datasets, reveal. And while these latter
estimates are not significant at conventional levels when using the standard cluster-robust p-values,
we find reassuringly smaller p-values (of around 8% to 10%) with the wild bootstrapping procedure.
In fact, this is a general pattern throughout this and other tables, suggesting that the degrees of
freedom adjustment on the asymptotic cluster-robust covariance matrix is in fact too conservative
in our case.
Also interestingly, column 4 shows a strong and very significant population between population
and state failure. The estimated coefficient for battle deaths as the dependent variable, in column
5, is also positive. However, the p-values reveals that it is, if anything, only marginally significant.
One possible concern with the results from Table 2 is that they might by driven by age com-
position effects. In particular, rather than larger populations it may be that younger populations
are correlated with conflict. Table 3 examines this issue by presenting regressions as in Table 2
with the share of population from 15 to 34 years of age as the independent variable. As the odd
columns from this Table reveal, this variable is usually not significantly correlated with conflict.
Moreover, when population is also included as a regressor in the even columns of the Table, the
results for population are very similar to those in Table 2, and the point estimate on the share
of young population is usually negative. These results suggest that rather than age composition,
total population is correlated in our sample with conflict (and state failure). However, these OLS
estimates are not necessarily causal, and the true effect of population on conflict might be larger
or smaller than implied by these coefficients. We next investigate this question.
2.5 Identification Strategy: the International Epidemiological Tran-
sition as a Natural Experiment
As noted in the Introduction, our identification strategy relies on the International Epidemiological
Transition as a "natural experiment" creating large increases in population. Such increase in
population followed major exogenous (to most countries) innovations in drugs (e.g., penicillin) and
associated effective treatments, and chemicals (e.g., DDT) and how to apply them. International
programs to spread best practices followed through, led by international agencies such as the
WHO and UNICEF. This episode provides an instrument for population growth, by exploiting
pre-intervention distribution of mortality from various diseases around the world, and the dates of
major global interventions affecting mortality from this set of diseases.
More specifically, we use the predicted mortality instrument, which adds each country's initial
(in 1940) mortality rate from 15 diseases until there is a global intervention, and after the global
intervention, the mortality rate from the disease in question declines to the frontier mortality rate13.
For country i at time t, the instrument is constructed as follows:
i= [ ((1 - Idt)Mdi4o + IdtMdFt), (2.5)
dED
where: Mdi4o denotes mortality in 1940 (measured as number of deaths per 100 individuals per
annum) for country i, from disease d E D; Idt is a dummy for intervention for disease d that
takes the value of 1 for all dates after the intervention; MdFt is mortality from disease d at the
health frontier of the world at time t; and D is the set of diseases listed above. Since Mdi4e is
the pre-intervention mortality for disease d and Idt = 1 after a global intervention, the variation
in this variable comes from the interaction of baseline cross-country disease prevalence with global
intervention dates for specific diseases. Countries that experienced higher mortality than others for
a given disease are expected to observe larger increases in population after the intervention.
One concern with the predicted mortality instrument is that it depends on the choice for dating
global interventions. An alternative instrument that is independent of the coding of global inter-
ventions assumes each country's initial mortality rate decreases at the pace of the global mortality
rate for the disease in question. The formula for this global mortality instrument is given by
M = Mdi40, (2.6)
it dED MasO
where Mdt (Ma4o) is global mortality from disease d in year t (1940), calculated as the unweighted
average across countries in the sample of countries in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007).
We use these variables as instruments for population. In particular, we posit the first-stage
13The 15 diseases are (in rough descending order of importance): malaria, pneumonia, and tuberculosis; influenza,
cholera, typhoid, smallpox, shigella dysentery, whooping cough, measles (rubeola), dyphteria, scarlet fever, yellow
fever, plague, typhus.
relationship for country i at time t,
Xit = <pM, + ; + + + u (2.7)
where: xit is the logarithm of population; M, the predicted (or global) mortality instrument; (
is a full set of country fixed effects; pt are year fixed effects; and Zit represents a vector of other
controls.
Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) show that the changes in predicted mortality led to major im-
provements in life expectancy (and other health measures). This is shown in Figure 8, where the
horizontal axis depicts the change in predicted mortality between 1940 and 1980, and the vertical
axis shows the change in log life expectancy during the same time period. In countries like In-
dia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Ecuador and El Salvador, where predicted mortality declined by a large
amount, there were large gains in life expectancy. Instead, life expectancy remained largely un-
changed in parts of western Europe, Uruguay, Argentina, Korea, and Australia, where predicted
mortality did not decrease as much. Also importantly, Figure 9 depicts the same negative rela-
tionship holds without the richest countries, so it is not driven by the comparison of initially rich
countries to initially low- and middle-income countries.
One concern is that these results are driven by a preexisting trend. To show that this is unlikely
to be the case, Figures 10 (and 11) look at changes in life expectancy during the pre-period, 1900-
1940 (and 1930-1940), and examine whether they correlate with future (post-1940) changes in
predicted mortality. Unlike Figures 8 and 9, there is no strong evidence of a negative relationship.
These issues are examined in greater detail in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), and the results point
to a very robust and significant relationship between predicted mortality and health that is unlikely
to be driven by preexisting trends. We now build on the consequences of these improvements on
health for population growth to examine the relationship between population and conflict.
2.6 Main Results
2.6.1 First Stages
That there is a strong first-stage relationship between predicted mortality and population is evident
in Figures 12 and 13. Like Figures 8 and 9, these figures measure the change in predicted mortality
between 1940 and 1980 in the horizontal axis, but show the change in log population during the
same time period in the vertical axis. Again, we observe a strong negative relationship (whether
looking at the whole sample or at low- and middle-income countries alone).
Table 4 shows the first-stage relationship in regression form by estimating equation (2.7). This
Table shows the strong negative relationship between log population and predicted mortality is
robust across alternative samples. Panel A reports long-difference specifications, and panel B
reports panel regressions. Column 1 includes all countries in our sample, and shows an estimate
of p equal to -0.782, which is significant at less than 1 percent. This estimate implies that an
improvement in predicted mortality of 0.469 per 100 (or 469 per 100, 000, which is the mean
improvement between 1940 and 1980 in our base sample) leads to around a 44% percent increase in
population (the mean population in our sample in 1940 was about 34 million, so this is an increase
of nearly 15 million, whereas the actual mean increase in population between 1940 and 1980 was
about 30 million). This implies that changes in predicted mortality account for almost one-half
of the increase in population 1940 and 1980. Column 2 repeats the same regression excluding
Eastern Europe, and Column 3 looks only at low- and middle-income countries. The estimate of p
is similar, and still significant at less than 1 percent. Panel B repeats the same regressions using a
panel with decadal observations. The results are still highly significant but the coefficients smaller,
which is reasonable since these regressions exploit shorter-run responses to changes in predicted
mortality. Column 4 presents results using the global mortality instrument. The results are also
strong and significant, reassuring us that they do not depend on the coding of global intervention
dates. Finally, column 5 excludes the countries most affected by World War II, again with almost
identical results.
The main potential threat to the exclusion restriction would be that the baseline mortality rates
are correlated with future changes in conflict. To show that this is unlikely to be the case, we will
show the robustness of our IV results to the inclusion of differential trends that are parametrized
as functions of various baseline characteristics. Whether this explains the first-stage relationship is
investigated with regressions of the form
1980Zi OM 6)Wt+ Uit (2.8)
t=1940
where Ct = 1 in year t and zero otherwise, and ri are "time-invariant" characteristics of country
i. These characteristics include: a measure of the average quality of institutions (average of the
constraints on the executive from the Polity IV data set over 1950-70; a dummy for independence in
1940; initial (in 1930) GDP per capita and population; and measures of the availability of natural
resources and ethnic polarization/fragmentation, often emphasized on the empirical literature on
civil war. These regressions are reported in Table 5. Since equation (2.8) includes a full set of
time interactions with ci, differential trends related to these characteristics are taken out. In long-
difference regressions of panel A, this specification is equivalent to including an interaction between
the 1980 dummy and the baseline characteristics.
The results in both panels show that controlling for these characteristics has little effect on our
results. Overall, the evidence in this section shows that the instrument is very strong and that its
correlation with population is unlikely to be driven by differential trends due to a third factor.
2.6.2 Reduced Forms and Falsification
Figures 14 and 15 find a strong reduced-form relationship between the change in conflict 1940-1980
and the change in predicted mortality over the same period, for all countries in our sample and for
low- and middle-income countries only, respectively. These patterns are shown in regression form
in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6: countries with a larger decline in predicted mortality experienced
a larger increase in years in conflict. Given the negative relationship between predicted mortality
and population shown in the previous section, this translates into a positive effect of population on
conflict in our 2SLS estimates below.
Before presenting these estimates, a useful falsification exercise (as we did before for the case
of life expectancy) is to look at changes in predicted mortality, and see whether they correlate
with changes in conflict or population during the pre-period. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 find no
relationship between the change in conflict from 1900 to 1940 and change in predicted mortality
from 1940 to 1980, for the base sample and for low- and middle-income countries. This lack of
relationship can be seen in Figures 16 and 17. There is a strong contrast between the patterns
in these figures and those of Figures 14 and 15. Similar specifications for our first stage (changes
in log population from 1900 to 1940 and in predicted mortality from 1940 to 1980) are shown in
columns 5 and 6, again with no sign of such a relationship. Predicted mortality explains changes
in population after 1940, but not before 1940.
These results therefore suggest that there were no preexisting trends related to changes in pre-
dicted mortality either in population or in our key conflict outcome variables. This gives us greater
confidence in using predicted mortality as an instrument to investigate the effect of population on
conflict. However, the exclusion restriction for our IV strategy -Cov(MI, e8t) = 0, where eit is
the error term in the second-stage equation- requires that the unique channel for casual effects of
predicted mortality on conflict is changes in population. Since this exclusion restriction is funda-
mentally untestable, we cannot be entirely sure that this is the case. As we documented before,
for example, changes in predicted mortality generated major changes in life expectancy. However,
life expectancy should probably not have a direct effect on conflict aside from through its impact
on population. As noted before when discussing Table 6 of first stages, as an additional check we
will control for differential trends parametrized as functions of baseline characteristics in our 2SLS
regressions to be discussed below.
As noted when discussing the OLS estimations, another concern is that the causal channel
is partly age structure. While potentially important, the OLS results of Table 3 do not show
a significant correlation. In addition, by 1980, when we observe the largest impacts on conflict,
changes in the demographic structure induced by the international epidemiological transition are
much reduced. Table 7 investigates this issue further. Column 1 presents long-difference regressions
for our base sample (where t = 1940 and 1980) of the share of population of ages 15-34 on predicted
mortality. The coefficient on predicted mortality is close to zero (0.004) and not statistically
significant. A similar result is obtained in column 2, which restricts attention to low- and middle-
income countries only. Columns 3 and 4 repeat these regressions but use the global mortality
instrument instead of predicted mortality as the independent variable. Again, there is no significant
relationship between the instrument and the share of young people in the population. Moreover,
when we look at a longer horizon, as in columns 5-8 with specifications similar to those in columns
1-4 but where t = 1940 and 1990, the point estimate on our instrument is actually negative, and
again not statistically different from zero. These results thus suggest that, by 1980 and 1990, the
main change induced by the international epidemiological was in total population, and not in the
demographic structure. Moreover, in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) it is further shown that the
international epidemiological transition affected life expectancy at various ages, not only at birth.
This is not surprising, as some of the diseases used in computing predicted mortality -in particular
tuberculosis and pneumonia, two of the main killers- affected the entire age distribution.
2.6.3 2SLS Results
Table 8 presents our main results, which are the 2SLS estimates of the effect of population on
conflict. More specifically, our second stage regression is given by equation (2.4), where population
is instrumented by predicted mortality -equation (2.7)-. As before, we report long-difference
regressions for 1940 and 1980 in panel A and panel regressions for 1940 - 1980 in panel B. This table
shows that the effect of population on conflict is positive, and very significant in most specifications.
In column 1, the dependent variable is the share of years in internal conflict per decade, as measured
by the COW dataset.
The size of the effect (7r is estimated to be 0.658) implies that the average change (0.65) in log
population leads approximately to 4.3 more years in conflict during the 1980s relative to the 1940s.
Compare this to the OLS coefficient of Table 2 (0.303), which implied an effect of around 1.97 more
years in conflict in the 1980s compared to the 1940s. For a country like El Salvador, experiencing
an increase in population from 1.6 to 4.6 million in this period, the OLS estimate predicts roughly
3.2 more years in conflict while the IV estimate of 7r implies an effect of roughly 7 more yeas in
conflict. We find similar results in the case of the panel regressions for 1940-80 presented in panel
B (7r = 0.54 with a p-value of about 0.01).
Columns 2-4 investigate the robustness of this result to using different measures of conflict and
the alternative global mortality instrument. In particular, the dependent variables in columns 2
and 3 are the years in internal conflict as a fraction of total years in the reference date as measured
by the UCDP/PRIO and Fearon and Laitin datasets, respectively. All the estimated coefficients are
positive, and typically significant at less than 1 or 5% according to our cluster-robust wild bootstrap
p-values. The more standard p-values from robust standard errors clustered at the country level are
somewhat more conservative. Column 4 considers instead the number of years the state failed as a
fraction of total years, and column 5 presents regressions for the (log of) battle deaths per year for
each reference date. While in the latter the coefficient on population is also positive and significant
in both panels, for state failure we find a positive significant effect just in the panel regressions.
Finally, columns 6 to 10 repeat the regressions from columns 1-5 but use global mortality as the
instrument for population. The results are very similar. This evidence suggests that our results do
not depend on the dating of global health interventions.
Table 9 examines the timing of the response of conflict to population growth. In particular,
columns 1 to 4 look at different time horizons by estimating long-difference regressions for our
baseline measure of conflict on population (instrumented with predicted mortality), where the
initial time period is t = 1940 and the final date is 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990. Moreover, column
5 looks at 1970-1997 as the post-period. Consistent with the idea that health improvements and
population increase have a lagged effect on social conflict, results are weaker if we only look only at
1940-60 or 1940-70. This result is again not sensitive to the coding of global health interventions,
as columns 6-10 reveal.
2.7 Robustness Checks
2.7.1 Alternative Samples, Instrument, and World War II
Table 10 presents a number of robustness checks on our results. We focus on our main measure
of conflict: share of years in conflict in each reference date according to the COW dataset on civil
war. For comparison, column 1 reproduces our main long-difference and panel regression estimates
from Table 8. In column 2, we exclude Eastern European countries, which may have had a special
behavior in the context of the Cold War. The estimated value of ir remains positive, of similar
size and statistically significant. Column 3 drops initially rich countries to verify that these results
are not driven by the comparison between rich and poor nations, and Column 4 uses the global
mortality instrument.
Columns 5-7 check whether results are driven by events around World War II. Column 5 excludes
the countries demographically most affected by the War, namely Austria, China, Finland, Germany,
Italy, Russian Federation (Urlanis, 2003). Column 6 assigns instead the level of conflict of the 1950s
to the 1940s. Column 7 simply ignores the war years, and assigns the number of years in conflict
from 1946-49 (as a fraction of the 4 years in these interval) to our dependent variable in 1940.
Overall, the coefficient is very stable and retains statistical significance at conventional levels.
These robustness checks thus lend more credibility to our baseline estimates.
2.7.2 Differential Trends
As emphasized before, the main potential threat to our strategy would be that these estimated ef-
fects of population on conflict are truly capturing differential trends between countries with different
levels of baseline mortality rates. Since these trends may depend on unobservable characteristics,
the threat is ultimately untestable. However, we can examine the robustness of our results to the
inclusion of differential trends, parametrized as functions of various observable baseline character-
istics. If differential trends due to independence, other institutional factors, initial population, and
variables commonly emphasized in the empirical studies of civil war do not change our results, we
are more confident about our exclusion restriction.
In Table 11, in line with the corresponding first stages in equation (2.8) and Table 5, our second
stage equations take the following form:
1980
Cit = 1rxot + ( + pt + E ict + Eit. (2.9)
t=1940
In column 1, we examine whether the results could be driven by differential trends between countries
with "good" and "bad" institutions. While there are many dimensions of institutions, we choose
to measure the quality of institutions by average constraints on the executive over 1950-1970. This
is a particularly relevant dimension of institutions, since, as noted in Section 2.2, the commitment
problem is a persuasive explanation for civil war. In column 2, si is simply a dummy variable equal
to 1 if country i was independent in 1940. Columns 3 and 4 control for differential trends as a
function of initial GDP per capita and initial population, respectively.
In columns 5-9, the country characteristics ni are variables commonly emphasized as correlates
of civil war. A large literature links conflict to natural-resource abundance, in particular oil, gas,
and diamonds 14 . A commonly used measure is oil exports divided by GDP or the share of the
natural resource sector in GDP (Sachs and Warner, 1995). As Ross (2006) notes, this measure may
be a poor proxy of rents in the economy or revenues for the government -key potential drivers of war-
since it does not include oil that is produced but consumed domestically, and it does not account
for extraction costs which may vary across countries. Also, even at similar levels of production,
the numerator tends to be larger in poor countries because poor countries consume less of their
own oil. Normalizing by GDP similarly inflates the numbers for poor countries. Motivated by this
reasoning, in columns 5-7, rj is, respectively: oil production per capita (from Humphreys, 2005),
diamond production per capita (from Humphreys, 2005), and oil and gas rents per capita (from
Ross, 2006).
A number of theories also suggest that ethnic (or religious) diversity and polarization may be
a cause civil war, or at least that they may facilitate surmount the big collective action problems
within groups in conflict 15. Nevertheless, cross-national studies find few differences between the
"The mechanisms whereby natural resources may lead to conflict are many (for a discussion, see Humphreys,
2005) and disentangling them is not simple. Within-country variation may provide a useful avenue for research, as
the study of Dube and Vargas (2008) demonstrates. These authors find that an increase in the international price of
coffee reduces violence in coffee-producing regions, while an increase in the international price of petroleum, increases
violence in regions with oil reserves and pipelines. This is consistent with the idea that in the capital-intensive sector,
an income shock increases the value of controlling the state without increasing wages and the opportunity cost of
fighting, while the opposite is true of a shock to the labor-intensive sector (Dal B6 and Dal B6 2004).
i5 In particular, ethnic identity may generate group cohesion and thus reduce free-riding within armed groups. As
noted in Blattman and Miguel (2010), the motives for such cohesion vary from "primordialist" arguments -stressing
the cultural, biological or psychological nature of ethnic cleavages (Horowitz, 1985) or economic models assuming
determinants of civil war in general versus "ethnic" civil wars in particular (see Fearon (2006) for
a review). This may be surprising, yet it could be driven by the fact that ethnic fragmentation is
measured with considerable error. As Blattman and Miguel (2010) point out, the existing proxies
may also be theoretically inappropriate and these indices of ethnic fractionalization have been
questioned as a meaningful proxy for ethnic tensions (e.g., Posner 2004a, 2004b). Esteban and
Ray (1994, 1999) argue that more than fractionalization, a bimodal distribution of preferences or
resources-"polarization"-is linked to greater conflict risk. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)
construct measures for polarization and fragmentation and find support for this theory. In columns
8 and 9 we use these measures of ethnic polarization and fractionalization.
Notice that the coefficient remains significant at conventional confidence levels in almost every
regression (an exception is column 9 controlling for ethnic fragmentation, where the p-value in the
long-difference specification is 12% for the standard cluster-robust variance estimator, but even in
this case the bootstrap p-value is around 5% -0.042-, and the panel regressions suggest a significant
positive effect). Moreover, the coefficient is quite stable across specifications, ranging from around
0.6 to 0.8 in most long-difference specifications. The sole exception is column 3 that includes a
differential trend by initial GDP per capita, yet here the estimated coefficient increases to 1.1. This
is reassuring, as we had observed different patterns of conflict for initially rich and poor nations,
but this result suggests our estimated impact of population on conflict is unlikely to be explained
by differential trends by levels of income. Overall, Table 11 suggests that it is unlikely that the
impact of population on conflict from our 2SLS is actually driven by differential trends16. The next
section investigates a different issue: whether they may be driven by mechanical effects.
2.7.3 Further Robustness Checks: Mechanical Effects
Since conventional measures of civil war rely on meeting a battle death threshold, an increase in
total population may mechanically increase the number of "detected" civil wars. In this section,
individuals share political preferences or prefer to mingle with co-ethnics (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Alesina
and La Ferrara 2000; Esteban and Ray 1999)-; to theories of dense ethnic social networks and low cost information and
sanctioning (Caselli and Coleman 2006; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005); to advantages of ethnic
alliances over class alliances in mobilizing for conflict (Esteban and Ray, 2008); and to "modernist" in which ethnic
conflict arises when groups excluded from social and political power begin to experience economic modernization
(Bates 1986; Ernest Gellner 1983).
16 Moreover, while Table 11 uses the best available measures of resource abundance and the more theoretically-
motivated measures of ethnic diversity, the results do not depend on the exact variable used to measure natural
resource abundance or social diversity. This is verified in Appendix Tables 2 and 3, which present the first and
second stages, respectively, for specifications similar to those in Table 11 but where alternative measures are used,
including: the share of the natural resources in GDP, total (instead of per capita) oil and diamond production,
religious polarization and fragmentation, and share of Catholic, Muslim, and Protestant population.
we use battle deaths data to verify that this is not driving our results.
Table 12 reports 2SLS regressions of equation (2.4), where the dependent variable is proportional
to the number of battle deaths in country i at time t. In particular, we normalize battle deaths
by initial (in 1940) population and take logarithms to calculate cit. For this exercise, we focus
on the UCDP/PRIO instead of COW dataset, since the former uses a lower threshold of battle
deaths and includes more conflicts. In long-difference regressions (columns 1-3), the estimated
coefficient for population is positive. The standard cluster-robust p-value is larger than 10%, but
the bootstrap estimates suggest otherwise: the p-value is 4% for the base sample using predicted
mortality (column 1), 2.2% when we use global mortality (column 2), and 4.4% when we allow
for a differential trend for initially independent countries (column 3). In the panel regressions of
columns 4 to 6, the point estimates are similar and we can be more confident about the significance
of the effect for the base sample using the predicted (column 4) or global mortality (column 5)
instruments. However, in column 6 which includes the interaction with initially independent the
coefficient is at best marginally significant at conventional confidence levels.
As an additional check, we consider a simple test to verify whether population changes had
an effect on conflict in addition to the mechanical effect that would be expected from size of the
population to number of deaths alone. To construct a measure of the deviation of battle deaths
from battle deaths predicted by population size, we proceed in two steps. In step 1, we use early
data on battle deaths to estimate the cross-sectional relationship between population and battle
deaths. In particular, we run a regression of the (log of 1+) battle deaths on log population 17,
for an initial baseline reference year. In step 2, we use the estimated coefficients from step 1 and
observed population figures for all countries in our sample to construct the "predicted" (log of)
battle deaths for each country in each reference year. Our dependent variable is then the deviation
of observed (log of) battle deaths from this prediction.
In Panel A of Table 13, we present our standard long-difference and panel regressions where
step 1 is calculated using observed battle deaths in 1930. Hence, Panel A relies on data from COW,
as it is our only source with data in 1930. While this source has the disadvantage of using a higher
threshold of battle deaths for inclusion as civil war, the advantage is that our baseline regression
for the relationship between population and battle deaths is estimated with data that precedes
7 Analogous to our measures for civil war incidence, the exact form of our dependent variables is
log (1 + tf deathsi, where no. of years refers to the number of years with data in the reference year (decade) t
for country i.
the key period from 1940-1980. In Panel B, however, we also report regressions using data from
UCDP/PRIO. In this Panel, step 1 estimates the relationship between battle deaths and population
with data from the earliest reference date available, 1940.
Two observations must be made about this exercise. First, in the regressions to establish the
relationship between population size and battle deaths (step 1), we consider only observations with
positive battle deaths. Hence this is the relationship between population and fatalities conditional
on war. While of course this implies a selection bias, it increases the predicted battle deaths
and stacks the cards against finding an effect for the deviation of observed deaths from predicted.
Second, while this constitutes an attempt to correct for the mechanical effect of population size, to
the extent that IV and OLS estimates of the impact of population on conflict are not too different
to each other, our final results for the effect of population on the deviations from predicted should
be biased towards zero. The reason is that the cross-sectional relationship even in 1930 or 1940 will
include the causal effect of population on Civil War. Imagine, for example, the situation in which
OLS and IV estimates are the same. Then one can estimate the same relationship from the initial
cross-section and the regression with deviations from predicted values will mechanically give zero.
Therefore, to the extent that OLS is similar to IV we will tend to get a downward bias.
With these observations in mind, we take the results from Table 13 to be very suggestive that
the results presented thus far are not driven merely by mechanical effects from population size to
"detected" wars. Indeed, in Panel A the estimated coefficient for population is significant at either
90% or 95% confidence level for most specifications (depending on whether we follow the standard
or bootstrap p-values). In Panel B, the estimated coefficient for population is also positive, but not
significant at conventional confidence levels.
Finally, we create new definition of war, based on relative threshold of violence. In particular,
we define a country-year as in war if its ratio of battle deaths to population is above the 5th, 10th,
and 20th percentile among country-years with battle deaths in the sample. With this measure of
war incidence, we construct our usual dependent variable as the share of years in war per reference
date.
Table 14 reports 2SLS regressions of equation (2.4) with this measure of cit. The results show
positive estimated coefficients on log population, that are somewhat smaller than the corresponding
ones using the standard measure of war (for the UCDP/PRIO). For instance, in columns 1 and 2
of Table 14 which use the 5th percentile threshold, the estimated coefficient for (log) population
in long differences regressions (Panel A) is 0.492 and 0.527 (when using the predicted and global
mortality instruments, respectively). The corresponding coefficients in Panel A of Table 8 (columns
2 and 8), are 0.637 and 0.653. Hence, the impact does appear smaller when looking at the relative
threshold of violence to define wars. However, while the coefficients are not significant according
to the conventional p-values, the bootstrap p-values still suggest this is a significant positive effect.
When increasing the relative threshold, and when looking at panel regressions, the general pattern
is that the estimated coefficient on population, while positive, is again smaller, and hence typically
not significant, or at best marginally significant at conventional confidence levels.
In sum, while some of the results in this section are less stark than those in the rest of our
exercises, the general pattern does not indicate that our results merely mirror a mechanical increase
in the number of "detected" civil wars from an increase in total population. In particular, most
of our specifications for battle deaths relative to initial population suggest a positive impact of
population growth, we present very suggestive evidence that population changes had an effect on
conflict in addition to the mechanical effect that would be expected from size of the population to
number of deaths alone, and population has a positive impact in some of our specifications for war
defined using relative thresholds of battle deaths to define war.
2.8 Effects on Regime Changes
The preceding results indicate that large increases in population may have adverse effects on social
stability by increasing the incidence of violent conflict. It is also possible to examine if other
measures of social change such as political transition are affected by population growth. Indeed, a
long tradition emphasizes the role of crises, and social unrest, in inducing political transitions .
To examine this question, Table 15 presents results where the dependent variable is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the country experiences any major regime change over the reference period.
The definition of any major regime change comes from Polity IV, and involves significant changes in
the polity score either in the direction of more democracy or more autocracy (see Appendix Table
1 for exact definitions). Columns 1-3 vary the sample considered (base sample, excluding Eastern
Europe, low and middle income countries only), column 4 uses the global mortality instrument (for
the base sample) and columns 5-8 allow for differential trends according to baseline characteristics
(institutions, a dummy for independence in 1940, initial GDP per capita, and initial population). As
usual, Panel A looks at long difference specifications, and Panel B focuses on panel regressions. The
general pattern is very clear: population growth increases the likelihood a major regime changes,
and the result is very robust to the various specification checks.
When examining whether these effects are mostly driven by movements towards democracy or
autocracy, we find that the most important driving force concerns democratic transitions. Table 16
shows this by presenting the same set of regressions as in Table 15, but where the dependent variable
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country experiences significant improvement in
the democracy score (see Appendix Table 1). Again, the general pattern is that population growth
increases the likelihood of significant movements towards democracy.
2.9 Final remarks
Civil wars create enormous economic costs and human suffering in many countries. This paper
shows that the significant (and largely unprecedented) population surges that followed the inter-
national epidemiological transition that began in the 1940s increased violent social conflict. We
interpret our findings as suggestive that larger populations, without a corresponding increase in
resources and technology, exacerbate the competition for resources and increase the likelihood of
conflict and civil wars in environments where the institutions cannot handle the higher level of dis-
putes. Given the tremendous increase in population in developing countries in the last 100 years,
our results highlight an important additional dimension of the implications of population changes
in less-developed countries. They may also help explain the puzzling fact that, while the interna-
tional epidemiological transition produced significant convergence in health conditions around the
world, no comparable convergence has been observed in income per capita. Finally, in line with a
long tradition emphasizing the role of crises and social unrest in inducing political transitions, we
show that the likelihood of major political transitions (and in particular democratic change) also
increased as a result of population growth.
2.A Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Years in conflictitotal years. COW
Years in conffictltotal years, COW
Years in corlictltotal years. Uppsala
Years in conictitotal years, Uppsala
Years in condictttotal years. Fearon and Laitrin
Years in conflictItotal years. Fearon and Laitin
Years with state failure/total years
Years with state failure/total years
Log I+ Battle Deaths, COW
Log 1+ Battle Deaths. COW
Log of population
Log of population
Base5ne Predicted Mortality
Global Mortality Index
Initialy Rich
Year Base Sample Counties
(1) (2) (3)
1940 0.051 0.000
(0-189) (0.000)
1980 0-131 0.000
(0.292) (0-000)
Above Median Below Median
Initially lnitiay Change in Change in
Middle Incomte Poor Predicted Mortality Predicted Mortality
Countries Countries 1940 to 1980 1940 to 1980
(4) (5) (a) (7)
D.050 0.088 D080 0.020
(0.175) (0.203) (0-249) (0.082)
0.100 0.224
(0.265) (0.357)
1940 0.135 0.000 0.115 0.260
(0.309) (0.000) (0.278) (0.417)
1980 0.277 0.091 0.2D3 0.444
(0.421) (0.302) (0.373) (0A70)
1940 0.121 0.000 D.100 0.238
(0.302) (0.000) (0.255) (0-427)
1980 0.242 0.091 0.183 0.378
(D.413) (0.302) (0.309) (0.475)
1950 0084 0-000 0.04 0.148
(0.225) (0.000) (0.204) (0.284)
1980 D.203 0.027 0.176 0.468
(0.404) (0.090) (0.352) (0.457)
1940 0.925 0-000 1.138 1-228
(2.696) (11000) (2.750) (3.425)
1980 1.392 0.000 1.028 2.428
(2.850) (0-000) (2.644) (3.381)
1940 9.191 9-349 8.871 9.557
(1.499) (1-344) (1.349) (1.7568)
1980 9.812 9.762
(1-384) (1-293)
9.393 10.321
(1238) (1-481)
1940 0.469 0.171 0.487 0.28
(0.271) (0.050) (0.224) (0.272)
1940 0.450 0.171 DA82 0.593
(0.258) (0.050) (0-222) (0.252)
0.252
(0.373)
0.201
(0.3a9)
0-415
(0-484)
(0.347)
0.307
(0487)
0-11B
(0.272)
0.421
(0.454)
1.126
(2.829)
2.558
(3.513)
9-124
(1-617)
9.856
(1.484)
(0:195)
0.84)
(0-184)
0.006
(GI35)
0.067
(0219)
0.134
(0.319)
0.077
(0247)
0.113
(0.308)
0.052
(0163)
DA DD(0.10)(0285)
0.708
(2.585)
0.191
(1.080)
9261
(1.393)
9.768
(1294)
0.241
(0.080)
0.238
(0.079)
NOTE- The table reports the mean malues of variables in the sanitles descibed in the colurm heading, with their standard deviations in parentheses. Initially rich countries had log GDP
per capita over 84 in 1940, niddle-incare ountries had log GOP per capita betweeen 7.37 and 84. and low-one countries had log GDP per capita below 7.37 in 1940 Prediaed
rortality is measured per 100 per year. Colums Band 7 report descriptive statistics forsubsarnpies in whAchchange in predicted nrtality beheen 1940 and 1980 was above orbelow
nedian value in the base sanple (-4.405). See the text and Appmtnx Table 1 for detals and definitions.
Table 2. Population and Conflict -OLS Estimates
Dependent variable is number of years in internal conflict or Dependent
number of years state failed/total years variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log (I+8atfle
Fearon and Deaths/No. of
COW Uppsala Laitin State Failure Years)
Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1950 Just 194 and
Panel A: long differences and 1980 and 1980 and 1980 and 1980 1980
log of population 0.303 0.255 0.236 0.591 2.076
p-value (0.058) (0.201) (0.238) (0.008) (0.265)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.014) (0.084) (0.102) (0.002) (0.134)
Observations 102 104 104 125 102
R-squared 0.658 0.656 0.625 0.713 0.561
Number of clusters 50 51 51 62 50
Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1950- Panel 1940-
Panel B: panel regressions 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
log of population 0.265 0.307 0.251 0.528 1.989
p-value (0.011) (0.048) (0.097) (0.005) (0.132)
p-value, wild bootsrap 0.000 (0.016) (0.052) (0.004) (0.096)
Observations 307 308 308 256 307
R-squared 0.478 0.629 0.621 0.630 0.496
Number of clusters 63 63 63 63 63
Note.-OLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Regular p-values for t-statistics with robust
standard errors (clustered by country) are reported in parentheses, as well as duster robust p-values following the
wild bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). Panel A is long-difference specifications
with two observations per country, one for the intial date and one for the final date. Panel B is unbalanced panel with
one observation per decade. See the text and Appendix Table 1 for definitions and details.
Table 3. Population and Conflict Controlling for Age Structure -OLS Estimates
Dependent variable is number of years in internal conflict or number of years state failed/total
years Dependent variable:
Log (1 +Battle
cow Upsala Fearon and Laitin State Failure Death ,s/No of years).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9), (10)
Panel A: long differences Just 1940 and 1980 Just 1940 and 1980 Just 1940 and 1980 Just 1950 and 1980 Just 1940 and 1980
share of population 15-34 0.865 -0.670 -0.595 -1.960 -2.091 -3.504 -2.437 -3.560 -4.255 -17.26
p-value (0.642) (0323) (0.849) (0.517) (0.604) (0.388) (0.311) (0.100) (0.840) (0.430)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.562) (0.570) (0.766) (0438) (0-640) (0.426) (0.160) (0.030) (0.750) (0.218)
log of population 0.381 0.332 0.344 0.567 3.226
p-value (0.051) (0.143) {0.145) (0.032) (0.112)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.026) (0.058) (0.046) (0.012) (0.022)
R-squared 0.618 0.691 0.690 0.724 0.651 0.686 0.629 0.717 0.587 0.639
Observations 86 86 88 88 88 88 90 90 86 86
Number of clusters 43 43 44 44 44 44 45 45 43 43
Panel B: panel regressions Panel 1940-1980 Panel 1940-1980 Panel 1940-1980 Panel 1950-1980 Panel 1940-1980
share of population 15-34 -0.465 -1.008 -1.191 -1.716 -1.643 -2.095 -1.538 -2.101 -8.577 -13.51
p-value (0.437) (0.108) (0.247) (0.096) (0.306) (0.198) (0.269) (0.100) (0.193) (0.061)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.346) (0.074) (0.286) (0.108) (0.384) (0.216) (0.270) (0.076) (0.146) (0.042)
log of population 0.330 0.307 0.265 0.504 3.001
p-value (0.014) (0.083) (0.116) (0.029) (0.058)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.008) (0.052) (0.062) (0.032) (0.054)
R-squared 0.488 0.538 0.647 0.668 0.669 0.683 0.530 0.575 0.537 0.571
Observations 227 227 228 228 228 228 184 184 227 227
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
Note.-OLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Regular p-values for t-statistics with robust standard errors (clustered by country are
reported in parentheses, as well as cluster robust p-values following the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). Panel A is long-
difference specifications with two observations per country, one for the intial date and one for the final date. Panel B is unbalanced panel with one observation per
decade. See the text and Appendix Table 1 for definitions and details.
Table 4. Predicted Mortality and Population: First Stage Estimates and Basic Robustness
Dependent variable is log population
(1 (} b) (4) (h)
Base bample,
Excluding Low and Global excluding most
Eastern Middle income mortality affected by
Base Sample Europe Countries Only instrument WWII
Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 and Just 1940 Just 1940 and
Panel A: long differences and 1980 and 1980 1980 and 1980 1980
baseline predicted mortality -0.782 -0.700 -0.764 -0.818 -0.811
p-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R-squared 0.988 0.989 0.987 0.988 0.987
Observations 102 92 80 102 94
Number of clusters 50 45 39 50 46
Panel 1940- Panel Pane 1940- Panel Panel 1940-
Panel B: panel regressions 1980 1940-1980 1980 1940-1980 1980
baseline predicted mortality -0.464 -0.402 -0.471 -0.681 -0.476
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R-squared 0.992 0.993 0.992 0.993 0.991
Number of observations 307 278 252 307 279
Number of clusters 63 57 52 63 57
Note.-OLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Regular p-values fort-statistics with robust standard
errors (clustered by country) are reported in parentheses, as well as cluster robust p-values following the wild bootstrap
procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). Panel A is long-difference specifications with two observations
per country, one for the intial date and one for the final date. Panel B is unbalanced panel with one observation per decade.
See the text and Appendix Table 1 for definitions and details.
Table 5. Predicted Mortality and Population: First Stage Estimates and Robustness to Differential Trends
Dependent variable is log of population
(1) (2 (3) (4) (5) (b) (7) 8) t9)
Interaction of post-year dummies with...
Oil Production Diamond Oil and Gas
Independent in Log GDP per Log Population per Capita in Production per rents per Capita Ethnic Ethnc
Institutions 1940 capita in 1930 in 1930 1960 Capita in 1960 in 1960 Polarization Fragmentation
Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and
Panel A: Long Differences 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
Baseline predicted mortality -0.730 -0.815 -0.600 -0.762 -0.782 -0.776 -0.808 -0.599 -0.587
p-value (0.004) (0.002) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.018)
p-value, wid bootsrap (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
p-value for post year dummy x ... 0.605 0.700 0.240 0.0659 9.64e-10 1.77e-07 1.50e-07 0.0413 0.185
R-squared 0.988 0.988 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.991 0.990
Observations 102 102 100 102 102 102 102 96 96
Number of clusters 50 50 49 50 50 50 50 47 47
Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panei 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940-
Panel B: Panel 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 Panel 1940-1980
Baseline predicted mortality -0.436 -0.484 -0.361 -0-446 -0.463 -0.460 -0.478 -0.337 -0.330
p-value (0.001) (0.001) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.008)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.002) (0.002) (0.028) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008)
p-value for post year dummies x --. 0.000358 0.0155 1.90e-08 0.111 0 2.40e-10 4.22e-10 0.000893 0.000488
R-squared 0.993 0.992 0.994 0.992 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.994 0.994
Observations 307 307 267 265 307 307 307 280 280
Number of clusters 63 63 53 52 63 63 63 57 57
NoLe -OLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Regiar p-values for It-statistics with robust standard enors (clustered by county) are reported in parentheses, as wel as duster rDbustp-values
following the wid bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Mler (2008). Panel A is long-difference specicatons with two observatons per country, one for fie intial date and one for the inl date. Panel B
is unbalanced panel with one observation per decade. See the text and Appendix Tabie 1 for definitions and details.
Table 6. Reduced Forms and Falsification Exercises
Low and
Middle Income
Base Sample Countries Only
Reduced Form
Low and Low and
Middle Income Middle Income
Base Sample Countries Only Base Sample Countries Only
(3) (4) (5) (6)
Falsification Exercises
Dependent variable is: --
Change in years in
conflict/total years from 1940
to 1980
Change in years in
conflict/total years from 1900 Change in Log Population
to 1940 from 1900 to 1940
Change in Predicted Mortality from 1940 to
1980
p-value
p-value, wild bootsrap
Observations
R-squared
-0.516
(0.002)
(0.006)
52
0.203
-0.643
(0.003)
(0.006)
41
0.215
0.0592
(0.156)
(0.110)
36
0.007
0.122
(0.328)
(0.388)
28
0.019
Note.-OLS regressions. Regular p-values for t-statistics with robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, as well as cluster robust p-values
following the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). See the text and Appendix Table 1 for definitions and details.
-0.189
(0.176)
(0.226)
52
0.033
-0.198
(0.318)
(0.352)
41
0.029
Table 7. Predicted Mortality and Age Structure
Dependent variable is Share of Poulation of ages 15-34
-- P) ) (4) (h) (b) (1) (d) ,
Low and Low and Low and Low and
Middle Middle Middle Middle
income income income income
Base Countries Base Countries Base Countries Base Countries
Sample Only Sample Only Sample Only Sample Only
Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940
long differences and 1980 and 1980 and 1980 and 1980 and 1990 and 1990 and 1990 and 1990
baseline predicted mortality 0.00384 -0.000329 -0.0285 -0.0299
p-value (0.871) (0.993) (0.300) (0.550)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.808) (0.978) (0.144) (0.510)
global mortality instrument 0.00462 0.000541 -0.0300 -0.0317
p-value (0.859) (0.990) (0.314) (0.568)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.798) (0.962) (0.194) (0.532)
R-squared 0.587 0.533 0.588 0.533 0.571 0.526 0.571 0.526
Observations 86 64 86 64 86 64 86 64
Number of clusters 43 32 43 32 43 32 43 32
Note.-OLS regressions. Regular p-values for t-statistics with robust standard errors (clustered by country) are reported in parentheses, as well as duster robust p-
values following the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). See the text and Appendix Table 1 for definitions and details.
Table 8. The Effect of Population and Conflict -2SLS Estimates
Dependent variable is years in internal conflict or years state failed/total years (cols 1-4, 5-8) and Log of I+Battle
Deaths/No. of years (cols 5 and 10)
Baseline Predicted Mortality UsingGlobal Mortality Rate
(1) 12) (3) (4) (b) (b) (7) (M) () (1U)
Log (1+Battle Log (1 +Battle
Fearon State Deaths/Total Fearon State Deaths/Total
COW Uppsala and Laitin Failure Years) COW Uppsala and Laitin Failure Years)
Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1950 Just 1940 and Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1950 Just 1940 and
Panel A: long differences and 1980 and 1980 and 1980 and 1980 1980 and 1980 and 1980 and 1980 and 1980 1980
Log of population 0.658 0.637 0.879 0.0315 6.774 0.649 0.653 0.872 0.681 6.646
p-value (0.034) (0.089) (0.051) (0.985) (0.040) (0.039) (0.093) (0.053) (0.151) (0.044)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.006) (0.020) 0.000 (0.986) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.060) (0.008)
Observations 102 104 104 125 102 102 104 104 125 102
Number of clusters 50 51 51 62 50 50 51 51 62 50
Panel 1940- Panel 1940. Panel 1940- Panel 1950- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1950. Panel 1940-
Panel B: panel regressions 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
Log of population 0.540 0.425 0.761 0.737 6.229 0.540 0.425 0.761 0.737 6.229
p-value (0.013) (0.141) (0.051) (0.053) (0.024) (0.013) (0.141) (0.051) (0.053) (0.024)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.014) (0.092) (0.020) (0.046) (0.018) (0.006) (0.088) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020)
Observations 307 308 308 256 307 307 308 308 256 307
Number of clusters 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
Note.-2SLS regressions wdh a full set of year and country tixed effects- Regular p-values fort-statistics with robust standard errors (clustered by country) are reported in parentheses,
as well as cluster robust p-values following the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). Panel A is long-difference specifications with two
observations per country, one for the intial date and one for the final date. Panel B is unbalanced panel with one observation per decade. First stages, for the sample with data on
years in conflict according to COW, in column 1 and column 4 of Table 4. See the text and Appendix Table 1 for definitions and details.
Table 9. Timing the Effect of Population on Conflict -2SLS Estimates
Dependent variable is years in conflict/total years according to Correlates of War -COW-
Baseline Predicted Mortality Using Global Mortality Rat.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Just Just
1940s and 1940s and
Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 1970- Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 1970-
and 1960 and 1970 and 1980 and 1990 1997 and 1960 and 1970 and 1980 and 1990 1997
log of population 0.111 0.471 0.658 0.464 0.749 0.114 0.456 0.649 0.436 0.724
p-value (0.630) (0.105) (0.034) (0.073) (0.030) (0.668) (0.110) (0.039) (0.063) (0.029)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.490) (0.012) (0.004) (0-022) (0.572) (0.022) (0.010) (0.018) (0.004) (0.012)
Observations 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102
Number of clusters 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Note.-2SLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Regular p-values for t-statistics with robust standard errors (clustered by country)
are reported in parentheses, as well as cluster robust p-values following the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008).
Long-difference specifications with two observations per country, one for the intial date and one for the final date. First stage for columns 1 to 5 in column 1
of Table 4-Panel A, and for columns 6-10 in column 4 of Table 4-Panel A. for See the text and Appendix Table 1 for definitions and details.
Table 10. The Effect of Population on Conflict: Basic Robustness Checks -2SLS Estimates
Dependent variable is years in conflict/total years according to Correlates of War -COW-
Base Sample,
Low and Middle Global excluding most Base Sample, Base Sample,
Excluding income mortality affected by assign 1950 to assign 1946-
Base Sample Eastern Europe Countries Only instrument WWlI 1940 1949 to 1940
Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and
Panel A: long differences 1980 1980 1980 and 1980 1980 1980 1980
log of population 0.658 0.739 0.841 0.649 0.650 0.524 0.687
p-value (0.034) (0.041) (0.056) (0.039) (0.038) (0.098) (0.040)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.042) (0.004)
Observations 102 92 80 102 94 102 102
Number of clusters 50 45 39 50 46 50 50
Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940-
Panel B: panel regressions 1980 1980 1980 1940-1980 1980 1980 1980
log of population 0.509 0.598 0.683 0.540 0.507 0.282 0.557
p-value (0.011) (0.015) (0.022) (0.013) (0.013) (0.120) (0.021)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.076) (0.004)
Observations 307 278 252 307 279 307 307
Number of clusters 63 57 52 63 57 63 63
Note.-2SLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Regular p-values for t-statistics with robust standard errors (clustered by country) are
reported in parentheses, as well as duster robust p-values following the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). Panel A is
long-difference specifications with two observations per country, one for the intial date and one for the final date. Panel B is unbalanced panel with one observation
per decade. First stages for columns 1-5 in columns 1-5 of Table 4. First stages of columns 6-7 are in column 1 of Table 4. See the text and Appendix Table 1 for
definitions and details.
Table 11. The Effect of Population on Conflict: Differential Trends -2SLS Estimates
Dependent vanable is years in conflict/total years according to COW
d1) (2) (3) (4) (b) (b) (r) (8) (7)
Interaction of post-year dummies with...
Oil Production Diamond Oil and Gas
Independent in Log GDP per Log Population per Capita in Production per rents per Capita Ethnic Ethnic
Institutions 1940 capita in 1930 in 1930 1960 Capita in 1960 in 1960 Polarization Fragmentation
Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just1940and Just1940 and Just1940and Just 194 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just1940and
Panel A: Long Differences 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
Log of population 0.791 0.589 1.127 0.665 0.658 0.665 0.635 0.805 0.748
p-value (0.037) (0.069) (0.095) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0064) (0.124)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.036) (0.042)
p-value for post year dummy x 0.314 0.527 0.260 0.663 0.0337 0.0393 0.0685 0.467 0.819
Observations 102 102 100 102 102 102 102 96 96
Number of dusters 50 50 49 50 50 50 50 47 47
Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel I940- Panel 1940- Panel1940-
Panel B: Panel 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 Panel 1940-1980
Log of population 0.545 0.454 0.930 0.517 0.510 0.513 0.494 0.599 0.503
p-value (0.029) (0.011) (0.038) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.038) (0.077)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.012) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.004) (0.026) (0.044)
p-value for post year dummies x ... 0.424 0.722 0.0176 0.249 0.157 0.0748 0.231 0.647 0.168
Observations 307 307 267 265 307 307 307 280 280
Number of clusters 63 63 53 52 63 63 63 57 57
Note.-2SLS regressions wth a full set of yea and country lied effects. RegLar palues for t-statistics with robust standard emxs (clustered by country) are reported in parentheses, as well as duster rtbust p-values
fotoving the Yid bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and lAIler (2008). Panel A is long.difference specications with tywo bservations per country, one for the itrial date and one for the final date. Panel B is
unbalanced panel with one observation per decade. Fast stages in Table 5 See the text and Apperdx Table 1 for defitions and details.
Table 12. The Effect of Population on Conflict: Mechanical Effects I -2SLS Estimates
Dependent variable is Log (1+Battle Deaths/Population in 1940), Uppsala
long differences panel regressions
Global Interaction with Global Interaction with
Mortality Independent in Mortality Independent in
Base Sample Instrument 1940 Base Sample Instrument 1940
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940-
1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
log of population 1.363 1.407 1.462 1.088 1.275 1.054
p-value (0.134) (0-136) (0.179) (0.057) (0.034) (0.154)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.040) (0.022) (0.044) (0.040) (0.038) (0.114)
p-value for Year dummies x
Independent in 1940 0.739 0.640
Observations 104 104 104 273 273 273
Number of clusters 51 51 51 54 54 54
Note.-2SLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Regular p-values for t-statistics with robust standard errors (dustered by
country) are reported in parentheses, as well as cluster robust p-values following the wid bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach
and Miller (2008). Columns 1-3 are long-difference specifications with two observations per country, one for the intial date and one for the final
date. Columns 4-6 are unbalanced panel with one observation per decade. First stage for columns 1 and 4 in column I of Table 4, for columns 2
and 5 in column 4 of Table 4, and for columns 3 and 6 in column 2 of Table 5. See the text and Appendix Table 1 for definitions and details.
Table 13. The Effect of Population on Conflict: Mechanical Effects 1I -2SLS Estimates
Dependent variable is Deviation of Observed Log (1 + Battle Deaths/No. of years) from
Predicted, Uppsala
long differences panel regressions
Global Interaction with Global Interaction with
Mortality Independent in Mortality Independent in
Base Sample Instrument 1940 Base Sample Instrument 1940
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940-
1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
log of population 3.932 4.203 4.492 3202 3.252 3-437
p-value (0.270) (0.253) (0.300) (0.363) (0.334) (0.402)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.112) (0.078) (0.124) (0.266) (0.260) (0.368)
p-value for Year dummies x
Independent in 1940 0.738 0.367
Observations 104 104 104 308 308 308
Number of clusters 51 51 51 63 63 63
Note.-2SLS regressions with a lull set of year and country fixed effects. Regular p-values for t-statistics with robust standard errors
(clustered by country) are reported in parentheses, as well as cluster robust p-values following the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by
Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). To calculate the dependent vanable, we run a regression of the log of (1+ battle deaths per year) for
each reference date on (instrumented) log population, for 1940 only. Next, we use the estimated coefficients and observed population
figures to estimate a predicted value of our dependent variable in each reference year. Finally, we calculate the deviation of the observed
vale of log of (1 + battle deaths per year) from this predictio. Columns 1-3 are long-difference specifications with two observations per
country, one for the intial date and one for the final date. Columns 4-6 are unbalanced panels with one observation per decade. First stage
for columns I and 4 in column I of Table 4, for columns 2 and 5 in column 4 of Table 4, and for columns 3 and 6 in column 2 of Table 5.
See the text and Appendix Table 1 for definitions and details.
Table 14. The Effect of Population on Conflict: Mechanical Effects IlIl -2SLS Estimates
Dependent variable is Years in internal conflict/total years, Uppsala
Panel A: long differences
log of population
p-value
p-value, wild bootsrap
War if Above 5th
Percentile of Battle
Deaths/Population
Predicted Global
Mortality Mortality
(1) (2)
Just 1940 Just 1940
and 1980 and 1980
0.492
(0.186)
(0.070)
0.527
(0.164)
(0.052)
War if Above 10th
Percentile of Battle
Deaths/Population
Predicted Global
Mortality
(3)
Just 1940
and 1980
0.407
(0.245)
(0.144)
Mortality
(4)
Just 1940
and 1980
0.440
(0.212)
(0.082)
War if Above 20th
Percentile of Battle
Deaths/Population
Predicted Global
Mortality Mortality
(5) (6)
Just 1940 Just 1940
and 1980 and 1980
0-383
(0.322)
(0.192)
0.427
(0.256)
(0.138)
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 104
Number of clusters 51 51 51 51 51 51
Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940-
Panel B: panel regressions 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
log of population 0.215 0.299 0.144 0.252 0.119 0.253
p-value (0.505) (0.310) (0.653) (0.360) (0.726) (0.367)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.458) (0.274) (0.570) (0.300) (0.744) (0.306)
Observations 308 308 308 308 308 308
Number of clusters 63 63 63 63 63 63
Note.-2SLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Regular p-values for t-statistics with robust standard
errors (clustered by country) are reported in parentheses, as well as cluster robust p-values following the wild bootstrap procedure
suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). Panel A are long-difference specifications with two observations per country,
one for the intial date and one for the final date. Panel B are unbalanced panels with one observation per decade. First stage for
odd columns in column I of Table 4, and for even columns in column 4 of Table 4. for See the text and Appendix Table 1 for
definitions and details.
Table 15. The Effect of Population on Regime Changes -2SLS Estimates
Dependent variable is Dummy=1 If any major regime change in reference period
Interaction Interaction Interaction
Excluding Low and Global Interaction with with (log) GDP with Log
Base Eastern Middle income mortality with Independent per capita in Population In
Sample Europe Countries Only instrument Institutions in 1940 1930 1930
(1) (2) (3) (4) (b) (b) (U) (8)
Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 and Just 1940 Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and
Panel A: long differences and 1980 and 1980 1980 and 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
log of population 0.576 0.471 0.963 0.557 0.892 0.495 0.777 0.594
p-value (0.145) (0.262) (0.094) (0.159) (0.056) (0.206) (0.278) (0.122)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.048) (0.140) (0.004) (0.052) (0.010) (0.076) (0.094) (0.022)
p-value for post year dummy x
Institutions 0.133
Independent in 1940 0.586
Initial GDP 0.639
Continent Dummies 0.378
Observations 104 94 82 104 104 104 102 104
Number of clusters 51 46 40 51 51 51 50 51
Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940-
Panel B: panel regressions 1980 1980 1980 1940-1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
log of population 1.100 0.968 1.532 0.892 1.458 0.923 1.402 1.149
p-value (0.008) (0.030) (0.012) (0.015) (0.009) (0.020) (0.110) (0.008)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.004) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) 0.000 (0.004) (0.032) 0.000
p-value for year dummies x ..
Institutions 0.484
Independent in 1940 0-380
Initial GDP 0.184
Continent Dummies 0.594
Observations 308 279 253 308 308 308 268 266
Number of clusters 63 57 52 63 63 63 53 52
Note.-2SLS regressions with a full set of yew and country Axed effects. Regular p-values for t-statistics with robust standard enors (clustered by counby) are reported in
parentheses, as wel as cluster robust p-values following the wild bootstrap proceduTe suggested by Caneron, Gelbach and Miler (2008). Panel A are long-dilference
specifications with two observations per country, one for the intial date and one for the final date. Panel B are unbalanced panels with one observation per decade. See the
text and Appendix Table I for detintions and details.
Table 16. The Effect of Population on Democratic Change -2SLS Estimates
Dependent variable is Dummy=1 if Maior democractic change in reference period
Low and
Middle Interaction Interaction Interaction
Excluding income Global Interaction with with (log) GDP with Log
Base Eastern Counties mortality with Independent per capita in Population in
Sample Europe Only instrument Institutions in 1940 1930 1930
Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 Just 1940 ana Just 1940 and Just 1940 and
Panel A: long differences and 1980 and 1980 and 1980 and 1980 and 1980 1980 1980 1980
log of population 0.457 0.391 0.636 0.439 0.610 0.421 0.768 0.474
p-value (0.097) (0.168) (0.115) (0.102) (0.088) (0.112) (0.202) (0.064)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.030) (0.082) (0.028) (0.020) (0.010) (0.036) (0.048) (0.004)
p-value for post year dummy x
Institutions 0.368
Independent in 1940 0.803
Initial GDP 0.438
Continent Dummies 0.337
Observations 104 94 82 104 104 104 102 104
Number of clusters 51 46 40 51 51 51 50 51
Panel
1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940-
Panel B: panel regressions 1980 1980 1980 1940-1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
log of population 0.663 0.561 0.928 0.526 0.898 0.755 1.185 0.701
p-value (0.008) (0.021) (0.030) (0.014) (0.031) (0.010) (0.076) (0.015)
p-value, wild bootsrap 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) (0.008) (0.010) (0.018) (0.008)
p-value for year dummies x
Institutions 0.114
Independent in 1940 0.489
Initial GDP 0.583
Continent Dummies 0.518
Observations 308 279 253 308 308 308 268 266
Number of clusters 63 57 52 63 63 63 53 52
Note.-2SLS regressions with a tul set ol year and country fixed effects. Reguiar p-values fort-statistics wiih robust standard enors (clustered by country) are
reported in parentheses, as well as cluster robust p-values following the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miler (2008). Panel A are
long-difference specifications with wo observations per counby, one for the intial date and one for the final date. Panel B are unbalanced panels with one
observation per decade. See Jie text and Appendix Table 1 for definitions and details.
Appendix Table 1. Variable Sources and Description
Variable Descripion Source
Social Confict
Years in oonsftscsfoeal Ratio of the number of years rih an ntemal conflict to total years assigned to reference date.
years Assignent of years to reference dates and exact defintion of internal condlict varies by data
source, as detaled below.
COW Number of years wirh etemal conflict defined as combat between a State and other actor, Correlates of f ar (COW) Intra-Sta wars
with tires categories nduded; civil war for control of cerdra goverment. conflict over local damse. See Sarkees (2000).
issues, and inter-comaunat conlict. The threshold for inclusion is 000 battle-related
deaths, civilian or miliary, but with massacres excluded. Assignment to reference dates:
1900ri900049. f940=1940-49. 1950=1950-59..... 1980=1980-89. t990=90-1999.
Uppsala Number of years wAh any incidence of an kntemal aimed conflict" or of "intemationalzed Backdating of the Uppsala Conflict Data
internal armed conflic". Armed conflict is defined to include all contested incompatibates Project (UCOP] dataase made i conjunction
that concem govemment or tentory or both where the use of aimed force between two with the Intemnationl Peace Resarch
partes results in at least 25 baele-relaed deaths. Of the so parties, a least one is the tnatut, Oslo (PRIO). See Geldnich et. al
government of a state. Assignmentt jreference dates: 1940=1g449, 1950g1950-59,.. (2002)
1980=198049. 1990=1990-99.
Fearon and Latin Number of years wthviolent civil conflict that (1) involved fighting between agents of (or Fearon and Latin (2003)
claimants to) a stale and organized, nonstate groups who sought either to take control of a
govemment, to take power in a region. or to use violence to change government policies. (2)
kiled at least 1.000 aver its course, wi a yeary average of at least 100. (3) At least 100
were kied on both sides including civilians attacked by rebels). Counts anticolonial wars as
occurring within the empire in question (e.g. Algeria is assigned to France). Assignment to
reerence ates:: 1940=194549,1950=1950-59.a..k, 1f980t1980hU9p 1 90=19C-n9.
State Falure Number Of years where state fate dummy equals 1. Coded her all countries with State Faij e Task Force phase replication
populations greaterMan 500.000 from 1955to 28, and equals I nHeren is any serious daPRsec.
instaility ina given yea. Four nes of polical instability are included: ethnic wan.
revolutionary wars. genocides and politloides. and adverse regiFe changes. AssLgaent to
reference dates: :1951955-59, 195019504-9,. 1980= 1980 -81990=1990-99.
Log(1+Batte Deaths) "Sest estimate"of annual bafle-related deaths for use with de COW dataset (version 2) and Center for lhe Study of Civil War -CSCW-
UCDPPRIO dataset (versicn 3). Assignmentto reference dates as in the respective conflict Bfde Deaths Dataset See Lacina and
dataset Gleditsch (20135).
Regime change Dummy variable, takes value of if tie country experiences a regime change in he reference Polity IV.
period. We consider in paricular: a dummy for Major Democratic Transition, defined by Polity IV
as six poets or greater increase in the POUTY score over a period of three years or less
including a shift from an autocratic POLITY value (-10 to 0) to a partial democratic POLITY
value 4+1 to +6) or full democratic POLITY value (+7 to +10) or a sift from a partial democratic
value so a fiE democratic value; a major adverse regine change, defined by PolitylV as a six or
more point decrease in POLITY score or an interregnal period denoing a colapse of central
state authority or a revolutionary transformation in the mode of governance (not a democratic
transition); and finay a durnmyfor any major rgune change, which equals one for either major
democratic or adverse transitions.
Population
Loa of Population Total Pocdation per country in 1900, 1940. 1950, 1960, 1970. 1981. 1990. 1990. Maddison 20031
Share of population 15-34. Percentage of the population in each age group for 1940. 1950. 1960, 1970, and 1980. Other From 1950 onwards, UN demographic
Share of other age groups age groups included are 0-4. 5-9. 10-14.- 75-79, and over 80- database (http:/esa.un-orgtunpp)L For 1940, UN
Demographic Yearbook 1948 (United Nations
194. Table 4. pp. 108-158). We use data for
4 or the closestavailae year or range of
years-
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Appendix Table 2. Predicted Mortality and Population: First Stage Estimates and Additional Robustness to Differential Trends
Dependent variable is log of population
Interaction of post-year dummies with...
Share of
Share of GDP Share of Catholic,
in Natural Mineral Diamond Average Muslim,
Resource Production in Oil Production Production in Religious Religious Ethnolinguistic Protestant in
Sector in 1970 GNP in 1971 in 1960 1960 Polarization Fragmentation Fragmentation 1980
Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and
Panel A: long differences 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
Baseline Predicted Mortality -0.495 -0.661 -0.796 -0.772 -0.562 -0.636 -0.777 -0.584
p-value (0.081) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.005) (0.009) (0.034)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.016) (0.002) (0-002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
p-value for post year dummy x ... 0.967 0.331 4.24e-06 0.0759 0.169 0.182 0.973 0.465
R-squared 0.992 0.990 0.989 0.989 0.990 0.989 0.988 0.989
Observations 68 92 102 102 96 96 102 100
Number of clusters 33 45 50 50 47 47 50 49
Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940-
Panel B: panel regressions 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
Baseline Predicted Mortality -0.268 -0.378 -0.472 -0.458 -0.321 -0.366 -0.429 -0.357
p-value (0.047) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.026) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.020) (0.006) (0.002) (0.014)
p-value for post year dummies x ... 1.69e-05 0.000486 3.10e-10 3.07e-05 5.38e-06 0.00135 0.00339 1.55e-08
R-Squared 0.995 0.993 0.993 0.992 0.994 0.993 0.992 0.994
Observations 201 277 307 307 280 280 302 309
Number of clusters 39 55 63 63 57 57 60 62
Note.-OLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Regular p-values for t-statistics with robust standard errors (dustered by country) are reported in parentheses, as well as
cluster robust p-values following the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). Panel A are long-difference specifications with two observations per country, one for
the intial date and one for the final date. Panel B are unbalanced panels with one observation per decade. See the text and Appendlix Table 1 for definitons and details.
Appendix Table 3. The Effect of Population on Conflict: Additional Differential Trends -2SLS Estimates
Dependent variable is years in conflict/total years according to COW
Interaction of post-yeardummies with...
Share of
Share of GDP Share of Catholic,
in Natural Mineral Diamond Average Muslim,
Resource Production in Oil Production Production in Religious Religious Ethnolinguistic Protestant in
Sector in 1970 GNP in 1971 in 1960 1960 Polarization Fragmentation Fragmentation 1980
Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and
Panel A: long differences 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
log of population 1.526 0.811 0.646 0.669 0.920 0.834 0.608 1.054
p-value (0.101) (0.041) (0.031) (0.032) (0.111) (0.058) (0.135) (0.103)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.002) (0.006) (0.010) (0.00a) (0.042) (0.024) (0.046) (0.010)
p-value for post year dummy x ... 0.248 0.165 0.0401 0.124 0-491 0.383 0.810 0.444
Observations 68 92 102 102 96 96 102 100
Number of clusters 33 45 50 50 47 47 50 49
Panel 1940- Pane 1940- Panel 940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940-
Panel B: panel regressions 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
log of population 1.516 0.627 0.501 0.517 0.650 0.614 0.369 0.730
p-value (0.063) (0.023) (0.010) (0.010) (0.088) (0.035) (0.062) (0.078)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.014) (0.020) (0;002) (0.008) (0.054) (0.014) (0.056) (0.024)
p-value for post year dummies x ... 0.349 0.0854 0.208 0.0745 0.637 0.469 0.241 0.817
Observations 194 270 307 307 280 280 295 302
Number of clusters 39 55 63 63 57 57 60 62
Note.-2SLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Regular p-values for t-statstics with robust standard errors (clustered by country) are reported in parentheses, as wel as
cluster robust p-values following the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Mller (2008). Panel A are long-diference specifications with two observations per country, one for
the intial date and one for the final date. Panel B are unbalanced panels with one observation per decade. First stages in Appendix Table 2. See the text and Appendix Table 1 for dekinliouis and
details.
Appendix Table 4. Reduced Forms Robustness I: Population and Predicted Mortality
Dependent variable is years in conflict/total years according to COW
01}(3 ()0 4) (5) ()v
Base Sample,
Excluding Low and Middle Global excluding most Base Sample, Base Sample,
Eastern income mortality affected by assign 1950 to assign 1946-
Base Sample Europe Countries Only instrument WWII 1940 1949 to 1940
Just 1940 and Just 1940 Just 1940 and Just 1940 Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and
Panel A: long differences 1980 and 1980 1980 and 1980 1980 1980 1980
baseline predicted mortality -0.515 -0.517 -0.642 -0.531 -0.527 -0.410 -0.537
p-value (0.028) (0.029) (0.033) (0.035) (0.031) (0.098) (0.030)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.008) (0.034) (0.006)
R-squared 0.683 0.679 0.681 0.680 0.693 0.683 0.655
Observations 102 92 80 102 94 102 102
Number of clusters 50 45 39 50 46 50 50
Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel Panel1940- Panel1940- Panel 1940-
Panel B: panel regressions 1980 1980 1980 1940-1980 1980 1980 1980
baseline predicted mortality -0.245 -0.247 -0.306 -0.367 -0.250 -0.137 -0.265
p-value (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.012) (0.003) (0.098) (0.005)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.068) (0.002)
R-squared 0.451 0.447 0.445 0.475 0.456 0.482 0.445
Observations 313 283 258 308 284 313 313
Number of clusters 63 57 52 63 57 63 63
Note--OLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Regular p-values for t-statistics with robust standard errors (clustered by country) are
reported in parentheses, as well as duster robust p-values following the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). Panel A are
long-difference specifications with two observations per country, one for the intial date and one for the final date. Panel B are unbalanced panels with one
observation per decade. See the text and Appendix Table 1 for definitions and details.
Appendix Table 5. Reduced Forms Robustness II: Population and Predicted Mortality
Dependent variable is years in confheittotal years according to COW(1) (2) (3) (4) (b) (6) (1) (8) (9)
Interaction of post-year dummies with...
Oil Production Diamond Oil and Gas
Independent in Log GDP per Log Population per Capita n Production per rents per Capita Ethnic Ethnic
Institutions 1940 capita in 1930 in 1930 1960 Capita in 1960 in 1960 Polarization Fragmentation
Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just1940and Justl1940and Just 1940and Just1940and Justl94and Just1940and Just 194D and
Panel A: Long Differences 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
Baseline predicted mortality -0.578 -480 -0676 -0.507 -0.515 -0.516 -0-513 -0-482 -0.439
p-value (0.023) (0.050) (0.044) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.061) (0.109)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.006) (0.018) (0.028) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.028)
p-value for post year dummy x ... 0.442 0.277 0.164 0.743 0.586 0.503
R-squared 0.692 0.686 0.697 0.690 0.683 0.684 0.683 0685 0.688
Observations 102 102 100 102 102 102 102 96 96
Number of clusters 50 50 49 50 50 50 50 47 47
Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel1940- Panel 1940- Pane 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940-
Panel B: Panel 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 Panel 1940-1980
Baseline predicted mortality -0.233 -0.215 -0.334 -0.230 -0.245 -0.248 -0.246 -0-206 -0.175
p-Value (0.012) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.017) (0.032)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.002) (0.008) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) (0.016)
p-value for post year dummies x ... 0.962 0.634 0.0117 0.235 0.638 0.149 0.584 0.417 0.189
R-squared 0.451 0.466 0.491 0.478 0.451 0.451 0.452 0472 0.485
Observations 313 313 268 265 313 313 313 284 284
Number of clusters 63 63 53 52 63 63 63 57 57
Note.-OLS regressions ith a full set of year and country fixed effects. Regular p-values fort-stahslics with robust standard errors (clustered by county) are reporled in parentheses, aswell as clusterrobustp-values
fclowkng the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and MIller (2008). Panel A are big-diffetence specificationswith two observations per ccunay, one for be itial date armd one for he inal date. Panel
B are unbalanced panels with one observatiorn per decade. See the text and Appendix Table i for definitions and detals.
Appendix Table 6. Reduced Forms Robustness IlIl: Population and Predicted Mortality
Dependent variable is years in conflict/total years according to COW
6) (L) 9) @~t) b)( )
Interaction of post-year dummies with..
Share of
Share of GDP Share of Catholic,
in Natural Mineral Diamond Average Muslim,
Resource Production in Oil Production Production in Religious Religious Ethnolinguistic Protestant in
Sector in 1970 GNP in 1971 in 1960 1960 Polarization Fragmentation Fragmentation 1980
Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and Just 1940 and
Panel A: long differences 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
Baseline Predicted Mortality -0.755 -0.536 -0.513 -0.517 -0.518 -0.531 -0.472 -0.615
p-value (0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.094) (0.049) (0.090) (0.032)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.012) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0,056) (0.016) (0.046) (0.014)
p-value for post year dummy x ... 0.142 0.457 0.502 0.131 0.990 0.870 0.784 0.308
R-squared 0.716 0.682 0.683 0.684 0.681 0.681 0.684 0.714
Observations 68 92 102 102 96 96 102 100
Number of clusters 33 45 50 50 47 47 50 49
Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940- Panel 1940-
Panel 8: panel regressions 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
Baseline Predicted Mortality -0.384 -0.237 -0.246 -0.248 -0.199 -0.219 -0.197 -0.238
p-value (0.009) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.063) (0.025) (0.005) (0.015)
p-value, wild bootsrap (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (038) (0.016) (0.004) (0.006)
p-value for post year dummies x ... 0.392 0.514 0.759 0.150 0.612 0.675 0.393 0.515
R-Squared 0.471 0.472 0.452 0.451 0.472 0-468 0.460 0.480
Observations 195 274 313 313 284 284 298 308
Number of clusters 39 55 63 63 57 57 60 62
Note -OLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Regular p-values for t-statistics with robust standard errors (clustered by country) are reported in
parentheses, as well as cluster robust p-values following the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). Panel A are long-difference
specifications with two observations per country, one for the intial date and one for the final date. Panel B are unbalanced panels with one observation per decade. See the text
and Appendix Table 1 for definitions and details.
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Figure 1. Average Population and Average Log Population
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Figure 2. Average Log Life Expectancy
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Figure 3. Average Log GDP per capita
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Figure 4. Conflicts: Civil War - COW
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Figure 5. Conflicts: Internal Conflict - UCDP/PRIO
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Figure 6. Conflicts: Civil Conflict - Fearon and Laitin
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Figure 7. Conflicts: Battle Deaths - COW
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Figure 8
Change in Log Life Expectancy and Change in Predicted Mortality
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Figure 9
Change in Log Life Expectancy and Change in Predicted Mortality
Low and Middle Income Countries
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Figure 10
Change in Log Life Expectancy 1900-1940, and
Change in Predicted Mortality 1940-1980
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Figure 11
Change in Log Life Expectancy 1930-1940, and
Change in Predicted Mortality 1940-1980
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Figure 12
Change in Log Population and Change in Predicted Mortality
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Figure 13
Change in Log Population and Change in Predicted Mortality
Low and Middle Income Countries
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Figure 14
Change in Years in Conflict/Total Years and
Change in Predicted Mortality
Base Sample
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Figure 15
Change in Years in Conflict/Total Years and
Change in Predicted Mortality
Low and Middle Income Countries
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Figure 16
Change in Years in Conflict/Total Years 1900-1940, and
Change in Predicted Mortality 1940-1980
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Figure 17
Change in Years in Conflict/Total Years 1900-1940, and
Change in Predicted Mortality 1940-1980
Low and Middle Income Countries
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Chapter 3
The Political Economy of Rural
Property Rights and the Persistence
of the Dual Economy
The fact that the wage level in the capitalist sector depends upon earnings in the subsis-
tence sector is sometimes of immense political importance, since its effect is that capi-
talists have a direct interest in holding down the productivity of the subsistence workers
(...) In actual fact the record of every imperial power in Africa in modern times is one
of impoverishing the subsistence economy, either by taking away the people's land, or by
demanding forced labour in the capitalist sector, or by imposing taxes to drive people to
work for capitalist employers.
Sir W. Arthur Lewis, 1954
3.1 Introduction
Widespread poverty and low aggregate productivity in less-developed countries is partly due to
poorly performing rural sectors1,2 . This raises the question of why is agriculture so unproductive
'I thank participants of the MIT development lunch, MIT political economy breakfast, the Political Economy
and the Economic History/Historical Development (EHHD) groups at Harvard-MIT, and the 2010 Midwestern Po-
litical Science Association for comments. In particular, I thank Ximena Cadena, Dave Donaldson, Esther Duflo,
Rachel Glennerster, Sarah Hamilton, Ana Marfa Ibdfiez, Gina M.S. Lambright, Carl Levan, Benjamin Olken, Samuel
Pienknagura, and Juan Fernando Vargas.
2 Compared to rich countries, poor countries have lower output per worker in agriculture relative to non-agriculture
(Restuccia et al., 2008). Since more people work in agriculture in poor countries than in rich countries, this apparent
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in poor countries. While there is no simple answer, there is broad consensus that property rights
are vital to agricultural productivity. Of course, such a general statement blurs several distinctions.
First, property rights refer to a variety of rights. These include: (i) transfer rights, which determine
the right to sell, rent, bequeath, or mortgage the land, and (ii) use rights, which establish permissible
activities. Second, there are many types of property rights. A key distinction is between communal
systems, where a customary authority holds and administers land rights, and private property
rights, which lie in the hands of individuals.
Given these distinctions, consider a more precise statement of the conventional wisdom: in-
dividual, well-specified and secure property rights over productive assets, and land in particular,
improve economic outcomes. Besley & Ghatak (2010b) suggest a two-fold categorization of the
underlying theory. First, secure property rights limit expropriation, incentivizing investment and
effort and reducing resources diverted for protection. Second, well-defined individual rights facil-
itate market transactions, improving asset collaterilazability (which may ease credit constraints
that hinder investments) and generating gains from trade (by making sure land is held by the most
productive owner). Although communal tenure systems may increase tenure security and provide
some basis for land transactions under certain circumstances (Deininger & Binswanger, 1999), in
practice private property rights, when clearly specified and well-enforced, improve productivity in
agriculture3 .
Despite these positive effects of property rights, the rural sectors of many less-developed coun-
tries are characterized by poor specification and weak enforcement of property rights. More specif-
ically, rural areas in developing countries throughout history and even today frequently involve the
coexistence of more than one regime of property rights and production. A more "modern" group
of "capitalist" landowners, with large farms around institutions of private property, coexists with a
more "traditional" or "subsistence" group of peasants, who farm small plots with limited property
violation of comparative advantage helps explain the bad productivity performance of poor countries (Caselli, 2005).
World Bank (2008) surveys the connection between agriculture, poverty, and development, and urges for measures
at improving agricultural productivity as a central strategy against world poverty.
3A microeconomic literature, too large to do it justice, examines the effects of property rights on investment
and productivity. Papers using an instrumental variables strategy to address the endogeneity problem offer mixed
results. For example, Besley (1995) reports some positive effects of individual's transfer rights on investment in
Ghana, whereas Brasselle et al. (2002) find no effect of tenure security on investment in Burkina Faso. However,
other studies using variation in the security of property rights induced by natural experiments or policy reforms find
positive effects of better property rights (e.g. Banerjee et al. (2002), Goldstein & Udry (2008), Hornbeck (2010),
Jacoby et al. (2002)). In a recent survey for the case of West Africa, Fenske (2010) concludes that, empirically, the
link between more complete land rights and investment has been found to be weaker than expected. Several reasons
ranging from thin credit markets to empirical difficulties help explain this, yet in an examination of multiple data
sets for the region the relationship seems robust for certain investments, such as fallow.
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rights.
Given the effects of property rights on productivity, this "dual" structure within the agricultural
sector may cause its low productivity. Why aren't private property rights adopted more widely?
Why did this socially sub-optimal organization emerge? Why did it persist?
In this paper, I examine these questions and put forward a theory that rests on the premise that
politically powerful landowners use this power to impoverish the subsistence sector to extract cheap
labour from peasants. Admittedly, landowners can hold down the productivity of the subsistence
sector in various ways. Still, limited property rights are especially attractive because, unlike other
distortions such as taxation, they achieve an additional goal: they tie peasants to land. Imperfect
property rights force peasants to remain in the agricultural sector to protect their property. In this
sense, imperfect property rights may be preferred to other types of distortions that reduce peasants'
welfare in the subsistence sector, especially if alternative employment opportunities appear in other
sectors.
I build a simple theoretical model to capture this intuition and examine the determinants of
peasants' property rights. Also, I explore whether these determinants change when employment
opportunities for peasants in other sectors improve. Alternative sectors may be any others that
compete with landowners for labour and require peasants' outmigration. It is natural to think
of them collectively as the "urban sector," and to associate an increase in the urban wage with
"modernization."
The main predictions of the model include the conditions under which weak property rights
emerge. In particular, I show that weak property rights arise when urban wages are low only if
the elite cannot tax peasants effectively. In contrast, when urban wages are high (and the threat
of migration is effective), poor property rights arise even when the elite tax peasants effectively if
peasants own relatively little land.
These results are driven by the conflicting effects of peasant limited property rights on elite's
welfare. By reducing peasant income, bad property rights increase peasants' labour supply for
the elite. On the other hand, reduced productivity decreases tax revenues for politically powerful
landowners.
How is this ambivalence over property rights resolved? When urban wages are low, good
property rights prevail if landowners can tax peasants. In this case, the elite want to impose high
taxes on peasants both for tax revenue and to get more labour from them. A high tax rate, in
turn, compels the elite to prioritize extracting peasants' income via taxation and thus to be mostly
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interested in increasing productivity by selecting good property rights institutions.
As noted, the implications of this theory at higher levels of modernization are markedly different.
The reason is that, with an effective threat of migration, increasing taxes on peasants' income no
longer induces them to work for landowners. On the contrary, it reduces the attractiveness of rural
areas; the ensuing migration decreases labour input for landowners. Thus, when hoping to avoid
labour force migration, the elite will choose minimal taxation. This implies tax revenues become an
unimportant component of landowner's income, muting incentives to adopt good property rights
institutions. To avoid migration and extract more labour from peasants, the elite select poor
property rights institutions. This logic prevails when peasants own little land. If peasants own
sufficient land, however, taxable income is high enough that the elite assign greater importance to
taxation. Thus, to increase tax revenues, the elite promote strong property rights for peasants.
Therefore, in the presence of landowner political power and a small subsistence sector, the
theory suggests a specific mechanism for the endogenous persistence of bad rural institutions as
development unfolds. This contrasts other theories of the dual economy in which the disappearance
of the subsistence sector is a more or less natural consequence of an exogenous process of capital
accumulation4 . In this sense, this work relates to underdevelopment theories of the "dependency"
tradition, most notably applied to Africa5 . As Clarke (1975) puts it:
"the 'traditional' social forms are not simply relics of the past but have been necessary
and integral to the development, maintenance and reproduction of peripheral capitalism
(...) the state, continues to support such 'traditional' structures [which] have not there-
fore been in 'transition' to modernity, being shaped by the global system and settler
colonialism, have been made thoroughly modern, poor, and dependent" (p.75).
In the theory outlined above, precisely the rise of an alternative "modern" or "urban" sector
may shift the rural elite's attention away from taxation. But when the elite is not concerned about
'In Lewis (1954), capital accumulation or productivity gains in the modern sector pull "unlimited supplies of
labour" out of the subsistence sector. Models of the dual economy and growth with structural change overcome
some of the limitations of the Lewis' model, but share the idea that accumulation of capital and knowledge in the
modern economy gradually reduces the size of the subsistence sector. Examples range from models of unbalanced
growth focusing on demand side forces (e.g., Kongsamut et al. (2001)) to models where income growth is associated
with information accumulation, reduction of idiosyncratic risk, and reduction of credit constraints (e.g. Banerjee &
Newman (1998), Acemoglu & Zilibotti (1999)).
5See Phimister (1979) for a historiographical essay. Arrighi (1970) argued, against the ideas in Barber (1961),
that capitalist development began with labour scarcity and high wages, not unlimited labour, and that as capital
accumulation proceeded it created cheap labour. Amin (1972), Clarke (1975), Palmer & Parsons (1977), and Palmer
(1977b) express similar views. Below, I draw heavily on the latter to discuss the Rhodesian case. Mosley (1983)
offers a critique of certain versions of underdevelopment theory.
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tax revenue, it has no direct interest in the productivity of the subsistence sector, and thus has
no incentive to promote efficiency-enhancing innovations in property rights institutions. Instead,
it has incentive to sustain the rural dual economy.
Also noteworthy, the model predicts a non-monotonic relationship between the quality of rural
property rights and peasant land. Indeed, when peasants' limited landholdings increase, this
strengthens the rural elite's incentives to reduce property rights in order to extract labour. How-
ever, if sufficient land is allocated to peasants, the elite prefers promoting optimal property rights
institutions to increase tax revenues. This suggests a general theory as to why small land reforms
deliver poor results compared to larger transfers of land to peasants.
The developing world provides several illustrations of dual rural economies where, as in the
model proposed in this paper, peasants have limited property rights and less political influence
than landowners. Communal tenure systems alongside private, commercial agriculture have been
dominant in parts of Latin America. Mexico is an important example: a long history of land
dispossession during the colonial and early independent periods fueled many of the agrarian recla-
mations during the Mexican Revolution of the early XXth Century. Land distribution was at the
center of Mexico's 1917 Constitution. Throughout the XXth Century, land distributed to peasant
communities in the form of ejidos was characterized by institutions of communal property. Land
was granted to ejidos as a whole, and members of the community typically enjoyed inheritable
(but otherwise non-transferable) use rights over specific plots. Also, these rights would be lost after
absence. Importantly, a large political economy tradition of land reform in Mexico emphasizes the
influence of landowner agricultural interests in shaping the land reform process and discriminating
against the ejido sector6 .
Mexico illustrates a few basic tenants of my analysis. For instance, comparing ejidatarios to
private peasants with similar small units of production, Lamartine Yates (1981) notes the role of
poor property rights in tying peasants to their land: "In recent times there has been observed
a sharp reduction in the number of these [small private] units as their owners have sold out and
migrated to the cities, (whereas ejidatarios on equally small units being prohibited from selling, are
much less mobile)" (p. 151). And later adds, emphasizing the limits to private initiative imposed
by these property rights institutions,
6The role of land reform in Mexico and its connection with the Partido Revolucionario Institutional's (PRI) long
hegemony has been much studied. A review is outside the scope of this paper.
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"theoretically, [the ejidatario] is free to leave whenever he wishes, but in practice he is a
prisoner tied to his land, because, if he left, the ejido would give him no compensation
for improvements he may have achieved through years of hard work. He is forbidden
by law to rent his land, even to another member of his own ejido. He is forbidden to
subdivide his parcela among his sons if by doing so the new parcelas would be below
the legal minimum size-which most of them would be" (p. 180).
Another exhaustive investigation of the Mexican agricultural sector highlights the role of eji-
datarios as a labour force for large landowners and the role of the property rights regime (Reyes-
Osorio, 1974). Surveys conducted in the late 1960s revealed that only 6% of property owners worked
as jornaleros. In contrast, 23% of ejidatarios did, and they worked more days as jornaleros than
owners (p. 270). The data from the decennial agricultural censuses cited in this study also reveal
an upward trend: the share of ejidatarios working as jornaleros rises from 9.4% in 1940 to 10.7%
in 1950 and 25.4% in 1960 (p.332). Moreover, ejidatarios suffered from underemployment more
often, with 74% of those in their sample reporting having been unemployed for part of the year
as compared to 54% of private owners. This study concluded that "it is useful to give a greater
flexibility to the land-man link in the ejido. That is, that the ejidatario may abandon the ejido,
if it benefits him, and sell his investments on his land plot to the community" (p. 972). Still, the
ejido, in its basic form, persisted until the 1990s in spite of the inefficiencies it created.
The settler colonies of Southern Africa are also good examples of the premises and mechanisms
analyzed in this paper. The distortions introduced against African farmers in Rhodesia (formerly
Southern Rhodesia, or current-day Zimbabwe) will be examined in more detail below. A parallel
story could also be told of the black reserves in South Africa, the discriminatory policies against
the black economy, and their role in providing white elites with cheap black labour7 . Large, private
estates of white farmers have coexisted with overcrowded African Reserves. Resembling ancient
7 As noted by Feinstein (2005), "the tragedy of the reserves created by this discrimination was an integral part of
the measures adopted to ensure the necessary supply of labor for the modern sector of the South African economy"
(p. 72). Perhaps the most important difference with Rhodesia is that agricultural elites faced competition for labour
from the mines. But mines adopted a system of short-term migrant workers, with skilled work reserved for white
workers (via the "colour bar"). While mining could survive with this scheme, it implied huge obstacles for industry,
which required a more stable and better educated labour force (see Feinstein, 2005, p. 130). Hence, in terms of the
theoretical framework, it may be useful in the case of South Africa to see the elite as a coalition of mining and rural
elites, both of which benefitted from the distortions of limited property rights and a scheme of short-term migrant
labourers, at the expense of the modern industrial sector (and of course, of black peasants!). Finally, there is little
doubt about the very low productivity of African reserves in South Africa, and communal tenure "was a potential
barrier in the reserves to those few who might have wished to be more innovative and entrepreneurial" (Feinstein,
2005, p. 73).
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customs of African societies, land in black Reserves is typically owned by the community, not
the individual. While individuals may have secure (and often inheritable) rights to use land, the
communal structure often implies the lack of permanent property rights over a specific plot, or
that these rights expire after a period of absence. Also, transfer rights (if any), such as sales or
rentals, are limited to the community. Needless to say, white agricultural interests held historically
far greater political power than the excluded black majority.
However, the argument proposed for the persistence of bad property rights does not pertain
exclusively to cases in which the rural dual economy has been institutionally codified and land
has been geographically segregated along racial or other lines. The theoretical mechanisms may
be present in many poor countries where large landowners often have more political power and
better-defined rights than smallholders. As noted in a recent World Bank Development Report,
"Heterogeneity defines the rural world (...) Large commercial farmers coexist with smallholders.
[Many smallholders] are in subsistence farming, mainly due to low asset endowments and unfavor-
able contexts. Consuming most of the food they produce, they participate in the market as buyers
of food and seller of labor" (World Bank, 2008, p. 5.)8.
Moreover, the political economy approach to explain the dualistic structure of the rural sector is
well-established. A large historical literature shows that land rights grow out of power relationships.
Large landowners use their political power to generate distortions in various markets to discriminate
against peasants and support their inefficiently large estates9 . Binswanger et al. (1995) offer a
review10 , noting that getting labour for the large estates "required lowering expected utility of
profits in the free peasant sector in order to reduce peasants' reservation utility (...) or shift their
labor supply curve to the right" (p. 15).
However, the role of the subsistence sector's property rights structure as a potential mechanism
to achieve this purpose has received comparatively little attention 1 . The idea that informal prop-
8See also
Binswanger & Deininger (1997), Deininger & Binswanger (1999), and Deininger & Feder (2001).
9The relationship between farm size and productivity is theoretically ambiguous, trading off the potential benefits
of scale economies with the incentive problems from monitoring labour in larger plots. However, available evidence
suggest that, at least for developing countries, incentive problems outweigh economies of scale (see Ray (1998, p.
453) and Banerjee (1999)). Thus, the dual structure in poor societies' countryside may be doubly detrimental
for productivity: the subsistence sector lacks the appropriate institutions of property rights to generate economic
efficiency, and the capitalist sector is organized around inefficiently large farms.
10See also Deininger & Binswanger (1993, 1995).
"For instance, it is not part of the list suggested by Binswanger et al. (1995) (or Binswanger & Deininger (1993)
for the specific case of South Africa). But the mechanism has not been completely neglected, and Binswanger &
Deininger (1993) recognize its relevance when they note: "A further distortion against black African farming was the
excessively restrictive 'traditional' communal tenure system imposed by successive land laws [in South Africa], the
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erty rights may "tie" households to their property and affect labor market decisions is studied in a
different context by Field (2007). She examines a large titling program in urban Peru, finding that
squatter families with no legal claim to property work fewer hours -since they spend more hours
per week maintaining informal tenure security- and are more likely to work inside their homes.
More generally, De Soto (1989, 2000) famously emphasized barriers to legal property ownership
of assets in developing countries as a major obstacle for prosperity. Without legal titles, the world's
poor can't use their houses, land, and machines as leverage to gain capital. However, De Soto is
more vague about the causes of such extralegality. This paper, while emphasizing the factor market
consequences of imperfect property rights, focuses on their possible political economy determinants,
arguing that property rights are intentionally precarious. In some instances, the consequences of
informal property rights on factor markets explain some groups' interests in sustaining them. In a
related contribution, Besley & Ghatak (2010a) explore the consequences of creating and improving
property rights so that fixed assets can be used as collateral. They show that the impact will vary
with the degree of market competition. Where competition is weak, it is possible that borrowers
will be worse off when property rights improve. Intuitively, imperfect property rights may in
effect protect borrowers from the power of lenders to force them to put up more of thier wealth
as collateral. An implication of the theory is that, under certain conditions, borrowers may thus
oppose the improvement of property rights.
A few related papers provide simple formal models in which poor property rights are encouraged
by powerful elites. However, the arguments put forward in this paper are distinct. Diaz (2000) ar-
gues rural elites prefer granting land inefficiently in Latin America. In her argument, granting plots
with poorly defined rights and low productivity "destroys" land. This strategy profits landown-
ers under sufficiently strong complementarity of land and labour and sufficient land abundance.
She argues these conditions prevailed in Latin America. Unfortunately, many other distortions on
the land-reform sector have similar consequences. In contrast, the attractiveness of poor property
rights in the theory I propose depends upon a characteristic that distinguishes this distortion from
others: it simultaneously affects the productivity of the sector and the cost of migration to other
sectors. Sonin (2003) offers a theory more focused on property rights, though his emphasis is not
in the rural sector or land. He uses the Russian case to argue that the rich have a comparative
advantage in the private provision of property rights. Hence, poor definition of property rights for
a wide cross section of the population allows them to use this comparative advantage to predate
first and most important of which was the Glen Grey Act of 1894" (p. 1461).
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from the poor.
On a more general level, this work builds on the idea that the nature of institutions is a crucial
determinant of economic performance. In recent years, this idea has received attention and support
beyond the microeconomic literature mentioned before12 . Also, the paper is related to the literature
on institutional persistence. It concurs with the political economy or "social conflict view" of
institutions which contends that inefficient institutions arise and persist because powerful political
groups benefit (Acemoglu et al., 2005). This view contrasts others which emphasize that institutions
are largely determined by economic forces, ideology, or historical accidents. The paper is closely
related, both in following this approach and in the formal analysis, to Acemoglu (2006). Specifically,
the theoretical mechanisms capture two of the sources for inefficient institutions highlighted by
Acemoglu (2006). The first source, revenue extraction, in which elites extract resources from other
groups in society via instruments which, like taxation, are typically distortionary. The second
source, factor price manipulation, arises when the elite compete for factors13 .
This approach implies that property rights institutions may be less responsive to economic
conditions than others theories suggest. For instance, economic theories of property rights suggest
that increased population density leads to a gradual transformation from poor property rights,
to communal systems, and eventually reaching individualized, well-defined and strictly enforced
property rights (Boserup (1965) and Demsetz (1967))14. While population density may incentivize
better property rights, political considerations may partially counteract these incentives. Indeed, in
the theory I suggest, rural elites have a strong incentive to lock as much labour in the agricultural
sector as possible by blocking institutional innovations in the nature of property rights.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, I lay out the basic setup of the model. Section 3.3
describes the economic equilibrium for a given set of institutions. Next, Section 3.4 characterizes
the equilibrium institutions by finding the political equilibrium and describes the main results.
2 Historical discussions that revived economists' interest in institutions include North & Thomas (1977), Olson
(1982), and North & Weingast (1989). Support from cross-country data has been provided, among many others, by
Barro (1991), Knack & Keefer (1995), and Hall & Jones (1999). Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) have exploited variation
in the types of institutions set by colonial powers to study the effect of property rights and checks on government
powers on long-run economic performance across countries, and several others have followed a similar strategy to
examine the effects of institutions within countries (e.g. Banerjee & Iyer (2005)).
13Political consolidation is also a powerful source of inefficient institutions if the elite's political power is threatened
when other groups prosper. A paper emphasizing the role of political consolidation in creating distortions in the rural
sector is Baland & Robinson (2008).
"While economists have provided a lot of evidence on the consequences of poor property rights in agriculture,
much less has been done to test theories on the adoption and persistence of these institutions. Bubb (2009) shows
that part of the variation in property rights institutions is explained by economic factors in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire
(in particular, the extent to which soil is suitable to the production of commercial crops).
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Section 3.5 discusses the historical case of Rhodesia and examines it under the lens of the theory.
Section 3.6 concludes with some final thoughts.
3.2 A Model of (Poor) Property Rights in the (Dual) Rural Econ-
omy
Consider a society with two types of producers in the agricultural sector. Producers differ not only
in their economic resources, but also in their political power. "Capitalists" or "landowners" are
politically powerful, control most of the land in society, but have little labour of their own. I will
also refer to this group as the elite. "Peasants" or "subsistence" farmers, on the other hand, face
the opposite situation: while their political power and ownership of land is limited, they are the
sole suppliers of labour in society.
The political power of the elite translates into the ability to select two key variables: taxation,
and property rights protection in the rural subsistence sector. Although these instruments introduce
distortions in the economy, the elite may rationally choose both positive taxation and imperfect
property rights.
The society is thus characterized by a rural or agricultural economy R divided in two (sub)sectors:
the "subsistence" sector denoted by S and the "capitalist" or landowner sector denoted by E (for
elite). Output in rural areas is produced using land and labour. There are T hectares of land in
the economy, with t under the control of the subsistence sector. Suppose there are L households
in the economy, each possessing a unit of labour. Each household i in the rural areas allocates a
share ei of its labour input to the subsistence sector and the rest (1 - ej) to the landowner sector.
For simplicity, I assume each household has an initial land endowment of t/L units of land.
Aside from the rural economy, there is an additional sector U in which workers are paid an
exogenous wage wu. It may be useful to think of this as the urban or industrial sector, but it
could represent any additional sector that competes with the landowner for labour. The crucial
assumption is that peasants must migrate to the U sector and cannot work in the agricultural
sector simultaneously (i.e., a peasant leaves with his entire unit of labour).
The "capitalist" agricultural sector consists of a representative landowner with the following
production function:
AEF (T - t, LE) = AE (T - t)1 a La,CE
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where a C (0, 1) and AE is a productivity term that will be normalized to 1. Since landowners
own no labour, just T - t hectares of land, the labour input in their farms (LE) amounts to total
peasant input. That is, LE = ZiCR (1 - ei) = LR - Ls, where the second equality defines total
labour input in the rural sector (LR) and in the subsistence subsector (Ls). I denote the number
of migrating households with m (so LR = L - m). Landowners hire labour and pay a wage rate
WE, which they take as given.
One key assumption of the model concerns the impact of property rights in the subsistence
sector. Even though defining property rights is not simple, the model only requires two conditions.
These conditions are plausible under various meanings of the term. First, a lower level of property
rights must reduce the productivity of the subsistence sector. Second, a lower level of property
rights must increase the cost of migration. Property rights in the subsistence sector can therefore
be captured by a positive scalar p E [p, f], where a larger p both increases the productivity of the
subsector and affects the cost of migration.
To capture the first part, I consider a reduced-form formulation and assume that each house-
hold's output in the subsistence sector is given by
1 ~1 -aA(p) f (x ,ei) = A(p) -(x ) - e
where xo is the land input (with EER X = t). Also, I assume A(p) = pAE, with I = 1 and y small
(i.e. p z 0). Adopting this functional form simplifies the analysis and satisfies two key properties:
A' (1i) > 0 and A (a) = AE. The first property follows the theoretical arguments and empirical
evidence mentioned in the Introduction. Still, I will remain agnostic about the exact channels at
play. The second property is a useful benchmark: with perfect property rights, both sectors are
technologically identical.
To capture the second part, I assume that a migrating peasant household can rent his land, but
the poor definition of property rights creates transaction costs or facilitates outright expropriation
of part of his land upon migration 15. Hence, if r is the prevailing rental rate of land from the
subsistence sector, the migrating household will only get p4r as rental income. The remaining
i"Again, there may be different reasons for this, but certainly the persistence of a traditional system of communal
tenure is one of them. Under such system, use rights are typically lost if the household permanently detachs itself
from the rural community. While this is the type of example that motivates this paper, it is interesting to note that
these general assumptions speak to other circumstances in which smallholders have relatively less secure tenure than
large landowners. Moreover, it can also be relevant when smallholders face greater monitoring costs that largeholders
upon migration to the cities, such that when renting their lands they must surrender to a greater share of land rents
to induce effort. This is plausible if large landowners rely on more mechanized production techniques.
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fraction (1 - p) may be expropriated and shared among all non-migrating households, or simply
lost 16 . These assumptions imply that the value of going to the urban sector, Vu, is given by
t
VU = wu + p -r. (3.1)L
The rental rate of land in the subsistence sector (r) is taken as given by individual members of the
subsistence sector. Subsistence farmers cannot rent land from nor to the landowners.
In the case of the elites, their income is taxed at a rate TE and they receive a lump sum transfer
of TE. Hence, the consumption of a representative member of the elite is:
CE = E + TE,
where
rE = (1 -TE) F (T - t, LE) -WELE-
Non-migrating peasants face taxes and transfers rs and Ts. However, their income also includes
any potential rents from land that are "expropriated" from migrating households. Therefore, con-
sumption for a member of the LR peasants is:
m
cis = is+Ts +-(1-I)r-
LR L
where
= (1 - rs) A (i) f (Z, ei) + (1 - ej) wE + - X 1r.
The government's budget constraint is
TE + TS = [TEF (T - t, LE) + -rsA (p) f (t, Ls)]. (3.2)
where 4 - [0, 1]. I assume there exists an upper bound ; on taxation, with t < 1, for example
because producers can hide each dollar of income at a cost of ;.
This completes the description of the environment. I consider different versions of the following
simple game:
16 To accommodate any case in between these extremes, one can think of non-migrating households keeping a
fraction o (1 - i) of the rental income jr from each migrating household, with a E [0,1]. For analytical convenience,
however, I focus on the case o = 1. With a = 1, unlike o < 1, the model has a simple explicit solution.
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1. A representative agent of the landowning elite chooses tax policies (rE, rs, TE, Ts) and a level
of property rights protection p. Since the elites never tax themselves and only redistribute
to themselves (rE = Ts = 0), the interesting choices are rs and p, with TE given by the
government budget constraint.
2. Subsistence farmers compare the value of going to the urban sector (VU) with the value of
staying in the rural areas (VR, to be defined below), and decide whether or not to migrate to
the city.
3. Producers in the rural areas maximize their consumption. Non-migrating peasants choose
labour and land inputs in the subsistence sector (ei and xi) to maximize consumption (cis).
Landowners hire labour (LE) to maximize consumption (CE). I assume labour markets are
competitive and all agents take the wage rate (WE) as given.
Stages 2 and 3 will determine the economic equilibrium of the model, for a given set of policies.
This is the focus of Section 3.3. The incentives of the elite to alter this economic equilibrium via
their choice of policy in stage 1 gives us the political equilibrium, which is analyzed in Section 3.4.
3.3 Economic Equilibrium
To characterize the economic equilibrium, consider the landowners' problem in the third stage.
They choose optimal labor demand (LE) to maximize consumption (CE). At this stage, TE is
taken as given by the landowners. That is, landowners act as a team politically in the first stage
of the game, but atomistically in the last stage. The first-order condition for this problem is the
standard condition
F2 (T - t, LE) = WE- (3.3)
Each of the LR non-migrating peasants, in turn, choose land (xz) and labour (el) inputs in the
subsistence sector to maximize consumption (cis), taking migration and policies as given. The
optimal choice must satisfy the usual pair of first-order conditions specifying equality between each
factor's marginal productivity and its price for all i E R. These conditions can be written as those
of a representative subsistence producer with access to t units of land, hiring LS = L - m - LE
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units of labour:
(1-rs) A (p) fi (t, L - m - LE) = r, (3.4)
(1-rs) A () f2 (t, L - m - LE) = WE- (3-5)
For a given m, (3.3)-(3.5) determine the equilibrium rural wage rate (WE) and the allocation of
rural labour between landowner and subsistence farms (LE and Ls). More precisely, given m as
determined in the second stage, LE (M) will satisfy:
F2 (T - t, LE (W)) = (1 - Ts) A (p) f2 (t, L - m - LE (m)) = w (m). (3.6)
where the last term defines the resulting equilibrium wage17.
To complete the description of the economic equilibrium, only the level of migration remains
unestablished. In the second stage, peasants continue to migrate as long as VU > VR, staying in
rural areas otherwise. Note that VR, simply the optimal value of cis, can be written using the
homogeneity of degree zero of f and competitive markets (equations (3.4) and (3.5)) as the sum of
labour and land rents:
VR = wE+ t1 +(1-p) (3.7)
L LR
In (3.7), there are two components of rural land rent income: rents from the initial endowment
and land left behind by migrant households. Of course, if either no one migrates (m = 0), or there
are perfect property rights for migrating households (p = 1), this second component of land rents
vanishes.
Starting with a situation with VU > VR, migration will continue until VU = VR, or
WU - WE = (1 - pL) Tr- (3.8)
In words, when there is positive migration the wage gain from going to the city wu - WE, must be
equal the loss in land rents from migration. This loss arises due to imperfect property rights in the
sense that migrating households do not get the full value of their land's rent. Clearly, with p = 1
there is no such loss; the no-migration condition simplifies to wu = WE.
Of course, it is possible that VU < VR at m = 0. In this case, there are no incentives to migrate.
7 Similarly, r (m) = (1 - -rs) A (p) fi (t, L - m - LE (M)) .
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In general, therefore, the migration decision can be summarized as follows:
m(VR -V U) = 0, M > 0, VR - VU >O. (3.9)
This completes the basic description of the economic equilibrium, which I define as follows.
Definition 1 (Economic Equilibrium) The economic equilibrium is given by a tuple {me", Lq,
r*, w~E} such that:
1. Taking WE, r and m as given, landowners choose LE to maximize their consumption CE and
each non-migrating peasant i E R chooses ej and x to maximize his consumption cis. In
particular, { L, eq r wf'f} satisfy (3.3)-(3.5), and
2. Migration (meq) satisfies (3.9).
Figure 1. Economic Equilibrium
Panel A Panel B
Economic Equilibrium without migration Economic Equilibrium with positive migration
wu < wE+(1-p)(t/L)r WU > wE+(1-p)(t/L)r
AEF2(T-t,LE) :(-)$2(j, s ) AF2(T-t,LE) (1-T)A([t f2(tLs )
LE -Ls '
LR=L
Figure 1 illustrates the economic equilibrium.
F -LE 1 Ls i 
LR i
L -
In Panel A, even at m = 0 the resulting wage
WE, which equates the marginal product of labour in the capitalist and subsistence subsectors, is
sufficient to avoid migration. The urban wage is not large enough to compensate for the wage
and relative land-rent benefit of the rural areas. Accordingly, in Panel A, wu is smaller than
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wE +(1 - p) jr when m = 0. However, if wu rises above this level, as in the case depicted in Panel
B, there will be incentives to migrate that only cease when WU - WE = (1 - f) r-
Thus far, I largely ignored functional form assumptions. It is useful to note that given the
Cobb-Douglas assumption for both subsectors, the only difference in technology results from the
parameters AE and A (p). Additionally, it is also useful to define the following "distortion adjusted"
measure of the land endowment in society: T t [(1 - rs) ILI + (T - t). Absent any policy
distortion (when pI and r = 0), T = T. Much of the following analysis focuses on elite's
incentives to reduce y or increase r, which effectively reduce T below T. Along these lines, I define
the "distortion-adjusted" share of land in the capitalist sector as 7E = - , and similarly, for the
subsistence sector, 7y = 1- 7YE- Then, the equations that satisfy the economic equilibrium indicate
that the subsistence and capitalist sectors absorb a share of -rural labour proportional to the size
of their (distortion-adjusted) landholdings: LE = (ELR and Ls = ySLR' 8
As for migration, (3.9) implies that
m =(0 if + < 1) [ (1- p) a 7s - (rs, A). (3.10)
Otherwise, m satisfies 19
WU = 1 + (1 - P) a 3 .Y (3.11)
The right hand side of (3.11) is the wage in rural areas plus an extra term capturing the relative
advantage of land rents a peasant enjoys if he decides to stay in the rural areas rather than migrate.
Similarly, the function w- (rs, p) , defined in the right hand side of (3.10), is the rural wage plus the
relative land rents advantage of rural areas when m = 0. It determines whether or not there will
be migration in equilibrium. I summarize the features of ?ii (-rs, M) in the following remark.
Remark 2 Consider the function ti : [0, -] x [, 1] -R+ as defined in (3.10).
1. iv (rs, p) achieves a global maximum at (0, p*), where
(a) p* = 1 if a E [1/2, 1).
18Factor prices, in turn, are given by wE and r = [(1- -s) ]1 a
19 In this step, the assumption a = 1 is important. When o < 1, the corresponding expression for equilibrium,
unlike when a = 1, provides no closed-form solution for m.
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(b) p* < 1 otherwise20 . Moreover, 'ii (rs, p) is increasing for p G [p, p*) and decreasing for
i E (p*, 1]
2. fii (TS, 1) = >()Vt (T)la ~ z (rs, ) for small /t.
The second part is straightforward. Consider the first part, which is proven in Section 3.A.1. It
should be clear that 0zii/&r, < 0, so an increase in taxation makes a migration threat more likely.
Indeed, an increase in rs reduces two terms in zP. First, the rural equilibrium wage WE at zero
migration ((TIL) ), and second, the effective share of land in the subsistence sector (Ys). In
other words, given more rural taxation, peasants earn less from both land and labour, so they are
more willing to migrate.
Property rights have a more intricate effect. A decrease in the degree of property rights'
enforcement in the subsistence sector has two countervailing effects: (i) by reducing the productivity
of the subsistence sector, it reduces the relative value of the rural areas in a similar way as taxation
does (by reducing WE and 7S); (ii) while this productivity effect encourages migration, a lower yL
also has a security effect as captured by (1 - p) in the expression. This second effect encourages
peasants to remain in the countryside to protect land rents, which would be (partially) lost upon
migration to the cities.
Now, recall that a is the coefficient of labour in the Cobb-Douglas production function. Thus,
when a > 1/2, income from land rents is relatively unimportant compared to wage income. There-
fore, the productivity effect prevails and an increase in t improves the relative value of rural areas
and a,. However, if land rents are important enough (if a < 1/2), with high y the security effect
prevails and the value of p that maximizes 77v is less than 1.
This remark is useful in establishing the following three regimes that arise regardless of the
value of a21.
1. No migration regime (wU < fi (;, I)). If the urban wage is very low (lower than f&, (r, p),
the global minimum of fv- (rs, p)), there will be no migration in equilibrium regardless of the
20 The exact value of j* in this case is given by the solution to
1-a . 1 - * . t_[p*] 
_
1= a - +(1-p a) +T-ta a t [p*|1-lo  -t
21I rule out the case a = 1, which is uninteresting. In such case, the rural technology is linear in labour, land is
irrelevant, and the migration decision for peasants simply depends on the comparison between wE = AE = 1 and
WU.
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policies adopted, so LR = L. Moreover, in the case where r is close to 1 and since p is small,
iv- (.r, p) ~ (T) . That is, tiv (r, i) approaches the competitive wage that landowners
would pay if they were employing all rural labour. Thus, the no migration regime is more
likely to arise with wu, t or L small, or with T large22.
2. Avoidable migration regime (wU G ['i (t, p) , i (0, p*)]). If the urban wage is at an interme-
diate level, the elite can avoid migration with the right combination of policies.
3. Unavoidable migration regime (wu > fvi (0, p*)) . With high wages, not even zero rural taxation
and the level of property rights (ps*) that maximizes 'ii (rs, p) can forestall migration.
Figure 2 depicts the functions fv- (;-, p) and ziv (0, p). It also shows the regions for wu in which
the economy would finds itself in each regime.
Figure 2: Three Regimes
Case a < 1/2 Case a > 1/2
iv- (0, p
t(0 i1) AvoAWdb
}No"Vation
1Z(T
3.4 Political Equilibrium
As noted, elites never tax themselves and only redistribute selfishly. Thus, TE = TS = 0 and the
political equilibrium is simply defined:
Definition 3 (Political Equilibrium) A political equilibrium is defined as a tuple {7POL, 7' 0O,
POL TPOL POL} such that
(rPOL POL) E arg max F (T - t, L) - we Li + TPOL
22Or, if we allow AE to vary, with AE large since ii) (t, I) ~ AE (T)'~" in this case.
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where TEOL satisfies (3.2), r OL - TOL = 0, and migration, labour allocation, land rents, and
wages, are given by {me, Lgreqwg} in Definition 1.
Solving for LR in (3.11), the problem can be written as follows:
max (1 - a) ('YELRf (T - t)1-a + 4'Ts [y (-sLR)a ti-1 , (3.12)
subject to:
LR = min {L, L,}, (3.13)
where I is for "interior" and L, is given by
LI =T +( - p) 7s . (3.14)
[ ) 1
The previous discussion showed the conflicting effects on elite's welfare of limited property rights
in peasant plots. To highlight these conflicting effects, I analyze problem (3.12), as in Acemoglu
(2006), with two separate problems: (i) the Factor Price Manipulation (henceforth FPM) problem,
which arises when # = 0 and the elite has no tax revenue-generating motive; (ii) the Revenue
Extraction (henceforth RE) problem, which focuses squarely on this latter motive, the maximization
of the second term in (3.12). I discuss each case, emphasizing the conditions under which a dual
rural economy arises, or those in which pi < 1 and the subsistence sector has inferior economic
institutions.
3.4.1 Factor Price Manipulation
Consider first the pure FPM problem that arises when 4 = 0:
max IrFPM = max (1 - a) - (YELR)a (T - t)-al. (3.15)1,A rp [a
Ignoring constant terms, and substituting 7YE, this expression underlines the fact that under purely
FPM objectives, landowners choose tax and property rights to maximize the labour to "land" ratio( to minimize the equilibrium rural wage.
The main features of the solution are as follows. First, FPM incentives compel the elite to
impose maximal distortions (high levels of taxation and low property rights) when there is no
threat of migration. Second, at intermediate and high levels of modernization, checks are imposed
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on these distortions. In the case of taxation, any effort to reduce the peasants' welfare in the
subsistence sector is eventually self-defeated by their freedom to move to an alternative sector.
But while taxation is reduced to a minimum, the level of property rights protection is not raised
to its maximum level, even with a very high urban wage. At the root of this result is that part
of peasants' land rents would be lost upon migration under poor property rights. The following
proposition summarizes these and other features of the solution2 .
Proposition 4 (Summary of FPM policies) Suppose 4 = 0. Then, with fv- (r, p) as defined in
(3.10) and p* from Remark 2, the unique political equilibrium features the following level of taxation
(r PM) and property rights (pFPM):
1. (No migration) If wu <vi (r, ,then -rFPM = - and pFPM =
2. (Unavoidable migration) If wu > - (0, p*), then rFPM = 0 and pFPM E (0 1/ (2 - )).
Moreover, OpFPM/OT > 0, 1 1FPM/a9 , > 0, and OtFPM/&t < 0. Finally, as T -- oo or t -- 0,
pFPMA~ FM 1/ (2a).
Proof. See Section 3.A.2. n
Consider the results of Proposition 4 for wu <v- (, /. In this no migration regime, regardless
of the policies selected by the elite, LR = L. Therefore, to maximize profits, the elite raise taxation
to its maximum level, i, reducing property rights in the subsistence sector to their lowest admissible
value, t. Indeed, the FPM motive compels landowners to make peasants' "outside option" as poor
as possible. Since without an effective threat of migration to another sector the only peasant
outside is income from their own plots, this is achieved by imposing the highest taxation and
poorest property rights institutions on the subsistence subsector. These policies minimize the rural
equilibrium wage and thus increase their rents, or, equivalently, maximize the proportion of rural
labour in the capitalist sector (note that LE/LR = (T - t) /T).
In the other extreme, the society is in the unavoidable migration regime, LR = L4? for any com-
bination of policies. Thus landowners maximize L,/fT. Let's examine the intuition of this solution,
as stated in part 2 of Proposition 4. It is straightforward to verify that L,/T is monotonically
2 3 The avoidable migration regime is, in general, a transitional regime in which policies gradually converge from
those prevailing in a no migration regime and in an unavoidable migration regime. For this reason, and to reduce the
number of cases to be analyzed, I relegate the unavoidable migration case to Appendix 3.B. I focus on the intuition
of the results in the main text, and present algebraic details in sections 3.A.2-3.A.4.
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decreasing in -rS, and this has a simple intuition. Landowners receive no benefit from imposing
taxation on the subsistence sector because, while increasing the share of rural labour in their plots,
7E, it encourages enough migration to the alternative (urban) sector that overall labour input falls.
Although optimal taxation is zero, not all distortions disappear under this regime. In particular,
the subsistence sector will not have perfect property rights, p = 1. Instead, a similar basic trade-off
between better rural productivity and protection of property rights (i.e., between the productivity
and security effects), implies the optimal level of property rights is pFPM < 1.
The solution shows that the equilibrium level of property rights is an increasing function of a.
Moreover, in the empirically relevant case of T large and t small, it is almost wholly determined by a.
Larger a means land is less important in the production function and land rents are less important
in peasants' decision to stay. This increases pFPM because it weakens the security effect (the
importance of losing land rents upon migration, which pushes y down) relative to the productivity
effect (the impact on the subsistence sectors' productivity and effective land endowment, which
persuades the elite to concede better property rights).
The comparative static results indicate that when peasants have more land it is important to
reduce the security of their property rights, compelling them to stay. Indeed, if t is very small
then staying in the rural areas to protect their land rents is relatively unimportant for peasants
compared to the fall in rural well-being that a lower I generates. In contexts where peasants
are able to control or obtain larger land concessions, the model predicts that landowners will try
to partly compensate for this by reducing p. On the other hand, when T is large relative to t,
landowners willingly give better property rights to peasants.
The FPM case highlights in the simplest form the main argument about poor property rights
as a distinct distortion which persists because it ties peasants to the land. However, it does so by
removing any direct tax benefit for elite landowners. To understand the puzzle persistently bad
property rights, one must ask whether elites choose them even when they directly benefit from
taxation in the subsistence sector. I turn to these issues in two steps. First, I demonstrate that tax
revenues accruing to the elite are always increasing in property rights. Next, I show that despite this
result, landowners may choose low property rights, especially when threatened by "modernization."
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3.4.2 Revenue Extraction
Consider now the problem of maximizing Revenue Extraction (RE) only24:
maxrs p T (7SLR)a ti-a]. (3.16)
Unlike Proposition 4, this section shows that, in the RE solution, policies are similar at different
levels for the urban wage. In particular, there is an intermediate level of taxation, and the level
of property rights is always maximal. I summarize the key features of the solution in the next
Proposition.
Proposition 5 (Summary of RE policies) Suppose the elite solves problem (3.16). Then,
with 'ii (r, pt) as defined in (3.10) and 1p* from Remark 2, the unique political equilibrium features
RE = 1 and the following level of taxation (rRE).
1. (No migration) If wu < iv (, I) , then rRE = min{t, rLaffer}, where TLaffer > _ 
2. (Unavoidable migration) If wu > i (0, pt*) , then rRE = min {, 1 - a}.
Moreover, or Laffer/eT < 0, ir Laffer/&a < 0, and a9Laffer/&t > 0. Finally, as T -+ oo or
t -> 0, -rLaffer -+ i - a.
Proof. See Section 3.A.3. m
The intuition for this solution in the no migration regime (when LR = L) is simple. To maximize
tax revenue, the landowning elite has a direct interest on raising productivity in the subsistence
sector to increase the tax base. With respect to rs, on the other hand, there is a standard Laffer-
curve logic. Although there is no labour-leisure trade-off for workers and they supply a unit of
labour inelastically, labour supply in the subsistence sector responds to rs because there exists
an alternative, untaxed sector in the elite's farms. Therefore, increasing the tax rate reduces the
tax base by reducing the share of labour in the subsistence sector. Unless the exogenous level of
feasible taxation, t, is binding, taxation will be set at the interior tax rate rLaffer E (0,1) such
that the marginal increase in revenue from raising the tax rate equates the marginal decrease in
revenue from the tax base erosion.
2 4 One may alternatively think of the RE problem as that which emerges when all the land is under the control of
the subsistence sector, t = T. Indeed, when the elites are not involved in production, they inevitably do not compete
for factors with the subsistence producers, and focus merely on revenue extraction. The features of the solution to
such a problem can be seen as a special case of problem (3.16). Thus I focus on the latter.
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In the other extreme, society is in the "unavoidable migration" regime and LR = L, for any
combination of policies. To characterize the solution in this case, it can be shown again that
although poor property rights may deter some migration, the maximand is increasing in [L for each
Ts. Therefore, the preferred level of p remains equal 1. Taking this as given, the optimal level of
taxation, TLaffer , can be easily calculated as rLaffer = 1-a. Again, the exogenous limit to taxation
may become binding. Thus, the equilibrium level of taxation is given by rRE = min (r, 1 - a}, as
noted in the Proposition.
Regarding comparative static results, the tax rate is higher when a is small. In this case, the
extent of distortions is reduced, since there are greater diminishing returns to labour and labour
input declines little in response to taxes. In the no migration regime, the elite also set a higher tax
rate when t is larger or T is smaller. More land in the traditional sector amounts to an increase in
the tax base. A decrease in T implies the alternative landowner sector is able to absorb less labour25.
With unavoidable migration, instead, taxation is independent of relative land endowments. The
relevant outside option for peasants is now the urban sector, which by assumption can absorb as
many workers as possible at a fixed wage wu.
In sum, when the objective is maximizing tax revenues, increasing urban wages reduce taxa-
tion to some extent, but property rights are maintained at their maximum level. This moderate
change in policy as wu rises contrasts the FPM solution, where bad property rights persist and
taxation is limited by "modernization." In the RE solution, unlike FPM, the dual economy does
not emerge endogenously as wu increases. Revenue extraction, in other words, poorly explains the
dual rural economy. The RE economy is instead a single-sector economy with differential taxation
on politically-weak producers 26. Thus, it is important to examine whether the argument about
the persistence of bad property rights set forth with the FPM case is robust to inclusion of a RE
concern. The next section tackles this issue.
25 A simple way to see this is to note that the weight that the erosion of the tax base bears in the first order condition
of problem (3.16), as shown in Section 3.A.3, is simply the share of land in the elite's sector, 7 E. When either t fall
or T increase, y. increases and approaches 1, and rLaf"f* decreases approaching 1 - a. On the other extreme, if
the share of landowner land is zero then rLaffer = 1. This follows from the assumption of no labour-leisure trade-off
and the absence of an effective threat of migration. The elite can set a confiscatory tax rate with no effect on the tax
base since labour is supplied inelastically and there are no alternative sectors for peasants.
26Since property rights are maintained at their maximum level and taxation is moderated by the desire not to
erode the tax base, the RE solution is also associated with lower costs in terms of productivity. Relatedly, the share
of labour working in the capitalist sector is not as large as in the FPM economy.
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3.4.3 The Combined Problem
In this section I examine problem (3.12) with 4 = 1, so that the elite receives the full benefit
of taxation of peasants' income and is also concerned with obtaining cheap labour. The next
Proposition summarizes the solution. To simplify the cases, I suppose that the exogenous limit
to taxation is not binding (and note in the Corollary an important instance where the solution
changes if it were).
Proposition 6 (Summary of COM policies) Suppose 4 = 1 and the elite solves problem (3.12).
Also, assume that - = 1. Then, with fv- (7, p) as defined in (3.10) and pt* from Remark 2, the unique
political equilibrium features the following level of taxation (riOM) and property rights (jpCOM):
1. (No migration) If wu < i- (-,/) , then pCOM = 1 and 1 jOM Laf fer
2. (Unavoidable migration) If wu > fv- (0, p*), then there exist thresholds t and t with 0 < t <
t < 1 such that: (i) if t - (0,4], then r'OM COM FPM; (ii) if t G [i,T|, then
rOM =1- a, and pCOM= 1.
Corollary 7 If wu < iv (-r,I) and f < a _ < T Laffer, then p1 COM = p and ro ---
Proof. See Section 3.A.4. m
To understand Proposition 6, it is useful to contrast it with Propositions 4 and 5. Starting with
the no migration regime, Part 1 of Proposition 6 shows that once the elite can also benefit from
taxation of peasants' income, RE-type policies with optimal property rights and positive but less
than confiscatory taxation similar to those of Proposition 5 will prevail.
The intuition for why, without migration, incentives to extract revenue prevail over reducing
wages stems directly from the proof of Section 3.A.4's result. In particular, elite consumption can
be either increasing or decreasing with the level of property rights in peasants' plots, for the reasons
already emphasized in the FPM and RE cases, respectively. On the one hand, FPM implies that by
reducing peasant income in their own plots, bad property rights increase peasants' labour supply for
the elite. On the other hand, RE indicates that they also reduce tax revenues, received by politically
powerful landowners. While RE and FPM push the elite on different directions regarding property
rights institutions, the elite has incentives to impose high taxes on peasants both for tax revenue
and to get more labour from them. For this reason, as noted in the proposition, the desired level
of taxation TrOM will exceed the RE desired taxation, T E = TLaffer. A high tax rate, in turn,
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resolves the ambivalence over property rights: it compels the elite to focus on extracting peasants'
revenue from taxation and thus to be directly interested in increasing peasants' productivity by
selecting good property rights institutions.
The intuition of the preceding paragraph also has an interesting corollary. If the exogenous
limit to taxation i is low enough, then the elite's FPM incentives will again prevail, because tax
revenues form a relatively unimportant component of their consumption. In other words, without
an effective threat of migration, the case for bad property rights for the elite is only compelling if
the elite has limited ability to tax the sector (low ;), or to receive revenues from such taxation (low
0).
Proposition 6 shows that when the urban wage is high and the threat of migration effective,
the prevalence of RE incentives is less obvious. The reason for this also follows from the preceding
discussion. In particular, notice that with an effective threat of migration, increasing taxes on
peasants' income is no longer useful from the point of view of FPM. As Proposition 4 established,
increasing taxes reduces the attractiveness of rural areas and the ensuing migration decreases labour
input for landowners and their profits. Thus, we can no longer conclude, as in the no migration
case, that a high level of taxation prevails, inducing the elite to focus on RE-type policies with
optimal property rights institutions.
In fact, if sufficiently concerned with avoiding labour force migration, the elite choose minimal
taxation. Proposition 6 establishes that the elite will be "sufficiently" concerned with migration,
relative to tax revenues, if peasants own little land. Since less land for peasants means more land for
the elite, this not only reduces the importance of revenues from taxation of peasants' production,
but also increases that of profits in landowners' farms which are increasing in the amount of rural
labour. Thus, the desired tax rate is zero. This mutes incentives to adopt good property rights
institutions. In the resulting equilibrium, to avoid migration and extract more labour from peasants,
the elite selects poor property rights institutions.
However, if peasants own enough land, the elite face the reverse situation. Due to sufficiently
large peasant income and sufficiently small landowner profit from their own farms, the elite focus
on increasing taxation and not on reducing wages. Thus, in this case, peasant property rights are
optimal and taxation is positive.
2 7 In Section 3.A.4 it is shown that a sufficient condition for this to happen is i <
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Turning to comparative static results, note that over the range t E (0, t] the fact that TCOM = 0
implies that RE has no bearing on the desired level of property rights. Hence, pCOM coincides with
pFPM from the FPM Proposition 4, and satisfies the same comparative static results. Similarly, over
the range t E [f, T] the fact that p1 COM = 1 implies that TCOM coincides exactly with TRE - 1 - ,
of Proposition 5 for the RE case. Indeed, with perfect property rights the rural wage (WE) will be
identical to the exogenous urban wage wu, eliminating any scope for factor price manipulation.
Nonetheless, the comparative static results of the combined problem are richer because variation
in the model's parameters may move the economy from a situation with t E (0, t] to one in which
t C [f, T]. More specifically, they predict a non-monotonic relationship between quality of rural
property rights and land in the hands of peasants. When peasants hold relatively little land
(t E (0, L]), obtaining more land increases the rural elite's incentives to reduce property rights
in order to obtain cheap labour. However, if enough land is allocated to the peasants such that
t E [f, T], the elite promote optimal property rights institutions to increase tax revenues.
This result highlights a general reason why, compared to more aggressive reforms, small land
reforms may deliver disappointing results in terms of productivity. More specifically, with preex-
isting distortions against smallholders (in this case poor property rights institutions), timid land
transfers to peasants may exacerbate the incentives of politically powerful rural elites to sustain
distortions against them. However, if land transfers are sufficiently large, extracting revenue from
peasants through taxes becomes a relatively more attractive option for politically powerful groups.
This also creates distortions, but with natural limits because elites have a direct interest in the
productivity of peasants.
More importantly, the analysis provides one possible mechanism for the endogenous persistence
of bad property rights institutions in rural areas. As noted before, several authors have emphasized
that the persistence of a backward "traditional" rural economy has been congenial to capitalist
development. Moreover, scholars of the "dependency" tradition have emphasized the incentives
to extract cheap labour as the major motivation behind the "underdevelopment" of traditional
economies. However, the particular role of bad property rights in this strategy has received less
attention.
This model shows that it is precisely the rise of an alternative "modern" or "urban" sector
which may shift the rural elite's attention away from taxation, creating incentives to sustain the
rural dual economy. The rise in the urban wage puts a natural check on taxation by promoting
migration. Instead, bad property rights elude this check, since they actually force peasants to stay
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in the rural areas to protect their property. Furthermore, the reduction in the tax rate provokes
the elite's disregard for the subsistence sector's income and productivity, and thus the elite lack
incentives to promote efficiency enhancing innovations in property rights institutions.
According to the theoretical results in Proposition 6, poor property rights should play this role
when rural elites face the threat of peasants outmigration and peasants communities hold relatively
little land. This makes Rhodesia a particularly relevant case study because peasant communities
were dispossessed by colonists from most of their lands. Moreover, when urban industry developed
and pressures arose to increase peasants' productivity, the issue of introducing individual property
rights gained prominence. Having presented all the theoretical results, let us examine the Rhodesian
case for an analytical interpretation.
3.5 The Rhodesian Case
In Rhodesian agricultural history, Palmer (1977a) notes that the dominant theme "is surely the
triumph of European over African farmers" (p. 221). The process whereby this triumph came
about can be usefully divided into three main stages, described briefly in Appendix 3.C.
In an initial stage, white settlers, consolidating their domination, were not concerned about
obtaining cheap labour from natives. Instead, they were interested in extracting resources from
them.
Later on, as settlers became more heavily involved in agricultural production, the extraction
of cheap labour from natives became a prime concern. White elites enacted policies that actively
contributed to the formation of a rural dual economy. These included forcing the natives into
unsuitable and overcrowded Reserves, segregating the land along racial lines, and codifying the
property rights institutions of the native land areas.
Finally, with this dual structure in place, the greater opportunities for labour in the urban
industrial sector gradually led to a third stage in which the rural elite faced stronger limits to the
extent of the distortions that it could introduce in the rural areas.
Next, I review each of these stages and interpret them using the analytical framework pre-
sented above. The review reveals, first, that the structure of the subsistence economy was far from
accidental. Rather, white elites actively promoted policies and institutions in the black peasant
economy to defend their own interests. Second, the white influence had consequences for the rural
economy in line with much of the theoretical analysis. In particular, when white involvement in
158
agricultural production was not so widespread, productivity in traditional black agriculture was
not threatened and, if anything, improved. Nevertheless, as white settlers competed directly with
black peasants and, more importantly, needed their labour, they attempted to impose the maxi-
mum possible distortions on natives. In their strategy to impoverish the traditional economy, few
methods were spared. Finally, among the various methods, the role of poor property rights be-
came apparent when the urban sector and industrial interests gained prominence, and pressure to
improve the productivity of native Reserves and cut the ties of the native to his land arose. Rural
elites, instead, had strong incentives to sustain the rural dual economy.
3.5.1 The early years: consolidating power and resource extraction
The motives of the early settlers in the initial period in Rhodesian economic history were clear
enough that little interpretation is required: "the main reason we are all here is to make money
and lose no time about it" (Palmer, 1977b, p. 13). Apart from searching for gold, this meant
extracting resources from the natives in the form of forced labour and taxes28 . Moreover, the
settlers quickly obtained the political power necessary to accomplish this.
However, direct involvement in agricultural production was limited. Hence, competition for
factors of production such as labour was not as fierce as it would become afterwards29 . Indeed, the
initial land grabbing was mostly for companies and speculators who were not actively involved in
farming 30 . Absentee landowners charged Africans for the right to occupy them. This 'kaffir farming'
limited the impact of the initial land-grabbing on the natives, who kept producing in these lands
(Mosley, 1983, p. 20) to pay rents and taxes imposed on them31 . Early European farmers resented
this as it diminished their labour supply, but absentee landowners (and the poorest European
28Regarding forced labour, in 1895 Native Commissioner Hartley stated: "I am at present forcing the natives of
this district to work sorely against their will, using such methods as I think desirable" (Palmer, 1977b, p. 43) and
early Pioneers made similar remarks. As for taxation, Rhodes and the BSAC suggested a hut tax that would "to a
certain extent furnish an incentive to labour which might otherwise be wanting" (Palmer, 1977b, p. 43). The Imperial
Government declined, but the Company began collecting a hut tax in 1894 in Mashonaland and in Matabeleland
Ndebele cattle was confiscated. Then a Native Department was set up for these purposes (Palmer, 1977b, p. 43).
29This is not to deny that even the early settlers were searching for ways to coerce labour, as the quotes in footnote
28 suggest.
3 0Many pioneers, more interested in gold, sold their land rights to them: "Of an estimated 15.8 million acres
alienated to Europeans by March 1899, some 9.3 million acres were in the hands of companies" (Palmer, 1977b, p.
33).
3 1After the 1896-1897 Risings, the Ndebele on European farms were obliged to enter agreements and, after a grace
period, start paying rents. Also, a hut tax was imposed simultaneously in Matabeleland. While the Ndebele resented
paying rents on their own land, and many were forced to become temporary wage labourers to pay, "On the whole
[they] preferred to remain on their old lands and put up with these exactions rather than move into the native
Reserves (...) situated in inhospitable country" (Palmer, 1977b, p. 65).
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farmers, who depended on these arrangements for labour) supported it and, initially, had their
way32 . An interesting implication of the prevalence of land absenteeism was that the greatest
pressure on the natives initially was not necessarily the alienation of land. "Evidence to support
this conclusion lies in the fact that no direct correlation can be drawn between the extent of land
alienated and the outbreak of resistance in 1896" (Palmer, 1977b, p. 44).
Strong pressure did not stop African agriculture from experiencing a period of prosperity, be-
cause natives took advantage of new opportunities. During early years of white settlement,
"A substantial amount of productive investment was none the less carried out by the
African peasantry during the first two decades of the present century. Africans bought
wagons and carts for the transport to the towns and mining centres, some invested
in corn crushers and in water boreholes, (...) by far the most prominent forms of
productive investment were cattle and ploughs. In the period 1905-21 the number of
African-owned cattle increased from 114,560 to 854,000 head (...) the number of ploughs
in use by Africans increasing from 440 in 1905 to 16,900 in 1921" (Arrighi, 1970, p. 214).
Palmer (1977b, p. 72) concurs, noting an early Shona prosperity. Peasants, living within access
to the main markets and the railroad and facing growing demand from mines, took advantage of
new market opportunities and grew new crops.
In short, these early years may be thought of as mirroring the equilibrium of Proposition 5
describing a RE solution. Without strong, direct involvement in agricultural production, politically
powerful groups had few reasons to resent this early prosperity. Moreover, the implications for the
agricultural sector were also consistent with the theoretical analysis. In particular, rather than as
a dual economy with a stagnant traditional sector, the rural economy was best characterized as a
single-sector economy wherein natives were at least as productive as white producers33.
3.5.2 White agriculture and factor price manipulation
Later, the situation changed. Contemporary observers were aware about the impacts of native
prosperity on labour supply (cited in Palmer (1977b, p. 78-79)):
3 2 The early members elected to the Legislative Council established in 1898 all had close connections with land-
owning companies and defended absentee landlords. In 1897, a Government Notice calling on all who had been granted
land on terms of beneficial occupation to comply by August 1898 or face threat of forfeiture was blocked by Rhodes
and settlers. An 1899 Land Ordinance was blocked by a Representatives Association and settlers in the Legislative
Council. In 1900, a Land Occupation Conditions Ordinance weakened occupation conditions (Palmer, 1977b, p. 61).
3 3Alternatively, since the industrial or urban sector was not a mayor concern in this period, the political equilibrium
of this period can be thought of as resembling the situation of Proposition 6 with low wages, with similar implications.
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"The natives today are cultivating twice the amount they did when we came to the
country, and so long as the land is unlimited and they have a market for their produce,
will the labour supply suffer" (Native Commissioner 'Wiri' Edwards, 1906);
"[Locusts are] not an unmitigated evil, for a really abundant harvest of kaffir corn and
mwalies would probably have the effect of reducing the number of Native labourers 50
per cent" (Native Commissioner Malema, 1906);
"At present the paltry sum of 10/- per hut is so easily earned it will never induce them
to work" (Native Commissioner Makoni, 1903).
Therefore, when white settlers got seriously involved in agriculture, they used political power
to erode the early prosperity of the Shona and Ndebele. Again, they were explicit about their
motivations. In particular, the Reserves were attractive as far as they could become a source of
cheap and abundant labour and were largely ignored otherwise. For instance, even when Europeans
had already expropriated natives, they did not push them to Reserves if these were too far away
because, as explained by the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry in 1911, "it would be very short-
sighted policy to remove these natives to reserves, as their services may be of great value to future
European occupants" (Arrighi, 1970) 34. Conversely, when some Reserves came under attack in
1914-15, their role in providing labour for nearby white neighbors was used as an argument to
protect them: "Inskipp was warned not to advocate the abolition of the Soshwe Reserve, 'as the
farmers in the vicinity are dependent upon it for their labour supply"' (Palmer, 1977b, p. 117)35.
3 4 E.F. Knight, correspondent to Rhodesia for The Times of London whose articles later appeared on a book,
Rhodesia of Today, gave the following view against the creation of Reserves in 1895: "To set these savages apart in
(large) Reserves would be to indefinitely retard their civilisation. Rich in cattle and mealie crops they would refuse
to labour for us and would pass their lives in indolence" (Floyd, 1959, p. 12). What Knight did not anticipate, of
course, was that Reserves would not be large, and that they could provide a handsome amount of migrant labour to
white producers.
The fact that Reserves were not as attractive if they did not serve the purpose of providing labour because they
were too far away was clear even on the early years. In Matabele (the land of the Ndebele), during the initial phase in
which land was mostly held by companies and speculators, "no attempt was ever made to force the Ndebele into the
distant Gwaii and Shangani Reserves, as they were too highly prized as a potential pool of labour. Frank Johnson,
the organizer of the Pioneer Column, was moved to comment that: 'We have excellent labourers in Matabele, and
from the mining and commercial point of view I regret the loss of the 2,000 odd Matabele killed in the late war very
much"' (Palmer, 1977b, p. 42).
3 5 Along the same lines, when Coryndon -the chairman of the 1914 Commission- argued that medium-size Reserves
scattered evenly throughout the country were preferable to the situation in Matabeleland in 1914 of practically no
Reserves in the center and huge ones in the outer districts, he cited among the arguments that "the labour supply
would be more evenly distributed" (Palmer, 1977b, p. 129)
Also, when the 1925 Land Commission met to examine the best allocation of the Native Purchase Areas (NPAs),
dividing the country in two was rejected because it would damage the labour supply, and instead NPAs should
whenever possible adjoin the existing Reserves to form with them compact Native Areas.
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However, not all Africans were expected to go to the Reserves and follow the customs of a
tribal society. The most entrepreneurial ones could in theory become private owners in the Native
Purchase Areas (NPAs). Fear of competition from African farmers was largely responsible for the
creation of the NPAs. NPAs were presented in the Legislative Assembly as a necessary evil to deal
with the problem of Natives buying land anywhere (Palmer, 1977b, p. 169-170). In these circum-
stances, it is hardly surprising that the NPAs did not generate a competitive African agricultural
sector. The limitations of the assigned NPAs are documented in Appendix 3.C36 . Furthermore,
the nature of property rights limited their productivity, as assumed in the theoretical analysis.
Though land allocated in the NPAs was owned individually, "there were many limitations to its
transferability, such as maximum size of holdings and sales to Europeans. Among other things
this meant that the extension of credit (which could possibly only come from European sources) to
African farmers was hampered and therefore a constant lack of financing was bound to hold back
their development" (Arrighi, 1973, p. 347).
While it was useful to think of the early years as mirroring the equilibrium of Proposition 5
describing a RE solution, the years of white agricultural development mirror the incentives of a FPM
equilibrium as in Proposition 4. During these years, there was relatively low industry development
in urban areas. As expected in a FPM solution with low urban wages, the rural elites competing
for labour had reason to resent native prosperity and attempted to impose the maximum possible
distortions on natives. White colonists strategically impoverished the traditional economy as much
as possible, to force peasants into the labour market.
However, the Corollary to Proposition 6 underlines an additional important element: landown-
ers' capacity to tax the subsistence sector should have been limited. Otherwise, they would have
been interested in increasing subsistence sector productivity and taxing the returns. African state
weakness is well-established, and lies at the center of many academic debates (see e.g. Herbst.
(2000)). While Rhodesia, and Southern Africa in general, had special characteristics in the conti-
nent given the relatively high proportion of white settlers, state capacity was undoubtedly limited.
Alexander (2006) puts it clearly, referring to the process by which power over Africans and their
36To provide some evidence here, "By 1943 the Rhodesian Government had come to admit, at least privately, that
some 4.727,000 acres of the NPAs were 'generally unsuitable for divisions into small holdings"' (Palmer, 1977b, p.
185). Arrighi (1973) summarizes some of the limitations of NPAs in his classic essay on the political economy of
Rhodesia. He claims competition from an African rural bourgeoisie was potentially dangerous for whites and for this
reason it was regulated and held within limits via the NPAs, which, moreover "constituted only 8 percent of the total
land areas of the country and it was generally located even farther away from markets, railway lines, and main roads
than those of the traditional peasantry" (Arrighi, 1973, p. 347).
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land was constituted: "This was in part a story of dispossession and repression, but it was also
a story of contradiction and compromise in which the state's goals were far from easily realised"
(p. 17). State-making, she argues, was constantly challenged by Africans, who "spread out from
hilltop fortifications; they fled from landlords; they sought to evade tax" (p. 20).
As should be clear from the review of European agriculture expansion, the notion that land
expropriation and ownership segregation resulted from white elites' efforts to obtain cheap and
abundant labour from natives is by no means new, nor lacking evidence. Less attention has been
paid to the role of the nature of property rights in the Reserves. The experience with NPAs shows
that efforts to introduce private land ownership for Africans were weak. The role of property
rights became even more apparent when the urban sector gained prominence. Rhodesia entered
the third stage identified above. The pressure to improve the native Reserve productivity and cut
ties between the natives and their land arose.
3.5.3 The role of industry
As noted by (Arrighi, 1970, p. 223) and as assumed in the theoretical analysis, the tribal social
system in Rhodesia made black peasants unwilling to permanently migrate to industrial urban
centers. By migrating only temporarily, "participation in the labour force thus left the worker's
obligations and duties to his rural kinsmen and his general involvement in the tribal social system
unchanged so as to retain his cultivation rights and to be able to claim support and succour when
necessary" (Arrighi, 1970, p. 223). By the 1950s, this scheme was hurting industrial capital,
especially industries requiring labour stabilization 7 .
The stated aims of the NLHA suggest that this Act was a response to such a situation. With
this introduction of individual rights, those excluded from land would provide a stable labour for
industry, and security of tenure in the Reserves would improve productivity. This, however, exactly
opposes what the rural elite in the model economy of Section 3.2 look for. According to the results
of Proposition 6, the rural elite oppose these aims for the same reason the industrial sector supports
them.
As with the NPAs, however, policies to introduce private property on the traditional African
sector turned out to be partial and timid. While the NLHA was supposedly revolutionary, and
"directly repudiated 'customary' and communal rights to land in favour of individual
3 7 (Arrighi, 1970, p. 223) claims that "It was in fact in those sectors in which stabilization mattered the most
(manufacturing, transport and communication) that after 1954 most of the increase in real wages was concentrated."
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land right holders and 'secular state power', [it] was to be tempered by a host of restric-
tions. Only those who farmed and owned stock at the time of the Act's implementation
were eligible for rights; land rights could not be used as collateral against a loan; the size
of the arable allocations and number of stock rights was limited [and] African 'rights'
to land were to be subordinated to the discipline of 'development'" Alexander (2006).
Therefore, rather than see it as a triumph for manufacturing interests, it is preferable to view
the NLHA as the compromise between settler farmers and secondary industry38. The impossibility
of truly revolutionary changes in policy was recognized by a senior official of the Native Affairs
Department. He remarked at the time, referring to an increase in the minimum wage that would
stabilize labour in the urban areas: "if a minimum wage was introduced in the towns you are bound
to have repercussions amongst the farming community and today the farming community rules the
country, so that flattens out the minimum wage straight away" (Arrighi, 1973, p. 362, emphasis
added).
In the 1950s, liberals failed to repeal the Land Apportionment Act. White farmers reaffirmed
their political power when the United Federal Party lost the 1962 elections to the Rhodesian Front
Party (Mosley (1983, p. 29) and Duggan (1980, p. 232)). The Land Apportionment Act was
confirmed by the 1969 Land Tenure Act. Duggan (1980) interprets these measures in the following
way:
"The Rhodesian state had thus come full circle. Its first coherent agricultural policy, in
the decade before World War I, was to eliminate the commercial production of Africans
and encourage that of settlers. Industrialization after 1940 produced and ambivalent
government policy; protection of settler farmers was costly to the growing manufacturing
sector. The NLHA was a compromise between the upper and lower strata of settler
society (...) During the 1960s, with the Rhodesian Front in power, ambivalence towards
African commercial agriculture disappeared" (Duggan, 1980, p. 237).
3 8 See Duggan (1980, p. 230) and Arrighi (1973) . Phimister (1993) reviews these arguments by Arrighi (1973)
and others along this vein, but also suggests that the actual impact of the Act may have been overestimated, as it
was done hastily and with limited resources, and less enthusiastically once it was clear that industry would not be
able to absorb all the landless proletariat that would have been created. Moreover, he stresses that opposition to
the Act did not only come from Africans who would have been left landless, but also from the African rural elites or
'reserve entrepreneurs' who had managed to concentrate wealth (land and cattle) in the Reserves, and whose position
would have been threatened by the redistribution of the Act. Indeed, for this it is important to remember that
while the NLHA allowed for sales of titles, no one could hold more than three times the standard area established by
authorities, and these provisions "were actually more egalitarian than the previous allocation of land in Rhodesian
reserves under the control of government-aid chiefs" (Duggan, 1980, p. 232).
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These tensions between the need of a stable labour force in industry and existing institutions
in rural areas can also be interpreted using the model. More specifically, rural elites interests were
instrumental in making institutional innovations in the traditional rural sector partial and timid.
Given that natives had been dispossessed from most of their lands for years, the political
incentives of rural elites are consistent with the results from Proposition 6 with t < t. Indeed,
Proposition 6 predicts that the rise in the industrial wage should put some limits on the distortions
that the rural elites are able to impose on the traditional rural sector. But, if rural elites are
sufficiently powerful with a sufficiently small subsistence sector, industrial development can lead
to no revolutionary institutional innovation in the subsistence sector. Rhodesian history from the
1940s to the 1960s adjusts well to this pattern. Although industrial development revealed that the
Reserve property rights regime put limits on both agricultural productivity and the migration of
labour to urban areas, settler political power and their strategy of factor price manipulation and
avoiding competition with black farmers successfully prevented the elimination of the rural dual
economy. The NLHA, hastily conducted and including a number of restrictions, is consistent with
this interpretation. With a small subsistence sector, rural elites favored poor attempted to obtain
cheap labour using poor property rights institutions. Poor property rights were preferred over the
strategy of promoting productivity-enhancing institutional innovation and taxing the returns.
3.6 Final remarks
Improving agricultural productivity in poor countries is important for several reasons. Most obvi-
ously, many people derive their livelihood from the rural sector in less-developed countries. Also,
agricultural productivity is more broadly related with the determinants of overall economic perfor-
mance. Indeed, development economists and historians have long argued that agricultural produc-
tivity may drive the overall development process. In particular, by creating the supply of labour
to industry and the surplus of food in society, agricultural productivity catalyzes the structural
transformations of development that Kuznets (1966) famously discussed3 9.
On the other hand, property rights appear to determine agricultural productivity. If property
rights in land are so good, why are they not adopted more widely? This paper suggests a political
39See (Ray, 1998, p. 353) for a review of these arguments, and Matsuyama (1992) or Gollin et al. (2002) for
examples of formalizations of these ideas. In the context of British economic history, the questions of whether there
existed an agricultural revolution that preceded the Industrial Revolution, and whether parliamentary enclosures
caused it, have generated a long and lively debate (see Allen (1999) and the references therein).
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economy explanation. Often, the rural sector in developing countries has a "dual" structure with
politically powerful producers or elites alongside traditional peasants with little voice in the political
process. In this context, rural elites maintain low agricultural productivity in the traditional sector
to obtain cheap peasant labour. However, this objective runs into trouble when peasants enjoy
alternative employment opportunities in the urban (or other) sector. In general, the emergence of
new "outside options" for peasants limits the elite's ability to manipulate factor prices. Distorting
the traditional economy, fails to increase elites' profits, but increases outmigration. This is true
for a number of potential distortions on the subsistence sector, which I have succinctly captured
in the theoretical model with taxation on subsistence income. But limited property rights in the
subsistence sector constitute a distinct distortion. Like other distortions they reduce peasants'
income in subsistence plots, but achieve something more: they force peasants to remain in the
agricultural sector to protect their property.
Thus, rural elites have little incentive to promote a transition to institutions of private property
in the subsistence economy. This suggests a specific mechanism for the endogenous persistence
of bad rural institutions as development unfolds. While other theories of "dualism" predict an
erosion of the "traditional" economy with development, in this theory it is precisely the rise of an
alternative "modern" or "urban" sector which shifts rural elite's attention away from taxation to
avoid migration. As a result, direct interests of rural elites in the productivity of the subsistence
sector disappear, together with incentives to promote efficiency-enhancing innovations in property
rights institutions. Also noteworthy, poor property rights are preferred for precisely the same
reason they hurt overall economic development: they simultaneously reduce the supply of labour
to industry (tie peasants to land) and the surplus of food in society (reduce subsistence sector
productivity). In this sense, this theory provides a link between political institutions that give
disproportionate power to large landowners and barriers to the structural transformations required
for development 40 .
Two final important caveats are worth mentioning. First, communal systems of land ownership
may provide a number of benefits to peasants. The flip side of providing peasants with full,
private property rights over their land is creating a number of landless people. The traditional
organization of the subsistence economy may provide insurance for peasants. This may not only
40Other theories share this spirit, but emphasize the interests of the landed elite to raise direct barriers to indus-
trialization or under-invest in necessary public goods in order to protect its rents (see, for example, Adamopoulos
(2008) and Galor et al. (2009)).
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protect them from extreme poverty, but also help explain the persistence of a relatively unproductive
"traditional" economy (Banerjee & Newman, 1998). Also, eliminating the option to sell their land
may protect peasants from selling it at low prices in times of distress, or under pressure from
more powerful groups. For example, Lamartine Yates (1981) notes that, decades later, Mexican
peasants still accepted the original motivation behind the inalienability of ejido land: "it was highly
necessary to protect the newly created groups of ejidatarios from having their land stolen back from
them by unscrupulous persons" (p.180). As Ray (2008) puts it while discussing the current state
of development economics, "the political economy of rights is a messy business, but of central
importance in development economics. Poverty in general enhances the social and political need
for ambiguity" (p. 21).
Second, motivations aside from extracting cheap labour from rural labourers may explain the in-
terest in keeping peasants tied to land. A prominent justification in the African cases is maintenance
of social order, under the (perhaps correct) impression of elites that concentrating population in
urban centers may threaten the stability of the regime. As Feinstein (2005) describes for the case of
South Africa, "The logic of domination dictated that the majority of the black population should
remain isolated and dispersed in rural areas and mine compounds; the logic of industrialization
dictated that they should concentrate in urban areas to provide labor necessary for economic ex-
pansion. This was a contradiction with which all white politicians had grappled since the formation
of the Union" (p. 151).
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3.A Proofs
3.A.1 Characterization of FDv (rs, pu)
That the relative attractiveness of the rural areas at m = 0, 77V (rs, p), is decreasing in -rs is
straightforward from inspection of (3.10) or simple differentiation. To characterize the behaviour
of tii (TS, p) as yL changes, rewrite it as follows:
O97- (rs, A)
ap
where
1-a
B (\±) t[(1-rs)]I- >0,L
1- p1-_______
k~p e I,
(t [(1 -rs)plt +T-t)
1-a 1-1t( -rcp y(p) j 1- p+ -(1-p)) A
a a [( - T) p1-a+ T -t
Now note the following properties41: (1) k (p) > 0 for all I E [p, 1] , (2) 1 (pp) ~ 1 + 1/a > 0,
(3) 1 (1) = 2a-1 5 0 if a > 1/2, and (4) l' (p) < 0. If a > 1/2, these properties imply that
O9fv (rs, p) /Op > 0 for all pt E [_y, 1] and thus p* = 1. If instead a < 1/2, from properties 1 and
3 ozii (rs, 1) /Iy < 0. Properties 1 and 2 imply in turn that -9' > 0. These observations,
together with properties 1 and 4, imply that there exists a unique p* E (p, 1) such that ",''* =
B * k (i*) * I (p*) = 0 which maximizes Cv (rS, p). Since k (t*) > 0, p* is defined by 1 (p*) = 0, or
(also using 7 s = 0) by:
~1
a a tJ*]1"+ T - t
3.A.2 Characterization of the FPM problem
Equilibrium policies in the no migration regime
The elite maximize which is monotonically increasing in rs and monotonically decreasing in I.
Equilibrium policies in the unavoidable migration regime
In the main text it was observed that the optimal property tax rate for the elite is r = 0. Taking this
as given, one can take a monotone transformation and note that maximizing L,/fT with respect to i
"To see property 4, write I'(p) = (a - 2) /a + a (p) * b (I) with a(p) 
t [(1 - Ts) pn I/ [t [(1 - rs) i] I+ T - t and b (I) =1 - ( - I) (1 - a (pi)) / (p (1 - a)). Note
the following: (a - 2) /a is negative and independent of j; a (i) is increasing in I and positive for all y;
b (I) approaches minus infinity at p = 0, equals 1 at yi = 1, and is also increasing in i. Thus a sufficient
condition for 1'(I) to be negative for all yt E [p, 1] is that it is negative at Ip = 1. But this always holds
because (2 - a) /a > 1 > a (1).
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is equivalent to maximizing z (pt) = log [(1 - p) t11T . The first order condition can be written as,
z' (p) = -1/ (1 - p) +-E/ [ - a) Al = 0. Since z' (I) is monotonically decreasing in p, z' (0) = 00,
and z'(1) = -oo, there exists a unique pFPM E (p, 1) such that z' (paFPM) = 0. Hence, LR/T
achieves a unique maximum at pFPM. Straightforward differentiation then yields the following
comparative static results: OptFPM/T > 0, a /FPMlaa > 0, g'jFPM/&t < 0. Moreover, note from
inspection of the first order condition that z' (1/ (2 - a)) < 0, and since z' (p) is decreasing in p,
pFPM < 1/(2 - a). Also from the first order condition, as T -> oo or t ->0, 7E approaches l and
thus pFPM 1
3.A.3 Characterization of the RE problem
Equilibrium policies in the no migration regime
In the main text it was observed that in the no migration regime the optimal property rights level
for the elite in the RE problem is y = 1. Taking this as given, taking logs on the maximand,
and ignoring constant terms, one can find the optimal level of taxation by maximizing 2 (Ts) =
log TS -(1s) The first order condition is ' (-rs) = 1/rs-aYE ((1 - a) (1 - rs))
I t(1-Ts)T _+(T-t))' .
0. Since ' (Ts) is monotonically decreasing in pt, z' (0) = oo, and z' (1) = -oo, there exists a unique
7 E [0, 1] , denoted TLaffer such that ' (r) = 0. Hence, there exists a unique TS E (0, 1) that satisfies
the first order condition and maximizes tax revenues42 . Inspection of this condition or straight-
forward differentiation then yields the following comparative static results: &rLaffer/l&T < 0,
9r Laffer/ 19a < 0, &orLaffer/&t > 0. Moreover, rs > 1 - a but as T -+ oo or t -+ 0, rs -+ 1 - a.
Equilibrium policies in the unavoidable migration regime
Taking logs and ignoring constant terms, the maximization problem in this case is equivalent to
maximizing
1 a ( ( 1 - a t[((1 - rs)/4p] r\
2 (s, p1) = log -rs + -Ilog p + a log (1 -rs) 1+(1'-A9) ~ P -T)A1 -a 1 -a a T
Taking the derivative with respect to pi, it is clear that 2 (rs, i) is increasing in ps for each rs. To
see this, taking the derivative and simplifying:
. 2 (TS, A) = - + at 1( - (1 /t - a) + ~-)
1- a y aT + (1 - pi) (1 - a) t [(1 - -rs)) /_ a 1-p T
Now note that > 1, and (- (1 - a) + - T) is decreasing in y and it can be no smaller than
- (1 - a). Thus, to verify that the expression is positive, it is sufficient to show that
at[P(1 TS) A] + 1
aT+(1 -i) (1- a)t[(1 -rs)pt]- 1-a
"Alternatrively, straightforward differentiation shows that the maximand is everywhere concave in TS, so
this solution is indeed a global maximum.
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After some algebra, it can be shown that this is equivalent to verifying that
-+ (p +a)(1a)< C' 
.T-t
t [(1 - FS) p] 1-
But since since p < 1 substituting (1 + a) for (p + a) in the left hand side of the inequality,
a (T -t)1
-+ (a+yp)(1a) < -1 +(1 +a)(1 -'a) = -a2 <0 < .T-t
t [(1 - Ts) AP I-
Therefore 52 (-rs, p) > 0 and the preferred level of p is 1. Taking this as given, one can find
21 (rs, 1) = 1/Ts - a/ [(1 - a) (1 - rs)] = 0 and solve for the optimal -rs, TS = 1 - a.This is indeed
a maximum since 211 ('rs, 1) < 0.
3.A.4 Characterization of the Combined Problem
Equilibrium policies in the no migration regime
Rewrite (3.12) as max cE = max +PM 7RE where, =FPM kTa, WRE = (1 -Ts)
and k = AE L . That the optimal rS must be larger than rLaffer, follows by taking the derivative
of cE with respect to rs, 9cE/&TS = 0%FPM/0frS + OwRE/&TS, and noting from the analysis of
the previous cases that while the first term is positive, the second is zero for 'rs = rLaffer (and
positive for lower values and negative for larger ones). Thus, rTOM such that &cE/&rs = 0 must
satisfy Tr'OM > TLaffer > 1 - a. Also, since lim"i & 7rRE/6Ors = -oo while lim,1 OrFPM/O-rS is
finite, -rcOM< 1.
On the other hand, O = k (-) h (rs), where k (-) = pact (1 - rs)' is a function of para-
meters that is always positive, while h (rs) = -a (1 - -ys) + Ts (1 - ays) / [(1 - rs) (1 - a)] may
be positive or negative. However, one can verify that h'(rs) > 0 for rS > 1 - a. This, together
with the fact that h (1 - a) > 0 implies that h (rs) > 0 for any rS > 1 - a. This completes the
proof that OcE/at > 0 for -rs > 1 - a, and since TrcOM > 1 - a, that pLCOM = 1. Finally, note that
for small rS the second term in h (rs) approaches 0, thus rendering h (-rs) < 0. Thus, a sufficient
condition for pCOM to be equal to zero is that t is sufficiently small that h (rs) < 0 at I = 0, or
since ys = 0 at p = 0, that I- <a (1 - a) / (1+ a (1 - a)).
Equilibrium policies in the unavoidable migration regime
Rewrite max cE = max K [wFPM ( FPM REf (p, r) where K = ( , WFPM
(1-)(Tt),wRE (t) = t (1 +(1 1-aiyS)1 kj~FPM = (1 +(1 -a~s)~ acEt(1 -a) (T - t), 1R -(S FP RE_
i -rs (1 - TS)1. Now we can observe that wFPM (t), the weight on #FPM (M, rs), is monoton-
ically decreasing in t, and zero at t = T. Also, wRE (t), the weight on kRE (/,t, rS), is monotonically
increasing in t, and zero at t = 0. Thus for any t sufficiently close to T, the optimal is equivalent to
that of maximizing FFPM, which from the preceding cases has a maximum at p4 = pFPM, -r = 0,
and for any t sufficiently close to 0, the optimum coincides with that of Tr RE, which has a maximum
at ya = 1, r = 1 - a. This establishes the result in the Proposition.
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3.B The Avoidable Migration Regime
3.B.1 FPM Policies
As could be expected, when the urban wages increases and the society transitions from the "no
migration" to the "unavoidable migration" regime, increases in the urban wage force the elite to
give policy concessions (in the form of lower taxation or better property rights in the subsistence
areas) to try to avoid migration. The elite gradually reduces r and increases yL from ;r and _y, their
levels in the no migration regime. Over a range of values for wu, these concessions imply that there
is in fact no migration even though the migration threat is present. However, once the elite reaches
zero taxation and property rights as given by the unavoidable migration regime in Proposition
3.15, it will choose to give no more policy concessions. From this point forward, further increases
in the urban wage generate positive migration. The next proposition summarizes the solution more
precisely.
Proposition 8 (Summary of FPM policies in the avoidable migration regime) Suppose # = 0 and
wU E [(i (r, p) , W (0, p*)] . Also, let p** be the level of property rights in the unavoidable migration
regime with FPM policies as described in Proposition 4. Then, with iv- (r, pt) as defined in (3.10) and
p* from Remark 2, the unique political equilibrium features the following level of taxation (rFPM)
and property rights (p FPM) :
1. if wu < iv (0, p**), then -r FPM E [0, t], pFPM C [p, p**] ,and as wU increases, rFPM falls,
or LFPM increases, or both.
2. if wu > (,**), then 7FPM=0 and /FPM /.I**.
Proof. The problem is to max min L, /T, L/IT subject to wu c [v- (-, p) , fz (0, I*)] . Since
L>Li, it is preferable, if unconstrained, to maximize L/T than to maximize L1,/T. However,
since the elite's problem is to maximize the minimum of the two expressions, the unconstrained
maximum of will in fact, over the relevant range of wages of the avoidable migration regime, be
above L/IT. This means that the elite will have to content itself with the "best" combination of
policies (that maximizes ) such that (LIT) / (LI IT) (equivalently, wu < fv- (rs, p)). Hence,
for a range of values of wu, one can think of the elite as solving the problem:
max L/T subject to wu 5 F (rs, p) . (3.17)
However, this reasoning fails when wu is large enough that (rs, p) = (0, p**) and L /IT is smaller
than L/T (that is, wu > iv- (0, p**)). Since (Ts, u) = (0, p**) maximizes A, there can be no otherT
combination of policies that yields a higher utility for the elite and satisfies (LIT) < (LIi).
Therefore, only for wu < f (0, p**) the solution is given by the solution to (3.17), and for
wu > zi (0, p**) it is (rs, i) = (0, p**)
As for the characteristics of the solution to (3.17), note the following. First, recall that zi (rs, p)
is increasing in p for p < p*, is maximized at p*, and is decreasing thereafter. Note also that p**
maximizes 5, but since = and T is monotonically decreasing in pt, it must be
the case that p** < p*. From Remark 2, this implies that 'iv (rs, pt) in the constraint of (3.17) is
increasing in pL. We also know that ?i (TS, p) is decreasing in TS. Second, the objective function,
, is decreasing in y and increasing in rs. These two observations imply that the constraint willisdcesnTn icesn l
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always bind and, regardless of the exact combination of policies (rs, p) that solve (3.17), an increase
in wu will necessarily imply a decrease in rs, and increase in p, or both to satisfy such constraint.
U
3.B.2 RE Policies
Since p = 1 is optimal in either extreme regime, it is optimal in the avoidable migration regime,
where LR in the maximand is either L or LI. Fixing p = 1, this is then a simple maximization
problem in one variable. In particular, when feasible the elite will set rs such that L, = L.
Intuitively, this equilibrium level of taxation decreases as the rural area becomes more attractive
and the elite tries to avoid migration. When migration becomes unavoidable, as noted above, the
desired level of taxation reaches 1 - a. Of course, if the exogenous limit on taxation - is binding,
then rRE =
Proposition 9 (Summary of RE policies in the avoidable migration regime) Suppose the elite
solves problem (3.16) and wu E [ (-r, p) , f (0, p*)]. Then, with ii (r-, p) as defined in (3.10) and
p from Remark 2, the unique political equilibrium features pRE = 1 and rRE = min{ ,ir}, whereS
; r [1 - a, TLaf fer] and is decreasing in wu.
Proof. Fixing t = 1, this is a standard maximization of Leontieff-type preferences on one vari-
able, rs. The elite will set rs such that L, = L, or wu = AE [(1IL) (t (1 - Ts)1- + T - t)
Solving for Ts, this is rs = 1 - ((l/t) (L (wu/AE)F - (T - t))) which is decreasing in wu.
3.B.3 COM Policies
A general characterization of equilibrium policies for the combined problem is more complicated.
However, from the preceding analysis some of its key features are easily established.
Proposition 10 (Summary of COM policies in the avoidable migration regime) Suppose the elite
solves problem (3.12), p = 1, and wu C [i (-, p) , i (0, p*)]. Then, with iv- (r, p) as defined in
(3.10), (r FPM FPM) and (TRE RE) given by Propositions 8 and 9, respectively, and I* from
Remark 2, the unique political equilibrium features the following level of taxation (TrOM) and
property rights (plCOM): (i) if t C (0,t], then -rOM = TFPM COM = jLFPM; if t C [t, T], then
COM R E COM _ RE
Proof. Follows from the proof for COM policies in the unavoidable regime case. *
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3.C Three stages in Rhodesian Agricultural History
The early years: consolidating power and resource extraction
According to Palmer (1977b, p. 12), the drive for the initial colonization of Rhodesia in the late
19th century was the discovery of gold in the Transvaal43 . This convinced the British that too
much power was placed on the hands of Afrikaners. And it convinced Cecil Rhodes of the British
South Africa Company (BSAC) that he should look North to find a "Second Rand." As a result,
in 1889 the BSAC obtained a Royal Charter to administer the territory as a protectorate. Soon,
the two main groups of natives (the Ndebele or Matabele, and the Shona) experienced a large-
scale dispossession of their land through violent and illegal means, and found themselves under the
political domination of the settlers. The strategies for dispossession of land included agreements
that were seen as "detestable, whether viewed on the light of policy or morality" (Palmer, 1977b,
p. 27) even by John Smith Moffat, the British Resident Commissioner".
War eventually broke out with the Matabele, and in 1893 another controversial agreement, the
Victoria Agreement, stipulated that everyone taking up arms for the BSAC in the Matabele war
was to be entitled to land with no obligation to occupy it. During these years, the best land was
taken away from the natives with little checks from the Imperial government. For instance, after
the Matabele war was won by the BSAC, a Land Commission was established in 1894 to provide
land for the natives. But the Gwaai and Shangani Reserves created by the Commission had little
concern for the natives and two years later "the Colonial Office was forced to concede that 'the
proceedings of the Land Commission were a farce' [while] Earl Grey, admitted that the Ndebele
regarded the two Reserves as 'cemeteries not Homes"' (Palmer, 1977b, p. 33).
The 1896-1897 Ndebele and Shona Risings (or First ChiMurenga) led the British government
to put some control on the BSAC. The main change was the establishment of an Imperial Resident
Commissioner who communicated with the British Imperial government 45. Also, the post-Risings
Ordinance of 1898, stipulated that the Company would "from time to time" assign to the natives
land sufficient for their occupation.
Aside from the creation of Reserves for the natives, Imperial authorities attempted an attack
"The Transvaal Republic was one of the independent republics colonized by Boer (or Afrikaners) settlers
who left the British-dominated Cape Colony in the XIXth Century during the "Great Trek." The emigrating
Boers -Afrikaans speaking descendants from the Dutch, German and French early colonizers of South Africa-
established several republics to the north, outside British control, after the British occupation of the former
Dutch colony. In 1885, huge amounts of gold deposits were discovered in the Witwatersrand (in Afrikaans,
"the ridge of white waters"), often known simply as the Rand.
"In 1888, Cecil Rhodes persuaded Ndebele King Lobengula to grant mining and administration rights
to the BSAC (via the Rudd Concession), promising to bring no more than ten white men to dig for gold,
something that was not included in the version that Lobengula signed. This was sufficient for Rhodes
to raise the Pioneer Column, offering pioneers land and mining claims in exchange for the occupation of
Mashonaland (the land of the Shona). In 1891, Lobengula attempted to divide and rule, granting rights over
administration and land, trade and banks to Edouard Lippert, at the time a rival of Rhodes. The strategy
backfired when, in an agreement that was kept secret from Lobengula, Rhodes bought the concession from
Lippert in exchange for shares, cash and grants over land (although part of it was still under Lobengula's
control!).
"'They also forced Rhodes to resign, and Leander Starr Jameson, the BSAC administrator, was on jail and
replaced by others, including Earl Grey and William Milton, who were more conscious that the Company
had to have a more orderly land policy. James had invaded the Transvaal in a (failed) attempt to assert
British supremacy, and this provided a window of opportunity for the Risings.
4680 Mashonaland Reserves plus the Mtoko District and 16 Matabeleland Reserves were formally approved
in 1902 by the Company Administrator. Imperial approval was granted in 1908 by the Colonial Office, on
the understanding that further consideration was not precluded.
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on absentee landlords4 7 . But the Legislative Council that had been set up in 1898 had a lot of
representation from local settlers with strong ties to the large absentee landowning companies.
In 1903 a compromise was adopted that allowed absentee landlordism to continue: landlords, by
surrendering one-third of their holding, could receive title free of occupation for the remaining48.
White agriculture and factor price manipulation
A change of approach followed around 1907, when a BSAC Directors tour of Rhodesia ended the
myth of the "Second Rand." One year later, the "White Agricultural Policy" marked the beginning
of a differential support for European farmers via government bureaucracy, banks, and support
in research, none of which were available for Africans. The Company decided to promote settler
agriculture and attract new immigrants, and this required an inevitable "squeezing-out process"
(Palmer, 1977b, p. 80).
But the Company did not just squeeze-out more natives into the Reserves; it attacked the
Reserves to recover the good land for European farmers49 . The British Resident Commissioners
tried to resist the attack on the Reserves, and ultimately agreed to create a commission in 1914 to
settle the land question.
The 1914 Native Reserves Commission5 0 was very arbitrary. For instance, it reported that "land
has been assigned to natives which is quite unsuitable for their purposes, though desirable from
an European point of view" (Palmer, 1977b, pg.108) without stating the criteria for suitability for
Africans or Europeans. But the criteria was clear, to the point that the Chief Native Commissioner,
referring to Reserves proposed "defended their extent on the ground that much of the land selected
was 'interspersed with granite and was otherwise unfit for cultivation"" (Floyd, 1959, p. 72).
Likewise, the remarks of the of the Land Settlement Department Director, F.W. Inskipp, who was
very active giving advice to the Commission, are quite revealing. To quote just two examples:
"As the area in question, which is practically a conglomeration of kopjes with very small
cultivable valleys in between, is infested with baboons and is only transversable by pack
animals, I see no objection [to making it a native reserve]" (Palmer, 1977b, p. 104);
and
"I understand that the greater part of this land applied for consists of a steep gorge with
the Hondi river flowing through it and that this portion at least is quite unsuitable for
European occupation. Further that natives are thickly scattered throughout the area
and that the climate is intensely hot and probably malarious. In view of these facts
"Landlord absenteeism was so prevalent and the expropriation of land had been so brutal, that it was hard
for the government to get land for the Reserves or immigrants. Palmer (1977b) quotes a letter from Milton
to his wife in 1896 saying that there was "absolutely no land left that is of any value at all for settlement of
Immigrants by the Government" (p. 60).
"The post-Rising Ordinance also gave natives the same rights "to acquire, hold, encumber, and dispose of
land" as non-natives (Article 43). While the issue faced resistance from white settlers, it was unimportant
at the time since so few Africans could actually buy land. However, it would become important in the
segregation debates of the 1910s and 1920s that led to the Land Apportionment Act of 1930.
49A Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry was established in 1910-1911, and reported "strong views con-
cerning the excessive acreages allocated for African settlement. The testimony of Native Department officials
was substantially against [the surveyor], however, for it was pointed out that in many Reserves the soil was
poor, water was deficient and certain localities were wholly unsuited for human occupation" (Floyd, 1959,
p. 75).
"The Commission was composed by 3 members, 2 chosen by the Imperial Government -including the
chairman Robert Coryndon- and 1 nominated by the Company.
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and of the remoteness of the land from market and railway, I suggest that there is no
objection to its reservation" (Palmer, 1977b, p. 117).
Apart from giving the Reserves the worst tracts of land, the Commission did not expropriate
European lands, thus ratifying the former process of dispossession. The end result was a suggested
reduction in the size of Reserves of 2.7 million acres, which was partially reduced by a last-minute
Imperial intervention to create 1.7 million acres of "reserve Reserves" 51. The Imperial Government
finally approved the Commission's Report in 1917, but the necessary Order of Council was delayed
by complaints until November of 1920.
In 1922, Southern Rhodesia held a government referendum in which the (small and mostly
European) electorate rejected joining the Union of South Africa. The era of Company rule came
to an end, and political power formally passed to white settlers. In 1925 a new Land Commission
was appointed and reported in favour of a policy of separate land purchase areas for Africans and
Europeans (the former referred to as Native Purchase Areas, NPAs) 52.
The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 followed many of the recommendations from this Commis-
sion. With this act, NPAs (adjoining the Reserves were tribal tenure and land use would continue)
were created "within which Africans alone could purchase land, with the quid pro quo that they
could no longer buy land in the better-situated European areas" (Palmer, 1977a, p. 236)53.
The biases against the African farmers were again evident. Many of the NPAs were either
malarial, or too distant from markets, or lacked water, or had already been occupied by natives
that had left overcrowded Reserves (Palmer, 1977b, p. 198, 213, 255)54. The situation was not
different in the Reserves. In 1926, policies of development of the Reserves were introduced. But
these were far too modest to compensate for the discriminatory policies in favour of European
farmers or to generate an agricultural revolution in the Reserves55.
The role of industry
Several amendments followed after the 1930 Land Apportionment Act. The most important was the
1950 Land Apportionment Amendment Act. By then, the population pressure in the Reserves led
the government to reduce the NPAs to provide more Reserve land. These new lands, called Special
" The Commission also dismissed the evidence provided by Native Commissioners, and also falsely reported
the recommendations were acceptable to the Native Department (examples on Palmer (1977b, pg.119-120)).
This Commission also saw no reason to "disturb" the Shona by informing them of the expropriation being
planned.
"In the debate over the convenience of segregation of land ownership different groups supported the idea
for different reasons. European farmers' racial prejudice and fear of competition from African farmers led
them to embrace the idea. The Native Department saw it as the only politically feasible option to encourage
individual tenure for Africans. Something similar occurred with Missionaries and African Associations, who
noted "the fact that Africans were being prevented from buying land on the open market and a [feared] that
(as in South Africa) they would end up with very little land" (Palmer, 1977b, p. 141).
"The Act also set a deadline for the abolition for rent-paying agreements on European farms in 1937 (this
date was later amended). From then on, only labour agreements would be allowed and absentee landowners
would be forced to sell or develop their land. It also set aside some Unassigned Areas for allocation at a
later date.
"Similarly, Unassigned Areas set apart "totaled 17.793,300 acres, of which all but 2,300,000 acres were
later stated to be either infested with tsetse fly or deficient in water" (Floyd, 1959, p. 85)
"Palmer (1977a, p.218) notes that in 1936-7, the government voted £13,546 to be spent for African
agriculture and E262,956 for European agriculture. In 1940, the numbers were £14,107 compared to E208,127.
Also, regulation such as the 1934 Maize Control Amendment Act was set in place which discriminated against
African maize growers.
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Native Areas, "in reality they were simply additions to the Native Reserves. Sizable acreages were
also acquired from European land and reclassified as Special Native Areas" (Floyd, 1962, p. 579).
But perhaps more important than this was the adoption one year later of the Native Land
Husbandry Act (NLHA). The stated aims were to replace the traditional system of native land
tenure under chief control with a system of individual tenure under government control and to
promote "good" husbandry. At this point, the role of the industrial urban sector was already
playing an important role, as the official discourse reveals:
"Grave problems flow from crowded and stagnant communities scraping a bare existence
from the exhausted countryside, and spilling as an inefficient migrant labour force into
industrial centers many miles from their homes and families" (cited in Floyd (1959, p.
114)).
"The time has come when all indigenous natives can no longer continue to maintain a
dual existence as part-time employment in the European areas and part-time farming
in the Native reserves for, apart from its impossibility, it does not conduce to efficiency
in either area" (cited in Alexander (2006, pg.46)).
Thus emerged the NLHA, conferring individual rights in the Reserves to eligible farmers (essen-
tially, peasants who under tribal tenurial conditions were cultivating land or had land under crops
during the preceding growing season).
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